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Abstract 
Modern challenges in forensic and security domains require greater insight and flexibility 
into the ways deception can be identified and responded to. Deception is common across 
interactions and understanding how mindset, motive and context affects deception is 
critical. Research has focussed upon how deception manifests in interpersonal interactions 
and has sought to identify behaviours indicative of truth-telling and deceit. The growth of 
mediated communication has further increased challenges in ensuring information is 
credible. Deception in military environments has focussed on planning deception, where 
approaches have been developed to deceive others, but rarely examined from counter-
deception perspectives. To address these challenges this thesis advocates a holistic 
approach to deception detection, whereby strategies will be tailored to match context. In 
accordance with an in vivo approach to research, a critical review of literature related to 
deception and related areas was conducted leading to the initial development of a 
theoretical holistic model of deception detection comprising a deception framework and an 
individual differences (deceiver and target) framework. Following model development, 
validation with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) was conducted. Explanatory thematic 
analysis of interviews conducted with SMEs (n=19) led to the development of meta-themes 
related to the ‘deceiver’, their ‘intent; ‘strategies and tactics’ of deception, ‘interpretation’ 
by the target and ‘target’ decision-making strengths and vulnerabilities. These findings led 
to the development of the Holistic Model of Deception, an approach where detection 
strategies are tailored to match the context of an interaction, whether interpersonal or 
mediated. Understanding the impact of culture on decision-making in deception detection 
and in particular the cues used to detect deception in interpersonal and mediated 
environments is required for understanding human behaviour in a globalised world. 
Interviews were conducted with Western (n=22) and Eastern (n=16) participants before 
being subject to explanatory and comparative thematic analysis identified twelve cross-
cultural strategies for assessing credibility and one culturally specific strategy used by 
Western participants. Risk assessment and management techniques have been used to 
assess risks posed in forensic and security environments; however, such approaches have 
not been applied to deception detection. The Deception Assessment Real-Time Nexus
©2015 
and Deception Risk Assessment Technique
©2015
 were developed as an early warning tool 
and a Structured Professional Judgement risk assessment and management technique. The 
Deception Risk Assessment Technique
©2015
 outlines multiple ways of identifying and 
managing threats posed by deception and is employable across individuals and groups. In 
developing the futures-based approach to deception detection, reactive, active and 
proactive approaches to deception were reviewed, followed by an examination of scenario 
planning utility and methodology from futures and strategic forecasting research. Adopting 
the qualitative ‘intuitive logics’ methodology ten scenarios were developed of potential 
future threats involving deception. Risk assessment of two scenarios was conducted to 
show the value of a risk assessment approach to deception detection and management. In 
conclusion, this thesis has developed a Holistic Model of Deception, explored the links 
between interpersonal and mediated strategies for detecting deception, formulated a risk 
assessment and management approach to deception detection and developed future 
scenarios of threats involving deception. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred 
engagements” – Sun Tzu 
Introducing and Defining Deception: 
Psychological research into deception has seen a large growth over recent 
decades and in particular since the start of the Twenty-First Century where greater 
emphasis has been placed on identifying deception to mitigate threats across forensic 
and security environments. Much of this research has focussed upon deception in 
interpersonal interactions with research into deception in mediated environments 
relatively neglected considering the impact of technology in everyday behaviour. In 
contrast research into military deception has arisen from studying historical 
incidences of deception and has sought to identify the key strategies and tactics which 
were used to deceive the target. 
In order to study deception, deception must first be defined. In a common 
definition of deception taken from interpersonal deception research Vrij (2008, p. 15) 
defines deception as “a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without 
forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be 
untrue”.  This definition covers a wide range of deceptive behaviours occurring in 
interpersonal interactions, whether the deception is low or high-stakes and 
acknowledges that an act may only be considered deceptive if it is deliberate rather 
than accidental. One proposed definition of online deception is “the intentional 
control of information in a technologically mediated message to create a false belief 
in the receiver of the message” (Hancock, 2009).  Such a definition is readily 
applicable to mediated environments; however, the changing nature of 
communication may require a non-specific definition that can be applied across 
multiple domains. In defining deception related to the military, UK Joint Doctrine 
Publication 3-80.1 (JDP 3-80.1) defines deception as “deliberate measures that 
manipulate the perceptions and condition the behavior of an opponent, in order to 
achieve and exploit an advantage” (DCDC, 2007). JDP 3-80.1 states that the aim of 
the deception is not to deceive the adversary but to exploit the effect of deceiving the 
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adversary. However, this definition does not focus upon deception specifically and 
seems equally applicable to defining influence. 
The current research revises the Vrij (2008) definition to define deception as 
“a deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the 
communicator considers to be untrue, with the aim of influencing the receivers’ 
mindset (manner of thinking structured by their attitudes, personality and culture) 
and/or behaviour”. This definition is applicable across interpersonal and mediated 
communication, whether the communication is verbal, paralinguistic, non-verbal or 
physical, and emphasises that the aim of deception is to change the receiver’s 
behaviour through implanting or enabling the target to generate a false belief, 
ensuring applicability to online and military environments. 
In strategic, operational and tactical environments there is a need to accurately 
identify deception to reduce threats posed to the UK and allies. Traditional and 
current approaches to deception have focussed primarily on identifying and increasing 
the number of cues indicative of deceptive behaviour within an interpersonal context 
(Granhag, Vrij & Verschuere, 2015). New approaches to deception detection focus 
upon eliciting behavioural differences between truth-tellers and deceivers (Granhag et 
al., 2015); however, 100% accuracy rates remain elusive and such approaches neglect 
the surrounding context under which deception occurs. Deception cannot be avoided, 
indeed deception will occur whenever and wherever adversaries are seeking an 
advantage (Bell, 2003; Whaley, 1982) therefore deception should be anticipated as 
occurring across a range of environments and greater understanding of how deception 
emerges and is responded to in complex environments is required. The need to 
prevent and manage potential conflict is discussed by Flavin (2013) and such an 
approach may be applied to deception where threat from deception may be prevented 
through its detection by a variety of techniques. Potential deception may be further 
managed through monitoring or actively looking for further behaviour to confirm or 
refute adversary deception. 
Scientist-Practitioner Model: 
The scientist-practitioner model is founded on the premise that trained 
practitioners should be knowledgeable in both research and practice (Douglas, Cox & 
Webster, 1999; Jones & Mehr, 2007). Adapting this approach to forensic and security 
environments there is a strong requirement that research is shaped by practitioners’ 
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requirements, and that their practice is subsequently informed by research. There are 
three key assumptions of the scientist-practitioner model (Jones & Mehr, 2007). The 
first assumption is that practitioners with skills and knowledge related to research will 
be effective in their performance (Jones & Mehr, 2007). The second assumption is 
that research is key to the construction of a scientific database (Jones & Mehr, 2007). 
The final assumption is that direct involvement in practice by researchers will result 
in studies on important social issues (Jones & Mehr, 2007). Practitioners should use 
validated methods of assessment where such methods exist, if they do not then the 
practitioner should apply scientific principles to develop or improve the efficiency of 
methods to address challenging behaviour (Shapiro, 2002). The scientist-practitioner 
model was initially developed for the treatment of adults with mental health problems 
(Shapiro, 2002), but this model is readily transferrable to understanding challenging 
human behaviour across applied settings (Gozna & Prendergast, 2008) making it 
particularly useful for the application of psychological approaches to deception in 
military environments. 
Applying Social Science to Defence Science: 
The application of research into deception and its detection from social and 
behavioural sciences to defence science is required to increase understanding and 
capabilities in defence environments. Through adopting an in vivo holistic approach 
(Boon & Gozna, 2009) focussing on a wide-range of human behaviours and 
surrounding contexts, a greater theoretical and practical input may be made towards 
understanding the deception process in defence science. 
Psychological research has begun to generate further understanding of how 
deception is conducted (Henderson, 2007, Henderson et al., 2007; Henderson & Lee, 
2008) and how deception may be countered in military environments (Helman, 2007; 
Henderson & Pascual, 2008; Smith, Johnston & Paris, 2004). Whilst research in 
investigative interviewing has sought to aid human intelligence (HUMINT) 
interviewing in military environments to improve the quality of information generated 
and reduce reliance on controversial and ineffective interrogation tactics (Evans, 
Meissner, Brandon, Russano & Kleinman, 2010; Fallon, 2014). The current research 
applies psychological research to develop a model of deception applicable to 
interpersonal, online and military environments. 
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Overview: 
The thesis introduces the topic of deception and the challenges of detecting deception 
in a world where communication is interchangeable between in-real-life and online 
modes, across strategic environments. A theoretical model of deception is then 
presented to the reader, followed by its refinement and validation by Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs), the development of scenarios of potential future threats involving 
deception, and the development of a screening tool and risk assessment and risk 
management tool. 
 A review of the literature surrounding interpersonal deception (see Chapter 2) 
explores theories of deception; the strategies which individuals, whether truth-tellers 
or deceivers, use to appear credible to others; why individuals are argued to be poor at 
detecting deception due to the cues used to detect deception, decision-making biases 
and the countermeasures which individuals use; methods of detecting deception 
across verbal, and non-verbal behaviour, differential recall enhancement (DRE) 
approaches; the effect of personality and individual differences on deception; the 
impact of culture on deception; holistic approaches to deception; and the application 
of the CHAMELEON approach towards deception. 
 Online deception research had been relatively neglected over the past two 
decades considering the widespread usage of technology in everyday behaviour. A 
review of the literature on online deception (see Chapter 3) discusses forms of and 
motives for online deception; theories of online communication and impression 
formation and how these may differ from in-real-life; how deception may be detected 
online, including the effect of culture; and adversary behaviour online. 
 A review of the literature surrounding military deception (see Chapter 4) 
examines taxonomies of deception and the deception planning process; the 
importance of understanding the target of deception; historical examples of how 
deception has successfully been used; decision making biases effecting military 
deception detection; and detecting military deception.  
 Following the review of relevant literature a theoretical holistic model of 
deception was developed (see Chapter 5), this model was then validated and refined 
through interviews with SMEs (see Chapter 6) resulting in a holistic model of 
deception examining the deceiver, their intent, the tactics used to deceive others, how 
information is interpreted by the target, and key characteristics of the target. As global 
societies become increasingly connected in in-real-life and online interactions, there is 
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a growing need for understanding how individuals across cultures make credibility 
judgements and the processes involved in making such judgements (see Chapter 7). 
A new approach to deception and its mitigation is outlined, where deception is 
examined from a risk perspective (see Chapter 8). Such an approach is highly relevant 
for deception in strategic environments with multiple forms of deception occur. 
Through identifying adversary attempts at deception then steps may be taken to 
increase resilience against threat. To date deception detection has focussed upon 
simply identifying when deception is occurring in interactions and the development of 
techniques to aid this process. Such approaches have focussed upon the interaction 
outside of the surrounding context from which deception occurs. Future threats 
affecting UK interests may emerge from the increase in global uncertainty and a more 
proactive approach to deception detection is required to deal with such challenges (see 
Chapter 9). The implications of this thesis are discussed and recommendations made 
for further development of a risk assessment approach to deception (see Chapter 10). 
The aims of this thesis are: 
- To develop a Holistic Model of Deception, that will be applicable across 
interpersonal, online and military environments. 
- To explore cultural similarities and differences in how credibility is assessed 
in-real-life and online environments, and increase understanding in potential 
vulnerabilities in these strategies. 
- To develop a screening tool for deception that can be applied in strategic 
environments, and once a potential threat is detected will lead to a full-scale 
risk assessment of deception and the deployment of risk management 
strategies to counter any identified threats. 
- To develop a proactive approach to deception detection through designing risk 
management strategies that are applicable to future threat scenarios. 
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Chapter 2: Interpersonal Deception. 
Introduction: 
The field of interpersonal deception research examines behaviours across forensic and 
non-forensic environments. In summary, research to date has sought to examine the 
strategies individuals use that enables them to maintain credibility whilst deceiving, 
the ability of practitioners in detecting deceit, verbal, non-verbal, and physiological 
deception detection and more recently, holistic approaches to improve deception 
detection ability across a range of practitioner groups. 
In everyday life people automatically use small lies requiring little cognitive 
effort to create favourable impressions, avoid embarrassment and maintain social 
interactions (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Serious lies are usually associated with 
protecting an individual’s reputation and involve a greater cognitive effort (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 2004) and are relevant when considering the motivation 
of a range of individuals and groups who may hold malign intent or wish to 
manipulate the impression they present to a particular audience. To compound the 
difficulties of lie detection there are no identifiable verbal, non-verbal or 
paralinguistic behaviours that are direct signs of deceit (Ekman, 2001) although some 
behavioural leakage may suggest that a person is committing an act of deception. 
 One challenge has been the low levels of deception detection accuracy 
identified by numerous studies (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall & Andersson, 2004; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Kronkvist, 2006; 
Porter, Woodworth & Birt, 2000), with overall accuracy approximately 54% (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). However, artificial laboratory conditions in addition to populations 
which are largely university students cannot reflect the reality of detecting deception 
in high-stakes environments (Boon & Gozna, 2009; Park, Levine, McCornack, 
Morrison & Ferrara, 2002; Van Koppen, 2012). 
Theories of Deception  
Deception in interaction has been presented via two main theoretical 
approaches: firstly, Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal (1981) argued that liars are 
affected by arousal, emotions, cognitive load and they will attempt to control their 
behaviour; and secondly, Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT - Buller & Burgoon, 
1996) states that displays of emotion may not be so apparent in conversational 
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interactions where the deceiver and receiver adapt their behaviour according to 
conversational changes. For example, liars may increase their verbal and non-verbal 
involvement throughout conversation to appear more credible (Burgoon, Buller, 
White, Afifi & Buslig, 1999). Deceivers may respond to target suspicions and adapt 
their behaviour to appear more truthful, although this may prove more difficult in 
online environments (Burgoon, Buller & Floyd, 2001; Burgoon & Qin, 2006). 
Deceivers’ Strategies 
Impression management involves the regulation by deceivers and truth-tellers 
of verbal and non-verbal behaviour to create and communicate a favourable 
impression to others (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Doering, 2010).  Regardless of 
intent to deceive, individuals require such abilities to appear credible (DePaulo, 
1992). Individual differences will influence how we appear to others, for example, 
people who are more expressive and confident appear more favourable to others 
(DePaulo, 1992). Ultimately there is a high level of skill involved in presenting 
emotions that people are not really feeling (DePaulo, 1992). 
Deceivers and truth-tellers are assumed to engage in different cognitive 
processes to appear credible, manage and report events, and that deceptions are 
outright fabrications (Leins, Fisher & Ross, 2012). In interviews, liars need to provide 
enough detail to make their story sound plausible but avoid suspicion (Hines et al., 
2010). Liars are more likely than truth-tellers to have prepared strategies to appear 
honest in interviews (Hartwig et al., 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig & Granhag, 2006; 
Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 2010), whereas truth-tellers believe their innocence will 
be identified by ‘telling the story how it happened’ (Hartwig, Granhag & Strömwall, 
2007). Through keeping an account simple (Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig et al., 2010; 
Strömwall et al., 2006) liars supply fewer details than truth-tellers (Strömwall et al., 
2006), reducing anxiety and cognitive demand in recalling events and decreasing 
chances of contradicting or incriminating themselves (Dando & Bull, 2011; Hartwig 
et al., 2007; Hines et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 2010).   
Deception strategies identified in research examining mock suspects included 
keeping the statement detailed, consistent, avoiding lying, denying guilt, playing the 
role of innocent and pleasant and unrehearsed and no hesitation (Hartwig et al., 2007; 
Strömwall et al., 2006). When asking liars to use their own strategies in ‘recalling’ an 
event, Leins, Fisher and Ross (2012) found that liars reported a previously 
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experienced event, followed by reporting a plausible story, reporting what people 
normally do and employed various other strategies which are not specified by the 
authors. The events that participants described from past experience were events they 
did frequently, recently and were routine or typical (Leins, Fisher & Ross, 2012). 
Such deceptive strategies appear to focus on presenting a credible image to the target, 
which may be effective in deceiving those unaware of such strategies. Truthful 
strategies relate to keeping statements realistic, telling the truth like it happened, 
firmly denying guilt, being cooperative, being spontaneous and coping with the 
uncertainty of the questions posed (Hartwig et al., 2007; Strömwall et al., 2006). 
Nonverbal impression management strategies for liars and truth-tellers (Strömwall et 
al., 2006) relate to reducing movement (Hartwig et al., 2007), maintaining eye contact 
(Hines et al., 2010), appearing calm and relaxed (Hartwig et al., 2007; Hines et al., 
2010) and controlling vocal behaviour. However, real-life suspects have different 
motives and contexts for their actions and may use different strategies based upon 
different experiences and knowledge of the justice system and such strategies will 
change in mediated environments.  
Experienced offenders may use different strategies to non-offenders in 
interviews to appear credible, including general verbal strategies, general nonverbal 
strategies and specific interview strategies (Strömwall & Willén, 2011). Principle 
strategies include staying close to the truth, information management and having no 
strategy. However offenders differ in their deception planning highlighting a 
distinction between the opportunities for careful planning versus a need to appear 
natural and spontaneous without having to risk forgetting a lie (Strömwall & Willén, 
2011). Furthermore, some offenders chose not to disclose information to force the 
interviewer to divulge evidence thereby assisting the offender’s realistic narrative.  
This suggests that real-world suspects may use strategies learned from previous 
encounters with the justice system emphasising the need for real-world research. 
Why people are bad at detecting lies 
There are ‘wizards’ of deception detection who are experts at detecting deceit 
across different situations and behaviours with approximately 80-90% accuracy 
(O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004); however deception detection accuracy for the majority 
of people, including professionals, is mainly poor at approximately 54% accuracy 
(Anderson, DePaulo & Ansfield, 2002; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, 
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Strömwall & Vrij, 2004). Bond and DePaulo (2006) claim that deception detection 
studies with accuracy rates higher than 70% may actually be subject to natural 
variance. However, the majority of studies examining deception detection have used 
artificial paradigms that do not reflect real-world interactions and strategies used to 
detect deception, thus behavioural cues to deception related to high-stakes 
environments may not be aroused (Helman, 2007), potentially distorting actual ability 
to detect deception creating an apparent level of chance. Deception research generally 
fails to consider lies that remain undetected – resulting in an overgeneralisation of 
those cues that are identified as indicative (Colwell, Miller, Miller & Lyons, 2006; 
Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Andersson, 2004). Furthermore, it may be hard to 
accurately assess veracity due to the complex nature of deception, lack of distinctions 
between overt truths and overt deceptions (Bond & Speller, 2009) and cognitive and 
heuristic biases in decision-making (DCDC, 2007; Henderson et al., 2007). 
Cues to Deception 
Many cues assumed to be indicative of deception are often not or there are 
only weak links between behaviour and cues (Anderson et al., 2002; Colwell et al., 
2006; Davis & Markus, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Helman, 2007) and these may 
be hard to accurately distinguish in real time (Helman, 2007). Genuine cues to 
deception are few whilst perceived cues to deception are identified and generalised to 
deceptive behaviours even when irrelevant (DePaulo & Morris, 2004).  Further, 
perceived audio/visual cues are more confidently assessed even when incorrect (Davis 
& Markus, 2006). 
The accuracy of lie detection appears to be based upon the predictability of a 
person’s actual and perceived deceptiveness gained from behavioural cues and 
matches of cue-based predictions of actual and apparent deception (Hartwig & Bond, 
2011).  The authors identified a strong correlation between perceived cues to 
deception and actual cues to deception, suggesting that, in contrast to previous 
research, people rely on the right cues. Rather there is a general lack of valid 
behavioural cues to deception. However, this meta-analysis was conducted primarily 
on low-stakes laboratory research where high-stakes deception cues may not be 
elicited and these findings may not reflect strategies that people really use to detect 
deception (Park et al., 2002). 
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Decision-Making Biases 
Decision-making biases affect our ability to accurately assess veracity. Truth 
biases can result in suspicious beliefs not being acted upon (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2000) and misattribution of received information (O’Sullivan, 
2003) and conversely lie biases can result in negative confirmation bias (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2000; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Andersson, 2004). Further 
demeanour biases also affect credibility judgements (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hurst & 
Oswald, 2011; Masip, Garrido & Herrero, 2004). In forensic and military domains 
there is a heightened awareness of deception to counter risk suggesting potential for 
biases. 
Intuition can impede accurate decision making (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008b; 
Porter, England, Juodis, ten Brinke & Wilson, 2008) however this will depend largely 
on the skill of the person identifying deceit.  Dangerous Decisions Theory (DDT; 
Porter & ten Brinke, 2009) proposes that judgements of trustworthiness occur almost 
instantaneously when we view a new face (ten Brinke & Porter, 2011b; Willis & 
Todorov, 2006), and this is subjectively experienced as intuition, although these 
judgements may be incorrect. Short interactions may not enable the establishment of 
baseline behaviour to judge deception and result in intuition effecting judgements (ten 
Brinke & Porter, 2011b). Intuition in judgements may have developed from strategies 
assessing danger and ‘fight or flight’ responses (Cannon, 1915). This creates 
challenges for making judgements of credibility and requires further evidence to be 
gathered to effectively gauge an individual’s behaviour on first exposure. 
Motivation for detecting deceit affects the accuracy of veracity judgements 
with motivated individuals performing poorly compared to less motivated 
counterparts (Porter, McCabe, Woodworth & Peace, 2007). This appears to be the 
result of high motivation leading to reliance on stereotypical nonverbal rather than 
actual verbal cues to deception, although this may be overcome through providing 
feedback on genuine cues to deception (Porter et al., 2007).  
 
Methods of detecting deception 
In principle there are three different ways to measure if someone is lying: their 
verbal behaviour; their non-verbal and paralinguistic behaviour; and their 
physiological behaviour (Granhag et al., 2015). For the purpose of the present 
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research, only that which is relevant to interpersonal and online interactions is 
considered and discussed. 
 
Verbal Deception Detection  
Verbal deception detection can apply to a range of interactions, whether 
interpersonal or online, thus techniques may be transferrable to military contexts. 
Techniques include Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), Reality Monitoring (RM), 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), and more recent approaches focussing 
on plausibility and detail of narrative. 
SVA is used to assess the veracity of statements and focuses on behaviours 
that truth-tellers are more likely to perform than deceivers (Rassin, 2000). SVA 
involves a review of relevant information, a semi-structured interview, CBCA and a 
Validity Checklist which assesses the validity of the CBCA findings (Akehurst, 
Manton & Quandte, 2011; Brown, 2010; Vrij, 2008 - See Appendix 2.1 for an 
overview of CBCA criteria). Akehurst et al. (2011) found that in truthful accounts 
CBCA criteria most often seen were: admitting a lack of memory, unstructured 
production and contextual embedding. Level of support for CBCA criteria varies, for 
example, unstructured production, contextual embedding, quantity of details, and 
reproduction of conversation appear in more than half of studies involving CBCA 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). Limitations to SVA include: scoring, reliability of 
criteria, establishment of ground truth, effects of interview style on inclusion of 
CBCA criteria, lack of a standardized training program (Akehurst et al., 2011; Brown, 
2010; Vrij, 2005), vulnerability to countermeasures (Vrij, 2005; Vrij, Kneller & 
Mann, 2000), an awareness of individual differences and personality, and allegations 
that misidentify the perpetrator or mix deception and truth are harder to identify (Vrij, 
2005). 
RM proposes that recollections of real experiences are developed from 
perceptual processes and are more likely to have aspects of perceptual, contextual and 
affective information, whilst recollections of false experiences developed from our 
imagination will be cognitive in nature and focus on our thoughts and reasoning 
enabling a distinction between truthful and deceptive accounts (Bond & Lee, 2005; 
Masip, Sporer, Garrido & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008 - See Appendix 2.2 
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for an overview of RM criteria). RM has shown similar levels of deception detection 
accuracy to SVA, however, it also has similar limitations and may be vulnerable to 
countermeasures, age and personality traits (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman & Fede, 
2013). Colwell et al. (2013) argue that differences between truthful and deceptive 
accounts are due to interviewing techniques rather than RM theory and differences 
between real and imagined events may dissipate over time (Johnson, Foley, Suengas 
& Raye, 1988).  This has relevance for the investigation of crimes that become ‘cold 
case reviews’ where historical evidence is relied upon and relevant suspects and 
witnesses are interviewed years following an event. 
LIWC (Pennebaker, Booth & Francis, 2007) is a technique for analysing 
conversations in order to understand people’s underlying thoughts, motives and 
emotions (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry & Richards, 2003). LIWC categorises words 
into dimensions of standard language, psychological processes, principles of 
relativity, and personal concerns (Bond & Lee, 2005).  In deceptive statements 
elements that enable differentiation from truth are a reduction in self-reference, 
references to others, number of exclusive words, an increase in motion words and 
negative emotion words (Bond & Lee, 2005). However there is a requirement for 
further work into the validity and reliability of LIWC to ensure that it is an effective 
method for detecting deception in on and offline verbal content. 
Non-Verbal Deception Detection  
Non-verbal deception detection methods focus on a consideration of facial 
expressions, micro-expressions (Ekman, 2001), and arm, hand and finger movements 
(DePaulo et al., 2003); however, non-verbal cues are potentially rare and do not 
guarantee deception. Instead confirmation is required that cues are related to deceit 
rather than other cognitive and emotional processes. 
Micro-expressions are facial expressions that are considered to appear for less 
than a quarter of a second and expose our true emotions (Ekman, 2001). A micro-
expression may suggest that a person is manipulating their behaviour and may be 
deceiving. Detecting these expressions will be challenging in operational 
environments, for example, train stations, where expressions may be explained by a 
number of reasons and practitioners may have difficulty in accurately detecting these 
expressions (McGuffog, Green & Crombie, 2004). Porter and ten Brinke (2010) 
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report variations in the occurrence of facial expressions, with some expressions 
appearing in the upper or lower face, some emotions easier to fake than others, micro-
expressions showing for longer than anticipated, occurring more in high intensity 
emotional displays, appearing in truthful and deceptive accounts and less frequent 
than anticipated (Porter, Korva & Baker, 2011; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; Porter, ten 
Brinke & Wallace, 2012; ten Brinke, MacDonald, Porter & O’Connor, 2011; ten 
Brinke & Porter, 2011a). It is likely that individual differences will occur in the ways 
such expressions manifest across people and there may be numerous mitigating 
factors explaining a facial expression (Porter et al., 2012).  
Increased cognitive load may lead to a reduction in illustrators (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Frank, 2007; ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a), which may make deceivers appear 
tense (DePaulo et al., 2003) whilst truth-tellers will increase their illustrators to 
emphasise their verbal content (Navarro, 2003) although a reduction in bodily 
movement to counter stereotypes regarding liar’s nervous fidgeting enhances 
credibility (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). It is unclear whether non-student groups 
exhibit greater or fewer illustrator cues to deception (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). 
Offenders may increase self-manipulators during fabricated stories suggesting that 
deceivers’ usage of these behaviours is context dependent or a strategy to distract 
receivers from verbal content (Porter et al., 2008). It is important to understand the 
baseline of normal behaviour before we can make judgements about deception based 
upon changes in non-verbal behaviour.  
Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) Approaches 
DRE (Colwell et al., 2013) approaches focus on maximising behavioural 
differences between liars’ and truth-tellers through the use of cognitive mnemonics, 
questioning strategy and use of evidence, for example, ACID (e.g. Colwell et al., 
2013), SUE (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2006), and cognitive approaches (e.g. Vrij, Mann, 
Leal & Fisher, 2010). DRE helps truth-tellers to remember and provide more detailed 
and verbose statements whilst deceivers work harder to maintain credibility and over 
rely on short, carefully constructed narratives (Colwell et al., 2013). The mnemonic 
section of investigative interviewing increases deception detection accuracy by 10 to 
27 % (Colwell et al., 2013), although it may be limited in application to online and 
military environments, whilst requiring evidence to challenge suspects’ narrative. 
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The cognitive load approach seeks to increase behavioural differences 
between liars and truth-tellers through asking cognitively demanding and 
unanticipated questions to circumvent deceivers’ preparations (Granhag & Vrij, 2010; 
Vrij et al., 2009; Vrij, Granhag et al., 2011a). Cognitively demanding questions have 
focussed on reverse order recall (Vrij, Leal, Mann & Fisher, 2011; Vrij, Mann, Fisher, 
Leal, Milne & Bull, 2008) and maintenance of eye contact (Vrij, Mann, Leal & 
Fisher, 2010). Unanticipated questions have focussed on sketch drawing (Leins, 
Fisher & Vrij, 2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal & Mann, 2011; Vrij, Leal, Mann, 
Warmelink et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2009), spatial questions, temporal questions and 
planning (Vrij, 2015b) and the Devil’s Advocate approach (Leal, Vrij, Mann & 
Fisher, 2010) to enhance behavioural differences between truth-tellers and liars. 
However, automatic assignation of participants to lying and truth-telling conditions 
and provision of alibis for deceivers may reduce motive and context for their actions. 
As these techniques affect both verbal and non-verbal behaviours it suggests that they 
can be applied to examining multiple-cues to deception, although validation in applied 
settings is required. Exploring how countermeasures may affect these approaches is 
also required. For example deceivers put forward convincing false beliefs and this 
may be hard to detect, as seen by the history of ‘green’ on ‘blue’ attacks in 
Afghanistan (DeAnda, 2012) and testimony related to the July 7
th
 bomber who was 
able to appear ‘normal’ to a school friend days before the attack (Boon, 2012). 
The SUE approach attempts to counter suspects’ strategies by allowing 
suspects a period of free recall before challenging them with varying strengths of 
evidence which may highlight inconsistencies in suspects’ accounts (Hartwig et al., 
2011; Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig et al., 2006). Stepwise revelation of evidence 
requires liars to adapt their narrative to incoming evidence sacrificing within-
statement consistency to maintain statement-evidence consistency, revealing cues to 
deception (Granhag, Strömwall, Willén & Hartwig, 2012). In real-world interviews 
suspects may use strategies based upon knowledge of the criminal justice system, 
suggesting that SUE requires further validation in applied settings to ensure viability. 
Tactical interviewing of suspects (Dando & Bull, 2011) builds on the SUE 
approach by examining which strategy of information disclosure during an interview 
is most effective in increasing behavioural differences between liars and truth-tellers 
(early, tactically or late). Dando and Bull (2011) found that tactical interviewing 
enables interviewers to more accurately make veracity assessments and interviewees 
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found the tactical interview more cognitively demanding than control and strategic 
interviews, whist disrupting deceiver’s narratives (Dando & Bull, 2011). However, 
this approach has similar criticisms to that of SUE and may have limited applicability 
to online and military domains. 
The ACID approach analyses the admittance of potential errors, the length of 
responses and RM criteria associated with differences due to memory, impression 
management, and unique contextual and internal/external details as they appear 
during a US police investigative interview (Colwell, 2007; Colwell et al., 2013). The 
Reality Interview (RI) emphasises increasing the interviewee’s cognitive load to elicit 
cues to deception and challenging impression management strategies (Colwell, 2007; 
Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor & Prewett, 2007). The ACID approach 
has been shown to accurately classify 86.8% of statements (78.9% truthful and 94.7% 
deceptive) (Colwell, 2007; Colwell, Hiscock & Memon, 2002). The credibility 
assessment aspect of ACID found that deceptive statements are shorter, less detailed 
and had fewer details in response to the mnemonic parts of RI, whilst honest 
statements were longer, more detailed, contained more affective details and had more 
details in response to the mnemonic parts of RI, and honest reporters were also more 
likely to admit possible error (Ansarra et al., 2011; Colwell, 2007; Colwell et al., 
2007). The type-token ration (TTR) is the ratio of unique words in a statement to the 
total number of words in a statement, with the premise that liars use more unique 
words to enhance their credibility, whilst truth-tellers have fewer (Morgan, Colwell & 
Hazlett, 2011; Suckle-Nelson et al., 2010). Colwell et al. (2013) state that ACID will 
not work when questioning people about their attitudes, future intentions, what a 
person may be hiding, and when the respondent actually believes or is mistaken in 
what they are saying. One limitation is that the research engaged in so far has been 
laboratory based (Colwell et al., 2013), suggesting that ACID needs to be validated in 
applied settings. 
 
Personality and Individual Differences and Deception 
The acceptance and likelihood of engaging in forms of deception may be 
based on exclusive or multiple personality traits (McLeod & Genereux, 2008). In a 
holistic approach to deception there is a need for understanding personality traits and 
disorders and individual differences as these affect how people lie, the situations they 
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lie in, and motives for lying (Gozna, Vrij & Bull, 2001) and how people detect 
deception. 
Social skills impact on deception with socially skilled people more expressive 
verbally and non-verbally in their truth-telling and lying, more involved non-verbally 
regardless of whether they are lying or telling the truth (Burgoon et al., 1999) and are 
faster in their response time to open-ended questions than less socially skilled liars but 
are still slower than truth-tellers (Walczyk et al., 2005). Liars with greater skills in 
encoding their behaviour are able to maintain a greater control over their behaviour 
when they are lying, and they are able to adjust their conversational involvement to 
mimic their interactional partner (Burgoon et al., 1999).  
There are disorders related to deception, pathological lying and instrumental 
gain that need to be considered by practitioners as potential explanations for suspects’ 
motives and behaviour (Taylor & Gozna, 2011). Psychopathy (Cleckley, 1982: Hare, 
1970), Narcissism (Raskin & Hall, 1979) and Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 
1970) are three personality constructs that form what has been termed The Dark Triad 
(Paulhus & Williams, 2002). When interacting with psychopaths it is important to 
realise that underneath their charm they may be deceiving you (Taylor & Gozna, 
2011). Although psychopaths may be identified by thin-slices of behaviour (Fowler, 
Lilienfeld & Patrick, 2009), in interpersonal interactions they employ 
countermeasures to circumvent these initial impressions (ten Brinke & Porter, 2011). 
Those individuals suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD - Raskin & 
Hall, 1979) are more likely to lie and exaggerate their status and importance as they 
are obsessed with a fantasy that they are trying to create in reality (Taylor & Gozna, 
2011). Manipulativeness and Machiavellianism are associated with more frequent acts 
of deception often committed for self-gain (Kashy & DePaulo, 2008; McLeod & 
Genereux, 2010). In everyday and high-stakes deception environments, such 
personality traits are further associated with little guilt and mental effort (Gozna et al., 
2001). Conduct disorders involve physical aggression towards people and animals, 
destruction of property, and serious violations of rules and people diagnosed with 
conduct disorders are more likely to engage in deceptive practices (Taylor & Gozna, 
2011). People with borderline personality disorder (BPD) may potentially manipulate 
others around them (Navarro, 2011b), whilst people with histrionic personality 
disorder (HPD) will lie to further their aims and their recollections are often biased by 
their own representations of reality (Navarro, 2011c), therefore, there is a need to 
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understand personality and challenging behaviour to ensure a robust response to 
deception. 
There are individual differences in deception detection abilities (Aamodt & 
Custer, 2006; Baker, ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Porter, Campbell, Stapleton & Birt, 
2002; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). Teachers, social workers, secret service agents, 
psychologists and judges are deemed better at detecting deception than students; 
however this requires confirmation in applied settings (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). 
People high in emotional intelligence have been found to be more accurate in 
detecting deception than those who are not suggesting that they are less susceptible to 
deceiver’s impression management strategies (Baker et al., 2012). More socially 
anxious and shy participants are less confident in their ability to detect deception than 
extraverted people (Vrij & Baxter, 1999) although there is no link between the Big 
Five personality traits in judges and the ability to accurately detect deception (Porter 
et al., 2002). 
 
Culture and Deception 
The impact of cultural differences on ability to deceive and to detect deception 
is critical in the globalised world. Deception is an evolutionary trait found in varying 
forms in every culture in the world (Bond & Rao, 2004). Different cultures have 
different beliefs regarding deception; for example, amongst Arabic people deception 
is acceptable if an individual is seeking societal approval (Al-Simadi, 2000). When 
people are communicating in different languages their ability to detect deception will 
be affected by language and it is hard to analyse whether this will benefit the deceiver 
or the target (Bond & Rao, 2004; Cheng & Broadhurst, 2005). 
Beliefs about and incidences of deception may have similarities and 
differences across cultures (Bond & Rao, 2004). For example, the belief that liars are 
more likely to avoid eye contact is reported globally (Global Deception Research 
Team, 2006). Individuals across cultures believe that liars are more likely to: make 
speech errors, including pauses and stuttering; show signs of nervousness; show signs 
of inconsistency in their verbalisations, verbal-non-verbal inconsistencies, and 
statement-evidence inconsistencies (Bond & Rao, 2004). Highlighting, that across 
different cultures people have both correct and incorrect beliefs about how to detect 
deception. Group membership and situational influences were not mentioned as cues 
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to deception (Bond & Rao, 2004), however these are part of the context under which 
acts of deception can arise. 
Cognitive load approaches to deception detection have also sought to detect 
deception in those from other nations and cultures (Colwell et al., 2013; Hazlett & 
Morgan, 2009; Morgan, Mishara, Christian & Hazlett, 2008; Morgan, Rabinowitz, 
Kallivrousis & Hazlett, 2010). ACID has been found to detect deception in Arabic, 
Spanish and English from a range of cultures and has found similar impression 
management strategies in English and Chinese speakers (Colwell et al., 2013). 
Morgan et al. (2008) found that truthful and deceptive Arabic speakers could be 
successfully identified through focussing on unique word count and response length 
in automated analysis of translated statements. Forced-choice questioning has also led 
to accurate identification of truthful and deceptive Russian and Vietnamese speakers 
(Hazlett & Morgan, 2009; Morgan et al., 2010). The success of cognitive approaches 
to deception detection in individuals from other cultures suggests that DRE 
techniques examine a basic level of human memory and cognition (Colwell et al., 
2013). 
 
Holistic Approaches: 
Previous approaches to deception detection are limited as they have focussed 
on weak and isolated cues to verbal, non-verbal and paralinguistic behaviours that 
may indicate deception but may also indicate other forms of emotional and cognitive 
arousal. Furthermore, research has focussed largely on the act of deception in 
experimental conditions and has neglected real-world motives and contexts (Van 
Koppen, 2012), background personality and individual differences (Boon & Gozna, 
2009), and the impact of culture. People are potentially not good at detecting lies in 
experimental situations (Park et al., 2002) and genuine cues to deception in 
experimental situations are weak (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). In seeking to detect 
deception it may be more beneficial to examine clusters of cues to deception 
alongside a comparison of such behaviours to baseline behaviours and incongruities 
between verbal and nonverbal behaviours to ensure that a more holistic view of 
veracity is produced (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Ekman, 2001, p. 147; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; Vrij, 2008).  
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Multiple-cue approaches to detecting deception have combined verbal, non-
verbal and paralinguistic cues to more accurately assess deception in high-stakes 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a) and low-stakes (Vrij, 
Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 2004a; Vrij, Edwards, Roberts & Bull, 2000) 
environments. High-stakes lies should be easier to discern than low-stakes through 
their greater effect on an individual’s psyche and cognitive process (Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2010). However, accurate veracity assessment in forensic contexts are often 
limited and individuals like psychopaths are almost 2.5 times more likely to be 
granted parole than other offenders due to their ability to deceive and influence others 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). Ten Brinke & Porter (2011a) found that through 
combining verbal, non-verbal, and facial expression cues, 92.3% of genuine and 
88.5% of high-stakes deceptive pleaders could be accurately identified. Whilst 
combining CBCA, RM and non-verbal cues to deception has enabled lie-truth 
discrimination of 80-90% accuracy in low-stakes environments (Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij, 
Akehurst et al., 2004a). In examining the reliability of rapid judgements of veracity 
based upon verbal and nonverbal behaviours, Vrij, Evans, Akehurst & Mann (2004) 
found that the observer’s overall accuracy rate was 74%, and that quantity of details 
was the strongest predictor of veracity in rapid judgements, however, reproduction of 
conversation, visual details, and cognitive operations were also predictors of veracity. 
Using multiple cues to detect deception has been examined across both high and low-
stakes environments suggesting that this technique should be incorporated into a 
holistic approach. Although these findings may be context specific and base-rates of 
behaviour may vary across individuals, suggesting that research into this area needs to 
incorporate these factors in credibility assessment. 
When seeking to detect deception or even to deceive others there are a wide 
range of factors that need to be incorporated to understand how deception can be 
interpreted and identified (Kaina, Ceruti, Liu, McGirr & Law, 2011). In detecting 
adversary deception there is a need for understanding background history, culture, 
personality, cognition, surrounding environment and organisational and operational 
factors (Helman, 2007; Kaina et al., 2011), although further research is needed to 
more intricately explore the effect that these factors have on deception. Furthermore, 
as veracity assessment may be adversely effected in cognitively challenging and 
group decision-making environments (Kaina et al., 2011) decision-support tools are 
required to enhance deception detection. 
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The CHAMELEON Approach 
The CHAMELEON Approach to Interviewing (CAI - Boon & Gozna, 2009; 
Gozna & Boon, 2010; Taylor & Gozna, 2011 – See Appendix 2.3) is a personality led 
investigative interview approach that takes into account a far wider breadth of 
information than traditional investigative interview approaches. In dealing with 
individuals it is acknowledged that every offender/suspect has the potential to be 
different from each other, to be different at different times, to behave differently with 
different people, to behave differently across different actions committed, to behave 
differently across different interviews, and to be different within each interview (Boon 
& Gozna, 2009; Gozna & Boon, 2010). Each Chameleon Offender (CO) will have 
different backgrounds, life experiences, attitudes, beliefs, offences and modus 
operandi (MO); each CO has the potential to vary in their cognitive ability, their 
affect and their cooperativeness at different times; each CO will behave differently 
with different interactional partners due to personal dynamics including, age, gender 
and socio-economic status and previous experience with people and their objectives; 
each CO will be different in their offences as not all victims respond in the same way, 
and circumstances including location, opportunity and interruptions will be different; 
each CO will be different within and across interviews due to how penetrative and 
subtle questions are, and the degree of incriminations as the interview progresses. 
When dealing with COs it is important to let them speak fully and not leap onto small 
mistakes, the longer an offender is left unchallenged for, the more likely they will 
overestimate their own cognitive ability and make mistakes (Taylor & Gozna, 2011). 
Work by Gozna and Boon has identified seven distinct chameleons (See Appendix 2.4 
for an overview of the CHAMELEONS). The principles behind the CAI can be 
integrated into a holistic approach to deception through providing an awareness of the 
strategies that people use in attempting to appear credible and influence 
conversational partners, and this will be applicable to both interpersonal and online 
environments.  
 
Conclusion 
Past research has focussed on seeking out weak and isolated verbal and non-
verbal behavioural cues to deception with more current approaches seeking to 
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increase behavioural differences between liars and truth-tellers through cognitive load 
and strategic questioning (Vrij & Granhag, 2012a), and others have begun to utilise 
multiple cues to deception to produce a more accurate assessment of veracity whilst 
re-examining assumptions regarding deception (e.g. Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). DRE 
approaches suggest that through increasing behavioural differences between liars and 
truth-tellers more cues to deception will be uncovered (Colwell et al., 2013), at first 
appearance these approaches seem to be effective in assessing veracity, however, 
much of this research has been conducted in laboratory environments using low-
stakes paradigms where undergraduate participants have been automatically assigned 
to truth-telling or lying conditions suggesting that individuals lack motive and context 
for their actions. Further research validating these approaches in real-life high-stakes 
environments is required to ensure ecological validity.  
 Multiple cue and holistic approaches to deception may produce a more 
accurate understanding of deception and the context in which it occurs. These 
approaches can be further developed with the incorporation of the CAI (Boon & 
Gozna, 2009; Gozna, 2011; Gozna & Boon, 2007, 2010) and examining clusters of 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour within the wider context that individuals have 
different motives for different behaviours, across different situations, with different 
people, that different personality traits and disorders, and different cultures and 
religions may also effect whether a person may be lying or telling the truth and how 
easy it is to assess veracity. Furthermore, a holistic approach to deception needs to 
incorporate an understanding of the potential communication channels across which 
deception may occur (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). In conclusion, a new approach to 
deception is needed that incorporates a far wider range of factors and elements than 
current approaches incorporate, alongside a greater understanding of the requirements 
that are needed and the challenges that occur in accurately assessing veracity in high-
stakes environments. 
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Chapter 3: Online Deception and Influence 
Introduction: 
In the online world there are threats from deception whether through 
interpersonal interaction via computer-mediated communication (CMC), social 
engineering techniques (Lewis & George, 2008) or adversary attempts at influence 
(Cornish, 2008; Thomas, 2003). Increasing growth in the Internet, social media and 
communication technologies has led to an increase in deception in individuals’ and 
groups’ online interactions (Zhou & Zhang, 2006), with vulnerability potentially 
reflecting online usage (Vishwanath, 2015) and engagement with features alongside 
incorrect strategies for assessing credibility (Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang & Rao, 
2011). Deception in mediated environments, particularly text-messaging, is 
considered as an everyday behaviour where some individuals are argued to be more 
prolific in their deception than others (Smith, Hancock, Reynolds & Birnholtz, 2014). 
Although individuals may prefer to deceive in some face-to-face contexts (George & 
Carlson, 2010; Whitty, Buchanan, Joinson & Meredith, 2012), it is still important to 
understand how deception occurs in online environments as deception may increase 
when communicating online (Zimbler & Feldman, 2011). 
Past research into deception detection suggests that people detect deception at 
chance levels (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), which presents challenges in cyberspace 
where increased anonymity challenges veracity assessment across interactions, 
statements, and identities (Cornish, 2008; Grazioli, 2004; Hancock, 2009). Deception 
detection accuracy in online environments is debated with some researchers arguing 
that there is no difference in detection accuracy between face-to-face and CMC 
interactions (Hancock, Woodworth & Goorha, 2010) and others arguing that mediated 
environments increase detection accuracy compared to face-to-face (Dunbar et al., 
2013; Van Swol, Braun & Kolb, 2013). It may be that differences in findings are 
attributable to context and strategies used to detect deception, for example, deception 
is argued to be harder to detect in high-complexity situations, potentially due to an 
increase in cognitive load and reduction in situational awareness (Giordano & George, 
2013). In online deception detection there may be potential difficulties due to limited 
applicability of traditional detection methods. However, some approaches may still be 
useful depending on context, for example, verbal methods may be applied to 
synchronous and asynchronous CMC; and non-verbal and verbal deception detection 
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methodologies may still be useful in analysing audiovisual content (Vrij & Mann, 
2004). The current chapter builds upon Chapter 2 through expanding the examination 
of deception outside of interpersonal, offline interactions towards how deception 
manifests in online environments. 
 
Forms of online deception: 
In cyberspace there are a wide range of possible deceptions and a wide range 
of communication channels in which deception can occur. People use multiple levels 
of cyberspace for communication from synchronous or asynchronous CMC on 
messaging platforms, to video sharing, blogs, forums, chat-rooms, bulletin boards, 
and more recent forms of social networking (Cornish, Hughes & Livingstone, 2009). 
Deception may be identity-based where individuals manipulate aspects of themselves 
or message-based where the content of the message is manipulative or they may be 
combinations of both.  
The most vulnerable aspect of a system to deception is individuals susceptible 
to influence as this bypasses computer security systems (Henderson et al., 2007; 
Thomas, 2008). There are several forms of social engineering used across both on and 
offline environments: pretexting, phishing; phone phishing, Trojan horses, road apple, 
quid pro quo (Thomas, 2008), page-jacking (Grazioli, 2004), piggybacking (or 
tailgating), impersonation, shoulder surfing, and dumpster diving (Henderson et al., 
2007). Terrorist groups also create false charity groups to attract financing through 
deception (Jacobson, 2010; Thomas, 2003). Social engineers are argued to employ 
multiple influence tactics to gain advantage (Henderson et al., 2007 – See Appendix 
3.1). Influencing targets to reduce their levels of risk resilience in online environments 
enables deceivers to more easily exploit targets for gain (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000). 
All of these deceptions involve judging whether information is truthful or deceptive 
and all have consequences related to judgement accuracy. There may be limitations to 
traditional forms of deception detection in mediated environments and a more holistic 
approach to deception detection is required to understand the behavioural context 
from which deception occurs. 
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Motives for online deception: 
Motives for online deception vary according to people’s needs and aspirations 
(Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Lu, 2008; Utz, 2005). Motives for online deception include 
self-serving and other-oriented lies (Whitty & Carville, 2008), concerns about privacy 
and safety (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Utz, 2005; Whitty, 2002), idealised self-
presentation (Utz, 2005), play (Joinson & Dietz-Uhler, 2002; Utz, 2005), avoiding 
unwanted social interaction (Hancock et al., 2009; Reynolds, Smith, Birnholtz & 
Hancock, 2013) and harmful intent, including financial gain (Buchanan & Whitty, 
2013; Utz, 2005). Frequent Internet users may deceive more than infrequent users 
potentially due to enhanced understanding of technology reducing mistakes indicating 
deceit (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006). Individuals may also prefer to deceive others through 
an avatar as this may reduce anxiety felt during text-based deception activities 
(Galanxhi & Nah, 2007). Although this may only be affective if the avatar is not 
reflective of their real-world identity (Hooi & Cho, 2012). There may be more high-
stakes motives for online deception related to adversary aims which current research 
has not fully explored.  
 
Online Communication Strategies: 
To understand online deception an understanding of how communication is 
conducted online is required. Detecting deception relies upon identifying cues from an 
individual’s behaviour, in CMC two characteristics that may influence the ability of 
the target to interpret these cues are media synchronicity and media richness (Carlson 
& George, 2004). Deception in CMC can be asynchronous or synchronous (Zhou & 
Zhang, 2006): Asynchronous CMC allows people to communicate at different times 
enabling rehearsability where people have time to plan and edit what they mean to say 
whilst reprocessability enables individuals to review previous messages aiding the 
process of constructing deception (Carlson & George, 2004; Zhou & Zhang, 2006). 
Ambiguities created in asynchronous communication can be further exploited to 
enhance plausibility and consistency of deception (Birnholtz, Guillory, Hancock & 
Bazarova, 2010). Rehearsability and reprocessability can also be used in face-to-face 
(f2f) interactions although it may be more difficult to perform these tasks under time 
constraints (Carlson & George, 2004).  
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In interactions synchronous CMC is more involving than asynchronous CMC 
and has greater perceived similarity, mutuality, higher identification and interaction 
coordination, greater cognitive, emotional and behavioural involvement, increased 
group feeling and identification than asynchronous CMC (Burgoon, Chen & 
Twitchell, 2010). Such increases in deceiver’s cognitive load may enable 
identification of deception (Zhou & Zhang, 2006). Greater conversational 
coordination leads to greater interpersonal interaction (Burgoon et al., 2010). 
Deceivers may be just as effective as truth-tellers in achieving conversational 
interactivity in both synchronous and asynchronous CMC and may appear more 
sociable, dominant and composed when lying compared to telling the truth (Burgoon 
et al., 2010). Burgoon et al. (2010) found that motivated deceivers can create a 
credible image while communicating via text and can use their credibility to influence 
others to make decisions regardless of synchronicity. Synchronous CMC poses 
greater risk due to increased interactions between the deceived and the deceiver, 
increasing the potential for malign influence (Burgoon et al., 2010).  
When conversing through CMC people have the advantage of editability, 
which is not present in f2f interactions (Hancock et al., 2010). Editability enables 
people to edit what they say before interaction increasing potential for deception. This 
is possible in synchronous and asynchronous CMC; asynchronous conditions increase 
time for message construction, although in synchronous CMC there is still a slight 
delay enabling more editability than f2f conditions (Hancock et al., 2010). CMC 
increases selective-self presentation, where people can more actively choose which 
aspects of themselves to present to the target compared to f2f communication 
(Hancock et al., 2010). 
People’s perception of richness in a communication channel may influence 
their choice of communication medium for committing deception (Carlson & George, 
2004), whilst cognitive and affective-based trust in low richness environments may 
mediate deception (Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). Media richness theory focuses on 
four areas of communication interaction: speed of interaction; cue multiplicity; 
language variety; and personal focus (Carlson & George, 2004; Carlson & Zmud, 
1994). There is a greater richness in communicational interaction with higher levels of 
these areas (Carlson & George, 2004). Judgements made regarding another individual 
may be influenced by cues available in the level of richness that decision-making 
occurs in (Wall, Taylor, Dixon, Conchie & Ellis, 2013). Both deceiver and deceived 
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may prefer synchronous interactions as they feel more able to deceive and to detect 
deceit (Carlson & George, 2004). A receiver may feel more confidence in detecting 
deception in familiar media formats and in conditions of high media richness as this is 
perceived as exposing more cues to deception whilst increasing accuracy in 
judgement (Carlson & George, 2004; Zhou & Zhang, 2004; Zhou & Zhang, 2007). A 
receiver may be less certain of their ability to detect deception in asynchronous 
communication with an unfamiliar sender (Carlson & George, 2004). Deceivers 
generally prefer synchronous communication for when they are lying but are able to 
differentiate between the usefulness of communication mediums for different types of 
deception, and may prefer asynchronous media for low-stakes deceptions where there 
is minimal risk (Carlson & George, 2004).  
Channel expansion theory expands upon media richness theory through 
examining an individual’s experience and perception of media richness in a 
communication channel in order to understand their choice of communication 
preference (Carlson & Zmud, 1994; Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Four experiences 
identified as being particularly important are: experience with the channel; experience 
with the messaging topic; experience with the organisational context; and experience 
with communication co-participants. As people develop their knowledge in these 
areas they will participate in increasingly rich communication through that channel 
and will then perceive that channel as becoming increasingly rich in communication 
ability. Alternatively if people do not develop these skills, they will not have an 
experience of rich communication via that channel and will not perceive it as useful in 
conveying information.  
The Internet can lead to perceived anonymity where there is a focus on the self 
and reduced concern of accountability to others (Hancock et al., 2007). This perceived 
anonymity may increase disinhibition and lead to more risky and extreme behaviour. 
Suggesting individuals may find it easier to participate in acts of deception online as 
they perceive themselves as anonymous and that they will not be held to account for 
their actions. Such disparities in online communication may pose little risk for the 
deceiver whilst posing a greater risk for the target, encouraging adversaries to conduct 
deception online. 
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Online Impression Formation: 
Mediated environments reduce the amount of behaviour that can be analysed 
to ascertain whether a person is lying, the cues to behaviour are filtered out (Burgoon 
et al., 2010; Carlson & George, 2004; Caspi & Gorsky, 2006; Hancock, 2009; 
Hancock & Dunham, 2001; Zhou & Zhang, 2006) and this presents a challenge for 
researchers used to f2f interactions (Lu, 2008; Utz, 2005). Elements of cognitive and 
verbal cues may still be apparent in synchronous communication as the deceiver 
requires cognitive effort to construct a story, especially if the conversational group 
involves multiple individuals (Zhou & Zhang, 2006).  
The Social Identity/Deindividuation (SIDE) model accepts the lack of cues in 
making judgements, but shifts focus towards how CMC is affected by social identity 
and cognitive processes used to make inferences and attributions from minimal 
information (Hancock & Dunham, 2001). The lack of individuating cues in 
interactions suggests that people using CMC become anonymous, with an increased 
reliance on social cues, including from communication style, in which impressions are 
formulated (Hancock & Dunham, 2001). Impressions generated from these cues may 
be more stereotyped and exaggerated representations of interactional partners 
(Hancock & Dunham, 2001).  
The hyperpersonal model combines the SIDE model and social information-
processing theory, to present a model where experiential, cognitive and behavioural 
aspects are considered together (Hancock & Dunham, 2001). In the hyperpersonal 
model interpersonal impressions in CMC are more intense, receivers make 
overattributions regarding their conversational partner’s personality and senders in 
CMC may also selectively choose personality traits that are present in interaction 
(Hancock & Dunham, 2001). It may be harder to detect deception in a person in 
online interactions if we initially perceive that person favourably and then make 
further attributions based on this favourable impression, understanding how such 
impressions are made may mitigate reliance on using partially formed online 
impressions to make judgements of veracity. 
 
Online Deception Detection Strategies: 
Deception occurs in a wide range of mediated environments, meaning 
deception detection strategies must reflect context, for example, verbal strategies may 
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be applied to online text-based communication and to online audio content, and non-
verbal strategies may be applied to online visual and audiovisual communication, 
however, there may be different cues and strategies used in deception detection for 
other forms of online deception. 
Theory of Deception (Grazioli, 2004; Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal & Berryman, 
2001) argues that individuals detect deception through noticing and interpreting 
anomalies in their environment through reference to the goals and aims ascribed to 
interactional partners. Theory of Deception has four processes: Firstly activation 
occurs where received information is paired to cues where there are discrepancies 
between what is observed and what is expected (Grazioli, 2004). Secondly, there is a 
deception hypothesis generation; where people attempt to develop an explanation for 
the differences between their observations and expectations. Thirdly, once a 
hypothesis has been generated it needs to be evaluated through comparison with 
related criteria. In the fourth stage there is a global assessment, where the hypothesis 
is combined with an overall assessment of deception of the area being questioned. 
Grazioli (2004) recruited MBA students who were deemed to be media and computer 
savvy through their presence on that course. In conjunction with a real website, a 
‘jacked’ website was created where half of the participants were unknowingly 
directed to the ‘jacked’ site (Grazioli, 2004). The participants who identified the 
deceptive site used fewer, but more predictive cues to deception (Grazioli, 2004). 
Priming individuals to the possibilities of deception may have some impact on 
people’s ability to detect deception in the context of page-jacking (Grazioli, 2004) and 
other contexts (George, Marret & Tilley, 2004). Individuals who accurately detected 
page-jacking used cues related to information assurance rather than trust, suggesting 
individuals could see through deceiver’s strategies to appear credible (Grazioli, 2004). 
Such strategies may be used upon an individual’s knowledge and use of a 
communication format alongside awareness of potential for deception online. 
Further development of the Theory of Deception argues that the recipient’s 
individual disposition and perceptions are also vital for detecting cues to deception 
(Wright, Chakraborty, Basoglu & Marett, 2010). Disposition to trust and Web 
experience are influences on detecting phishing, however computer self-efficacy, 
security knowledge, perceived risk, and suspicion of humanity may not be strong 
predictors of detecting phishing (Wright et al., 2010). In detecting phishing via email 
there are two points to detect deception: the first point is before the email is opened, 
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where email authentication cues are salient and second after the email is opened it 
becomes the only source of cues to deception (Wright et al., 2010). Once opened there 
is an initial authentication of the email and perceived cues to deception before 
suspicion is activated by the relationship between the cues, context and individual 
factors (Wright et al., 2010). Individual factors include sensitivity to the value of 
information, concern for privacy, obedience to authority and conscientiousness in 
judgement, whilst contextual factors were linked to knowledge of the institution. The 
third stage of deception detection involved individuals’ confirmation of suspicion. 
The evaluation of the hypotheses was found to be related to two main categories: 
confirmation seeking of authenticity and individual investigation of authenticity 
(Wright et al., 2010). 
Prominence-Interpretation Theory (PIT – Fogg, 2002) argues that individuals 
assess credibility of websites through noticing features, judging them and then 
assigning credibility. Fogg (2002) argues that prominence is affected by user 
involvement, website content, the user task, user experience and individual 
differences, whilst acknowledging the potential for other factors that may influence 
how people assign prominence. User assumptions, user skill/knowledge, context and 
user goals are argued to be linked to the interpretation of features (Fogg, 2002). PIT 
focusses on the content and interpretation of the user in assessing credibility of 
websites, however, it seems possible that individuals may assess credibility in this 
manner in other contexts including other forms of online content and has the potential 
for expansion to face-to-face situations. 
People focus on website design features to inform their judgements of website 
credibility (Fogg et al., 2003 - see Appendix 3.2). Fogg et al. (2003) examined 
whether different techniques are used to assess credibility in different contexts. E-
commerce sites are judged according to their reputation and recognition, and customer 
service; news sites were judged according to perceived bias of information; non-profit 
organisations were judged according to their identity, with fewer references to their 
information structure; opinion/review sites were judged according to their information 
bias and accuracy; travel sites were judged according to customer service; and search 
engines were judged according to information functionality and design and 
individuals also tested these sites to form their own opinions (Fogg et al., 2003). 
However, further work is required to examine whether individuals use these strategies 
for assessing credibility in other online environments. 
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In assessing credibility there is a trust bias towards information coming from 
perceived reliable sources (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013), and to website design, content 
and complexity features rather than familiarity with website sponsors (Flanagin & 
Metzger, 2007). However, online information may lack the indicators used to assess 
author identity or reputation and subsequently credibility (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). 
When information regarding the source is unavailable, difficult to interpret, or 
missing there may be uncertainty over the veracity of the information (Metzger & 
Flanagin, 2013). 
Cognitive heuristics are often employed to make decisions regarding the 
credibility of online information, to reduce cognitive load during decision-making 
(Metzger & Flanagin, 2013; Metzger, Flanagin & Medders, 2010). Metzger et al. 
(2010) identified five cognitive heuristics used to evaluate credibility online in a US 
sample: reputation, endorsement, consistency, self-confirmation, expectancy 
violation, and persuasive intent. Although there is difficulty in sorting heuristics into 
explicit categories as processes may occur simultaneously in decision-making, and 
contexts may generate multiple heuristics, alongside one heuristic activating another 
(Metzger et al., 2010). Cognitive heuristics used to assess credibility may further not 
be effective in distinguishing truth and deception, highlighting the need for 
understanding whether individuals use correct or incorrect strategies for assessing 
credibility online. If individuals from adversary nations use such incorrect heuristics 
for judging credibility then they may be exploited through deception operations. 
In developing a framework of online credibility assessment, Hilligoss and 
Rieh (2008) propose that there are construct, heuristic and interaction credibility 
judgements, although these judgement strategies may work in conjunction with one 
another. The construct level identified by Hilligoss and Rieh (2008) examines how 
individuals construct credibility which in turn influences how they judge credibility. 
The heuristics level involves judgement strategies that are used across multiple 
contexts, whilst the interaction level focuses on judgements based upon source and 
content cues (Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008). These processes are argued to influenced by 
context (Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008), although the impact of personality and its effect 
upon decision-making is also required. The interaction level proposed by Hilligoss 
and Rieh (2008) focuses upon an individual’s interactions with a website and neglects 
the online interactions that occur between individuals which require credibility 
judgements that will be influenced by interpersonal dynamics. Furthermore, the 
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framework proposed does not focus upon the accuracy of credibility judgements in 
identifying truth and deception. 
In linguistic patterns in synchronous CMC, deceivers may use a greater 
number of words, sense-based words, and other-oriented pronouns and use less self-
oriented words when lying than when telling the truth (Hancock et al., 2008). 
Motivated liars may use fewer causal terms when lying, unmotivated liars may 
increase their use of negative terms and motivated deceivers will be more successful 
in their deception (Hancock et al., 2008). The anonymity of cyberspace means that 
individuals may feel no connection to those they are deceiving and no need to feel 
guilty for deceiving them (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006) suggesting that they may not show 
emotional cues to deception associated with guilt. Biases occurring in f2f interactions 
may also occur in mediated interactions, for example, the truth bias is prominent in 
assessing deception in CMC increasing vulnerability to deception (Boyle, Kacmar & 
George, 2008; Hancock et al., 2010). 
Language change in online communication has enabled the identification of 
cues to deceit (Hancock, Curry, Goorha & Woodworth, 2005; Toma & Hancock, 
2012; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker & Twitchell, 2004), including potential cues to 
deception related to insider threat (Taylor et al., 2013) and linguistic markers for 
radical violence (Cohen, Johansson, Kaati & Mork, 2014). Hancock et al. (2005) 
found that deceivers produced more words, used fewer first person but more third 
person words and more sense words than truth-tellers. Increasing the number of words 
may be used by deceivers to appear more credible or as a strategy of distracting the 
receiver from inconsistencies in narrative, whilst other tactics may involve the 
deceiver distancing themselves from their behaviour. In a simulation of an insider 
attack, Taylor et al. (2013) found that in email communication insiders became more 
self-focussed, had greater negative affect and engaged in more cognitive processing 
whilst their mimicking of team members language deteriorated over time, potentially 
due the cognitive load involved in appearing credible. Examining the language used 
to identify intent to harm others, how individuals discuss targets and identify with 
others may be a promising approach for detecting violent extremists before acts may 
occur (Cohen et al., 2014). Analysing behaviour indicative of deception and threat in 
online environments is a promising approach to deception detection and can be further 
augmented with the inclusion of individual differences and the social and affective 
context of the interaction (Thompson, 2009). 
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ACID has been applied to deception detection in synchronous CMC via IM 
(Werdin et al., under review). CMC allows users to track their information and avoid 
releasing sensitive information or making contradictions, and they can appear calmer, 
furthermore users are able to edit and review their messages before sending, and with 
the lack of f2f there is less behaviour to control (Colwell et al, 2013). Werdin et al 
(under review) required participants to tell the truth or lie about their gender and 
interaction with a same-sex best friend and found that honest statements were longer 
and more detailed at free recall but not during mnemonics, although overall these 
differences were not significant. However, this study was low stakes and used a 
student sample, suggesting it may have issues of real-world validity. Techniques 
involving mediated interviewing may also be more likely to uncover deception 
through deceiver’s confessing their deceptive behaviour (Dunbar et al., 2013). Not all 
individuals may confess to deceptive behaviour and confessions still have a 
requirement for investigation to ensure they are legitimate. 
 
Cross-cultural deception in computer-mediated communication: 
Although there has been an increase in the amount of research examining 
deception detection in f2f and CMC there has been little research examining cultural 
differences in deception detection across either communication medium (Lewis & 
George, 2008). For issues of national security and intelligence assessment of 
communication from other cultures, understanding the impact of culture on deception 
is critical. Culture can be divided into four dimensions: 1) individualism/collectivism; 
2) power distance; 3) uncertainty avoidance; and 4) masculinity/femininity (Hofstede, 
1980, p.260). In a comparison of Koreans’ and Americans’ experience of deception, 
Lewis and George (2008) found that: Koreans are more collectivist, more likely to use 
deceptive behaviour and lie about different aspects of themselves than Americans; 
and deceptive behaviour is greater in f2f communication than CMC for Koreans and 
Americans; Americans and Koreans hold similar beliefs about deceptive behaviour in 
CMC, however, Koreans are more deceptive using f2f communication than 
Americans, potentially due to richness of communication channel (Carlson & George, 
2004). Individuals holding stronger masculine cultural beliefs are more likely to be 
deceptive than those holding stronger feminine value beliefs (Lewis & George, 2008). 
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Overall, regardless of culture people may prefer to engage in deceptive behaviours 
through f2f rather than CMC (Lewis & George, 2008). 
When exploring Taiwanese deception, Chen and Huang (2011) found that 
deceivers often select tactics which reflect their own and the target’s characteristics. 
Chen and Huang (2011) identified deception tactics including masking, mimicking, 
relabelling and inventing which were used against individuals and business. Tactics 
used to deceive business were more likely to include relabelling and inventing (Chen 
& Huang, 2011). Deceivers purporting to be businesses were more likely to use 
masking tactics, whilst deceivers purporting to be individuals were more likely to use 
mimicking and inventing tactics (Chen & Huang, 2011). It is crucial to understand the 
tactics which individuals use in order to appear convincing to others and further 
research is required to examine this across cultures. 
 
Online Adversary Deception and Influence: 
A major issue involving cyberspace is increased potential for adversary 
influence where there is a need for accurate methods of veracity assessment in order 
to mitigate adversary influence. The digital domain has the potential to be exploited at 
multiple levels by a wide-ranging group of adversaries, from lone actors, to criminal 
organisations, to terrorist groups and state-sponsored actions, furthermore these areas 
do not have set boundaries (Cornish, 2009; Cornish et al., 2009; Cornish, Livingstone, 
Clemente & Yorke, 2010).  
The Internet has made adversary influence and deception (Tan, 2003) far more 
accessible and interactive with its audience from posting videos on website for 
viewing (Weimann & Gorder, 2009), to interactive virtual communities where people 
can anonymously discuss issues and ideas and engage in influence (Cornish, 2009; 
Nacos, 2007; Ramsay, 2008; Thomas, 2003; Weimann & Gorder, 2009). The wide 
range of communication formats in cyberspace has enabled groups to organise their 
activities even when they are severely restricted and monitored (Weimann & Gorder, 
2009). Furthermore, as misinformation proliferates online, a wider range of 
individuals, whether predisposed towards such material or not, may interact with such 
information presenting additional challenges in reducing vulnerability to 
misinformation (Mocanu, Rossi, Zhang, Karsai & Quattrociocchi, 2015). 
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Terrorist and insurgent groups began to utilise mediated technologies during 
the Russian-Chechen conflict during the 1990s and early 2000s, since then there has 
been an exponential rise in the number of groups using the Internet (Thomas, 2009). 
The rise of the Internet has enabled terrorists to self-publicise through their websites, 
and maintain a greater control of their own image and perception amongst their target 
audiences, whilst simultaneously manipulating the image and perceived perceptions 
of their adversaries (Weimann, 2004). The internet is useful to adversary groups due 
to: easy access; little or no regulation; increased reach; fast flow of information; 
inexpensive development and maintenance of a web presence; the ability to shape 
coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a source 
for stories (Weimann, 2004) and the development of influence strategies to reflect 
their targets (Thomas, 2003; Thomas, 2006; Weimann & Gorder, 2009). 
 
Conclusion: 
Individuals commit acts of deception on the Internet for a variety of reasons 
from playing with aspects of identity to acts of phishing where they seek to gain 
access to confidential information. In the online environment the ability to detect 
deception is similar to that in interpersonal interactions in that it is similar to levels of 
chance. Aspects of traditional verbal and nonverbal deception detection methods may 
be applicable to the online environment as verbal deception detection methods may be 
useful in assessing veracity in CMC and in audiovisual material, and non-verbal 
deception detection methods may be suitable to analysing visual and audiovisual 
behaviours. However, they may not be enough to assess veracity by themselves and 
there needs to be an understanding of the personality and individual factors and how 
these impact on behaviour in the online world. 
Adversary use of the Internet for deception and influence increases the need 
for a model of deception detection that can be employed across technologically 
converging domains to counter threat. Current research in this area is lacking, in 
particular the impact of personality and culture on deception across communication 
domains. The range of utilities open to adversaries on the Internet shows a need to 
develop a comprehensive model of deception detection to examine veracity at 
multiple levels from interpersonal deception across terrorist disinformation and the 
analysis of strategic threats. 
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Chapter 4: Military and Strategic Deception 
Introduction: 
Military deception differs from deception in everyday life, where the ability to 
deceive is considered a valuable skill rather than a character flaw (Glenney, 2009). 
Military deception encompasses interpersonal and online environments and detection 
methods are required to assess veracity of information across attributable and non-
attributable sources. Research in military deception has focussed on developing 
strategies for deceiving others and the use of deception as a force multiplier (DCDC, 
2007), whilst research into deception detection has been neglected. Adversary use of 
deception in asymmetric conflict should be anticipated as it is cost effective and 
enables increased flexibility against superior forces (Godson & Wirtz, 2002; 
McPherson, 2010; Whaley & Busby, 2002). Current challenges in military 
environments reflect the rise in social media and the increased reach, impact and 
speed in which the information environment may be shaped by adversaries (Collins, 
2002; Dearth, 2000; D’Ovidio, 2007; Stein, 2000). Increasing the need for developing 
strategies to counter adversary deception. Whilst the majority of research into 
deception examined in Chapters 2 and 3 addresses deception from a forensic 
background there is a contingent need to examine military approaches to deception 
whether interpersonal or mediated to ensure robust responses are developed to 
potential threats. The current chapter outlines theories of military deception, target 
audience analysis, historical lessons learned, decision-making biases and approaches 
to counter-deception. 
 
Theories of Military Deception: 
Deception ranges across the strategic, operational and tactical (DCDC, 2007; 
Glenney, 2009). Strategic deception occurs in the misleading of an adversary of 
intended operations at the highest level, operational deception occurs in the 
misleading of an adversary in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and is used to support 
strategic deception in the medium or short-term, whilst tactical deception incorporates 
all short-term measures intended to mislead the adversary (DCDC, 2007; Glenney, 
2009). It is argued that strategic deception is often hardest to understand and identify, 
due to the complexity of operational environments, and the multiple features involved 
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in constructing deception increasing cognitive load in the target (Henderson & Lee, 
2007; McPherson, 2010). 
Taxonomies of Deception 
 Taxonomies of different forms of deception have been developed exploring 
the forms that deception is argued to take across a range of environments (Bell, 2003; 
Henderson et al., 2007; Henderson & Lee, 2007; Macdonald, 2007; Whaley, 1982; 
Whaley, 2007). Deception is proposed to comprise of simulation and dissimulation 
(Bell, 2003; Whaley, 1982). Simulation is considered to be showing false information 
to the target through mimicking, inventing and decoying strategies (Whaley, 1982). 
Mimicking tactics seek to deceive the target through imitating reality, inventing 
tactics create something new which is false, and decoying tactics deceive the target 
through diverting attention to another area (Bell, 2003; Henderson & Lee, 2007; 
Macdonald, 2007; Whaley, 1982). Dissimulation is argued to deceive the target 
through hiding information by masking, repackaging and dazzling tactics (Whaley, 
1982). Masking aims to hide information by making it invisible to detection, 
repackaging hides reality through disguising and modifying appearance, and dazzling 
hides reality through presenting a range of options to blur reality in sense-making 
(Bell, 2003; Daniel & Herbig, 1982; Henderson & Lee, 2007; Macdonald, 2007; 
Whaley, 1982). 
 Deception tactics can be used to reinforce the target’s existing beliefs enabling 
exploitation (Bell, 2003; Cali & Romanych, 2005; Henderson & Lee, 2007; Heuer, 
1981, Macdonald, 2007). If the target is fully or partially aware of attempts to deceive 
them, the deceiver may deploy ambiguity increasing or decreasing tactics (Bell, 
2003), which require resources, whether physical or cognitive to uncover the 
deception. Changes in ambiguity may also affect the target’s decision-making 
abilities, particularly use of cognitive heuristics which may result in bias (Gerwehr, 
2006; Heuer, 1981). Exploiting the target’s emotions will provide another tactic for 
deceiving others (Dauber, 2009; Henderson, 2007). For example, Dauber (2009) 
reports that Iraqi insurgents posed as US soldiers injured during Gulf War II in online 
chatrooms and attempted to influence the domestic US audience against the war. 
 Deception is argued to mainly occur as a combination of both simulation and 
dissimulation tactics (Bell, 2003; Macdonald, 2007), as whilst simulating reality, 
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reality also needs to be concealed from the target to maintain consistency and 
plausibility of the deception. Macdonald (2007) includes disinformation as a 
deception tactic which incorporates both simulation and dissimulation as truthful 
information may be concealed whilst real information may be simulated through 
camouflage, decoys, dazzling and conditioning and such tactics may occur across a 
range of communication channels increasing the need for a holistic approach to 
deception detection. 
 The target may also be deceived through conditioning techniques where the 
deceiver creates a pattern of behaviour which can then be exploited later, for example 
as in the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel (Macdonald, 2007). The 
Egyptian forces conditioned the Israeli forces through staging numerous canal-
crossing exercises, and movement of large numbers of troops to the border before 
withdrawing them. This meant that when then the Egyptian troops were mobilised for 
the invasion the Israeli forces were not prepared as they thought the troops would be 
withdrawn again (Macdonald, 2007). Such conditioning may be conducted over a 
period of time so that the target then accepts behaviour as normal with no apparent 
threat shown (Macdonald, 2007). Another form of deceiving the target involves 
changing tactics or rules as the target may not have anticipated or prepared for 
eventualities that do not reflect perceptions of normal behaviour (Macdonald, 2007).  
Recent approaches have sought to apply psychological principles to military 
deception to create greater understanding of the deception process and how to conduct 
deception (Henderson, 2007; Henderson et al., 2007). Henderson et al. (2007) 
conducted a review of deception research to identify generic principles of deception 
that occur across a range of contexts. A model of deception was proposed where 
deception is accomplished through presenting the target temporally-anchored 
perceptual cues sequences which through pattern recognition shape the target’s 
cognition and behaviour (Henderson et al., 2007). Cues are argued to be physical and 
information based and can be combinations of both, whilst cognitive, affective, social 
and environmental factors may be manipulated to reduce or disrupt the target’s pattern 
matching and expectancies (Henderson et al., 2007). 
These principles are seeking to highlight how people can be deceived rather 
than how to detect deception, although knowledge may be reversed for detecting 
deception, for example, an understanding of how people can be influenced is 
beneficial to both senders seeking to deceive and receivers seeking to detect 
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deception, whilst target audience analysis of adversaries may generate an 
understanding of the potential deception strategies they will utilise.  
Deception Planning 
In order to successfully deceive others in strategic, operational and tactical 
environments deception must be carefully planned to ensure its effectiveness 
(Henderson, 2007). Deception should be expected in some operating environments 
where it presents an asymmetric advantage for weaker nations against stronger 
nations who rely on superior forces and technology (Godson & Wirtz, 2002; 
Macdonald, 2007). Various approaches have been developed for planning deception 
operations (Bell, 2003; Daniel & Herbig, 1982; Henderson, 2007; Latimer, 2001; 
Whaley, 1982). Deception plans have covered key areas of human behavior including 
identifying the actions and means required in targeting key adversaries to influence 
their cognition and behavior towards a desired state (Heuer, 1981; Johnson & 
Meyeraan, 2003; McPherson, 2010). 
The deception planning process is argued by Whaley (1982) to consist of 10 
stages. First the deception planner must know the strategic goal of the deception; 
second the planner must decide how they want the target to react for strategic 
advantage; third the planner must decide how they want the target to perceive events 
or information; fourth the planner is required to decide what is to be hidden and what 
is to be shown in place of reality; fifth the planner must analyse the pattern of reality 
which is being hidden to identify the characteristics that must be hidden or altered; 
sixth the planner then analyses the pattern of the false reality to ensure that it is 
plausible; seventh the planner has designed the desired effect and the method with 
which it is constructed and now the means for presenting this information to the target 
is required; eighth the effect and the means to convey the effect have been developed 
and now the deception begins; ninth the channels through which the deception is 
communicated are selected for links to the specific target audience; and tenth to 
ensure the success of the deception the target must believe the information they 
receive (Whaley, 1982). This process covers the deception planning process in depth, 
however, it does not consider how the adversary may respond to the deception and 
how such changes are measured and then responded to by the deceiver. 
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Bell (2003) proposes a similar deception planning process to Whaley (1982), 
however, the effectiveness of deception and further responses by the target and 
deceiver are also considered. Bell (2003) argues that the deception process covers 11 
stages: first the deception is planned, where the goal is identified alongside the costs 
and benefits of the deception, and the selection of the form of deception and the 
channel to be used in the deception; second the ruse is constructed from a variety of 
tactics to ensure the context is reflected; third the channel for the deception is 
selected; fourth the deception is channeled to the target; fifth the target makes a 
decision regarding whether to accept the deceptive information as truthful or not; 
sixth the deception is accepted and the target adjusts their behavior to match the 
deception; seventh the target responds to the deception; eighth the deception planner 
analyses the target’s response to the deception; ninth the deception planner decides 
whether to respond to target feedback; tenth the deception cycle is continued where 
the planner makes further adjustments to the deception or continues to measure the 
target response to the deception; or eleventh, where the deception cycle is closed 
whether through discovery by the target or achievement of the planner’s goals (Bell, 
2003). However, there is a further need for understanding how the target may counter 
such attempts at deception, whether through the tactics they use to uncover the deceit 
or how they may identify attempts at deception but then begin a deception cycle of 
their own. 
Daniel and Herbig (1982) developed a model of deception focussing on: 
secrecy, organisation and coordination; plausibility and confirmation; adaptability; 
predispositions of the target; and factors in the strategic situation. Secrecy refers to 
protecting the deception with a cover story, and ensuring operational security 
(OPSEC) amongst own forces. To protect secrecy the deceptive act must be well 
organised with precision planning. Both the organisation and secrecy of a deception 
will be coordinated from a centralised point. The deceiver must think like the 
adversary, in order to ensure plausibility the deception must appear like a realistic 
proposal, and be confirmed from a number of credible sources (McPherson, 2010). 
The deception strategy should be flexible and able to adapt as the situation changes 
and as adversaries react to the deception (Martin, 2008). How an adversary reacts is 
based on their predispositions, they may believe that something is wrong but will still 
fall for a deception if the deception is credible to their biases (Martin, 2008).  
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UK deception is argued to have 4 main objectives: to provide a commander 
with a choice of actions to implement their mission, by manipulating the adversary as 
to his intentions and by diverting the adversary’s focus away from the action being 
implemented, in order to achieve the allied aims; to mislead the adversary and 
persuade them to implement actions that are to their disadvantage and can be 
exploited; to gain surprise; and to reduce friendly causalities (Latimer, 2001). Latimer 
(2001) has seven principles for deception focussing on the decision maker’s thinking; 
action to make them act in a specific manner; coordination and centralised control; 
preparation and timing which requires a logical planning process where timing is 
critical, and this links to the operational plan; security including OPSEC; credibility 
and confirmation where the adversary must believe the deception, through the 
provision of a credible plan; and flexibility where there is an ability to adapt to change 
(Latimer, 2001).  
Success in deception  has been typified by its integration into the operation 
plan, central control, minimal staff planners, maintenance of OPSEC, multi-layered 
and complementary deceptions which reinforced adversary sensemaking within the 
context of tactical norms (Henderson & Lee, 2007). When deception has been 
unsuccessful there has been less central coordination of the multi-layered approach 
potentially decreasing the plausibility of deception attempts and increasing detection 
by the adversary (Henderson & Lee, 2007). To increase the success of deception in 
depth knowledge of the target is required. 
 
Target Audience Analysis: 
An in-depth knowledge of the deception target is needed to increase chances 
of influencing key decision makers through deception strategies (DCDC, 2007) and to 
avoid mistakes associated with cultural and religious differences (Jajko, 2002; Wolfe 
& Arrow, 2013). Mackay and Tatham (2011, p. 95) argue that understanding 
audiences is central to communication and should be part of preparations for 
operations and this concept is readily transferable from influence operations to 
deception operations. In influencing a target audience the message needs to be 
contextually rational to the audience to actually change their behavior (Mackay & 
Tatham, 2011, p. 96), if the message is not rational or plausible to the target they may 
remain skeptical. 
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In deceiving and detecting deception in military domains incorporation of 
cultural intelligence is argued to improve the effectiveness of deception capabilities 
(Coles, 2006). Cultural intelligence considers information derived from cultural 
demographics, social, political, and economic information, enhancing understanding 
of a nation’s people, history, psychology, beliefs, and attitudes and behaviours. 
Cultural intelligence will improve deception detection through understanding the 
wider picture of the reasons for, how and why a person from another culture may 
commit deception. Understanding the interactions between language, culture and 
cognition enables the detection of group biases and preferences which will aid 
analysts and those in operational environments to uncover potential threats (Ceruti, 
McGirr & Kaina, 2010). 
Awareness of culture in conflict enables greater influence in shaping the 
information environment, and defending again adversary deception. Spencer and 
Balasevicius (2009) refer to the usage of cultural intelligence by Special Operation 
Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, where awareness of cultural differences in 
Afghanistan enabled enlistment of adversaries of the Taliban to help take down their 
regime. However, cultural awareness may be limited to specific operations rather than 
strategically deployed. In Afghanistan one of the difficulties facing troops is the 
ability to separate friend from foe, through understanding cultural differences we may 
be able to accurately do this (Spencer & Balasevicius, 2009). Spencer and 
Balasevicius (2009) state that skilled interpreters are able to detect deception through 
cues in changes in behaviour, speech pauses, facial expressions and ambiguities, and 
that they rely on how something is said rather than what is said (Spencer & 
Balasevicius, 2009). 
 
Historical lessons learned: 
A key aspect of understanding the effectiveness of deception is to understand 
lessons learned from successes and failures in deception and deception detection 
operations (Wolfe & Arrow, 2013). Sellers (2009) examined Operation Mincemeat 
and the principles which made it a successful mission. Operation Mincemeat was a 
deliberate deception operation to conceal the location of the D-Day landings 
conducted by Allied forces during the Second World War (Sellers, 2009). This 
deception operation involved placing false information on a body, purporting to be 
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that of an Intelligence Officer whose plane had crashed into the sea, and this body 
would then float onto Spanish shores where the false information would be fed back 
to the German forces (Sellers, 2009). Through understanding the adversary the target 
could be focussed towards specific behaviour. There needs to be strict centralised 
control in order to ensure that the operation is properly controlled with no leak of 
information. Time needs to be considered into a deception operation, as you need to 
allow time for the adversary to receive, interpret, respond and then you receive 
feedback to any information they receive. Each deception must also be integrated to 
the overall operation that the deception is supporting (Sellers, 2009).  
Exploring lessons learned from military influence campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan enables the understanding of successful and unsuccessful influence 
tactics (Wolfe & Arrow, 2013). In cross-cultural influence, tactics involving respect, 
empathy, prior relationships and familiarity with the influence targets predicted 
success in influence (Wolfe & Arrow, 2013). Negative tactics were used more 
commonly in unsuccessful attempts at influence (Wolfe & Arrow, 2013). These 
findings highlight the importance of using positive influence campaigns as they may 
reduce casualties and fatalities in operational environments (Wolfe & Arrow, 2013). 
Alternatively, these findings highlight that individuals are also more influenced by 
positive information which when linked to deception may suggest that there is more 
potential vulnerability from adversary deception operations which appear credible and 
positive to the target. 
Deception as a strategy was neglected during the conflict between the former 
Yugoslavia nations of Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo supported by NATO and 
Albanian troops and also in the more recent Afghan conflicts (De Caro, 2002; Vego, 
2002). Vego (2002) argues that the US viewed deception as unnecessary as it was not 
needed in conflicts where they had powerful physical strength, and that adversary 
deception would be ineffective. However, Serbian use of deception during the Kosovo 
conflict was widespread in its attempts to undermine NATO morale (De Caro, 2002).  
During the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah succeeded in 
using deception to combat Israel’s military superiority (Acosta, 2008). Hezbollah 
controlled the information sphere before Israel confronted them over their repeated 
attacks and border skirmishes on the northern Israeli-Lebanon border (Acosta, 2008). 
This enabled Hezbollah to control the ways in which they presented themselves to 
appear more credible to their audience (Acosta, 2008). Hezbollah’s denial operations 
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were successful through their Counter-intelligence (CI), OPSEC, and strict control of 
open-source information (OSINT) and intelligence. Meaning Israel was unable to 
gather information and intelligence about Hezbollah’s military capabilities before 
they engaged in combat seriously undermining their operations. Hezbollah built fake 
bunkers that would be picked up by aerial drones, and built their real bunkers out of 
sight of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR - 
Acosta, 2008). Hezbollah also conducted an electronic warfare bluff through allowing 
rumours to surface that they were using electronic warfare capabilities that were able 
to monitor Israeli radio communications, and then took information like troop 
casualties and broadcast it on TV to undermine Israeli morale (Acosta, 2008). 
Hezbollah retrieved this information through monitoring UN provided OSINT about 
Israeli troop movements and actions in Lebanon (Acosta, 2008). Hezbollah expanded 
their TV station so that they could now broadcast their beliefs and messages to a 
wider audience, and their news stories were broadcast further by other Arab TV 
stations, for example, Al Jazeera (Acosta, 2008). These other networks did not check 
the validity of Hezbollah’s broadcasts, footage made its way onto websites without 
any form of veracity assessment and journalists were given strictly controlled tours of 
Israeli bomb damage by Hezbollah guides (Acosta, 2008). Hezbollah also attempted 
to hijack other websites to provide links to video footage from their TV channel; 
however, they were thwarted in their actions by other Internet users (Acosta, 2008).  
Dauber (2009) examined the aftermath of Operation Valhalla (an engagement 
between US Special forces and a Jaish al-Mahdi squad). Dauber (2009) states that 
prior to this conflict they could expect an adversary propaganda response between 24 
to 48 hours of the event, however, in this case there was an adversary response within 
45 minutes where the bodies of 16 or 17 Jaish al-Mahdi insurgents had their weapons 
removed and were moved into a position of prayer, and then photos were taken of 
these bodies and uploaded to the Internet where they were portrayed as having been 
the victims of unprovoked aggression. Dauber (2009) states that the targeted audience 
of this adversary deception was the US public in an attempt to reduce morale. 
 
Decision-Making Biases: 
Decision-making biases in intelligence analysis and deception detection 
highlight areas of vulnerability which may enable adversary exploitation. Awareness 
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of these biases in judgement is required to increase resilience against adversary 
deception. To interpret the real world people create simplified mental models to 
reduce complexity, and it is within these simplified models that intelligence analysis 
occurs, even if this is not the most efficient way of interpreting the real world (Heuer, 
1999). People construct their own versions of reality through the information which 
they perceive from their senses and this information is then interpreted according to 
experiences, needs, desires and cultures (Heuer, 1999). Analysts need to be aware of 
themselves to understand how they and others might interpret the same data (Heuer, 
1999). Heuer (1999) states that information analysts use is from a variety of sources, 
and such information is often incomplete, unreliable, subject to deception and 
decision-making is often affected by time constraints.  
Further biases may reflect distrust of real information due to the information 
source (Whaley, 1973), an overreliance on traditional forms of warfare and perceived 
technological superiority (Bell, 1982; Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003), and anchoring and 
availability biases may also affect how information is interpreted (Heuer, 1981). 
Vulnerabilities in decision-making may emerge through a target’s greed (Bell, 1982) 
where they fail to accurately assess information due to the perceived benefits, and 
where information target’s pre-existing beliefs meaning analysts may fail to 
accurately question the veracity of information (Bell, 2003). To counter such biases in 
decision-making analysts require an open mind, skepticism, resistance in jumping to 
conclusions, to pay attention to anomalies and adherence to intelligence procedures 
(DCDC, 2007). 
 
Military Deception Detection: 
To increase resilience against adversary deception, deception detection 
strategies are required. In detecting adversary deception we must assume that our 
adversaries are using varying forms of deception, for example, the Soviet Union 
incorporated ‘Maskirovka’ (strategic masking, camouflaging and use of denial and 
deception) throughout their military operations (DCDC, 2007). To identify deception, 
there is a need for knowledge of the adversary alongside strong intelligence and 
analysis of adversary behavior and patterns (Cali & Romanych, 2005; DCDC, 2007). 
Deception detection may be passive and active (Bell, 2003). Passive deception 
detection is argued to consist of a continual examination of reality seeking false 
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patterns and hidden threats alongside evidence of adversary deception planning (Bell, 
2003). Active deception detection is argued to consist of measures of identifying 
those who plan deception based upon their background history or perceived future 
intentions (Bell, 2003). Cali and Romanych (2005) state that counterpropaganda, 
including disinformation, is a neglected area of focus within operating environments 
and that current strategies are focused towards reactively identifying adversary 
propaganda and how they shape situational awareness rather than proactively 
identifying adversary counterpropaganda which may mitigate threats before they 
occur (Godson & Wirtz, 2002). 
Incongruities in behaviour can lead to deception detection (Whaley & Busby, 
2002). Information received also needs to be compared with past information and this 
should not be rushed otherwise intelligence failures may occur (Heuer, 1981). The 
plus-minus rule argues that deception detection occurs when an individual identifies 
what has been added or hidden to make information appear credible (Whaley & 
Busby, 2002), however, this process will be affected by complexity in human 
interactions. In uncertain contexts more evidence will be required to detect deception 
and assessing deception across multiple channels may improve this process when 
there is understanding of how such techniques affect communication (Whaley & 
Busby, 2002). 
Deception may be detected through identifying elements of deception plans 
(Bell, 1982; Whaley & Busby, 2002). Identifying patterns involved in misdirection, 
identifying the key players involved in an operating environment, the intentions they 
may have, what the payoff or gain may be, where the events take place, adversary 
strength, adversary style and the information channel involved in communicating the 
deception (Bell, 1982; Whaley & Busby, 2002). All of these areas may highlight 
vulnerabilities in an adversary’s deception operation and in turn may exploit the target 
if undetected. The current research will seek to expand this approach through the 
incorporation of culture, personality and individual differences and the use of multiple 
context-specific forms of deception detection. 
Decision Support Tools 
The most common decision support tool used in deception detection is the 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH – Heuer, 1981) and variations of this 
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approach (Pope, Jøsang & McAnally, 2006; Stech & Elsässer, 2004). Stech and 
Elsässer (2004) examine military deception detection through ACH and argue that 
counter-deception is hard because people often do not consider alternative 
explanations for the information they receive, and misinterpret the information they 
do have. ACH (Heuer, 1981; Pope et al., 2006) utilises information received to 
generate several possible scenarios for what may happen with the most plausible 
option being selected, however, this may also increase ambiguity in decision-making 
and increase vulnerability to deception (Pope et al., 2006; Stech & Elsässer, 2004). 
Stech and Elsässer (2004) try to rectify this problem by developing a system they call 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses - Counter-Deception (ACH-CD) for giving 
support to decision-making. Stech and Elsässer (2004) use statistical analysis to 
identify anomalies indicative of deception, however, this approach has to date not 
addressed interpersonal or online deception. 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses using Subjective Logic (ACH-SL) is an 
approach to veracity assessment in intelligence reports (Pope et al., 2006). Stech and 
Elsässer (2004) state that there are four types of analytical failure that may affect 
ability to accurately detect deception: Poor anomaly detection where there is a 
dismissal of anomalies as they do not appear significant or do not reflect other 
information; Misattribution where analysts generalise anomalies to processing errors 
or gaps in data collection rather than to deceptive behaviours; Failure to link 
deception tactics to deception hypotheses; and inadequate support for deception 
hypotheses, where analysts fail to link deception to an adversary’s potential goals. If 
there are more methods employed to assess veracity then a better overall analysis 
should be produced. Those individuals providing information and intelligence may be 
reliable on some aspects of the information they provide, but not on others; they may 
provide a mixture of first and second-hand information; they may provide information 
on some areas, but not on areas that may adversely affect them (Pope et al, 2006). If 
there are multiple sources of information for an area of intelligence, the reliability of 
the information received should increase (Pope, 2006). However, it may still be 
prudent to analyse every source of information for veracity, as information received 
from multiple sources may still be part of an adversary deception campaign. There 
may be decay in the reliability of a source for information over a period of time, 
therefore complacency in assessing information should be avoided (Pope, 2006). On 
the other side, sources whose past information may have been suspect and potentially 
 48 
deceptive may start to produce information that is reliable (Pope et al, 2006). Past 
information may need to be taken into account in this assessment, but there needs to 
be a balance to ensure that good information is not disregarded due to previous 
deceptive information being provided by an informant. 
Humans are argued to have cognitive limitations across perception, attention 
and memory and to counter such limitations in operational environments decision 
support systems can be used (Smith, Johnston & Paris, 2004). One such tool that has 
been tested in detecting deceptive threats is Tactical Decision-Making Under Stress 
(TADMUS – Smith et al., 2004). TADMUS aims to augment the recognition of 
malign behaviour, manage the attention of the practitioner, and to improve memory 
functioning in the search for diagnostic information (Smith et al., 2004). Smith et al. 
(2004) found that when using the TADMUS for decision support analysts made fewer 
false alarms than a control group when assessing threats in a simulated environment, 
although both groups still missed threats. TADMUS was argued to reduce the 
cognitive load on operators enabling them to more accurately match patterns of 
deception with their pre-existing knowledge (Smith et al., 2004). Further research 
would be required to examine the effectiveness of transferring such automating 
techniques to other contexts in which deception occurs, and it is anticipated that this 
may prove difficult to perform. 
The Deception Analysis Cognitive Process (DACP – McPherson, 2010) is 
used for counter-deception and has been used with success in strategic operations. 
The DACP is split into eight phases (McPherson, 2010). First there is recognition of 
what to look for in detecting deception; second there should be an evaluation of the 
deceiver, alongside an awareness of target vulnerabilities and biases; third there is 
emulation of identifying or recognising how the adversary conducts deception;  fourth 
there is selection of the tools used to detect deception; fifth there is implementation of 
deception detection techniques; sixth there is collection of information including 
resolving ambiguities or gaps in knowledge; seventh there is the integration of 
information to begin the formulation of whether deception is occurring; and eighth 
there is the determination of whether or to what extent the adversary is conducting 
deception (McPherson, 2010). The DACP outlines a promising approach to deception 
detection in operational environments, however, this approach may be improved 
through further understanding of deception and in particular deception detection 
strategies. 
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The CAI (See Chapter 2 - Boon & Gozna, 2009; Gozna & Boon, 2010) may 
be utilised for deception detection in the military environment. The CAI states that 
there will be differences across offences that need to be taken into account, for 
example, that people may be different across different offences and they may be 
different across and within interviews. In conducting deception a comprehensive 
knowledge of an adversary is needed including knowledge of characteristics and 
historical background, knowledge of the deception target (including their own 
cognitions and biases), current ISTAR, adversary intentions, preconceptions, 
deployments, their communication and information systems infrastructure (DCDC, 
2007). In deception detection this approach may be adapted to analyse the adversary 
conducting deception as knowledge and awareness of the adversary will enable a 
more holistic understanding in detecting adversary deception. In detecting adversary 
deception analysing information and intelligence from a holistic perspective covering 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour across converging technologies may enable a greater 
understanding of deception and its detection. 
 
Conclusion: 
The nature of military deception is protracted with deception possible in both 
interpersonal and online environments; therefore there is a need for accurate veracity 
assessment to prevent vulnerabilities from adversary deception. Traditional forms of 
deception detection may be employed across these areas, however, to ensure that a 
more comprehensive assessment of veracity is produced a more holistic approach to 
deception detection is needed. Using singular verbal or non-verbal cues to deception 
may not be constructive when we are analysing received information and intelligence 
it may be more prudent to analyse clusters of behaviour and combine verbal and non-
verbal detection methods, furthermore individual differences and personality factors 
may have an effect on a person’s motivations for providing us with information 
enabling us to produce a more accurate assessment of veracity. If we understand an 
adversary’s cultural background we will also be able to anticipate how an adversary 
may think and hypothesise what strategies they may use in deception. 
 
 50 
Chapter 5: Towards a holistic model of deception: Theoretical 
developments. 
Introduction: 
The protracted nature of deception across interpersonal, online and military 
environments highlights the range of areas where vulnerabilities may occur and the 
requirement for bespoke and proactive techniques that can assess veracity across these 
challenging domains. Although accuracy rates in experimental settings for lie-truth 
judgements are low (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), it is acknowledged that interactions 
involving low or high-stake deception will likely incorporate a mixture of truth and 
deception (Bond & Speller, 2009). The varying nature of information presented to 
deception targets can increase the challenge of assessing veracity with a contingent 
need to approach the deception identification task by incorporating multiple elements 
that can be utilized across domains. Chapter 5 draws together the contrasting 
approaches to deception detection outlined in previous chapters and proposes a model 
of deception detection where detection approaches are tailored to match the context of 
interactions and illustrates this approach to three scenarios involving deception. 
Traditional Approaches 
In developing methods to detect deception, the application of verbal, non-
verbal, and paralinguistic techniques have largely focussed upon isolated cues (Vrij, 
2008); whilst recent approaches have sought to increase behavioural differences 
between truth-tellers and deceivers (Colwell et al., 2013).  However, these approaches 
are primarily focussed on detecting deception in interpersonal interactions and using 
evidence to challenge individuals, which suggests a potential limited application to 
environments without interpersonal interactions or evidence to challenge individuals’ 
narrative. 
Verbal Approaches 
Verbal approaches examine differences between truth-tellers and deceivers in 
how they construct events through verbal content across communication channels.  
Techniques include SVA (Köhnken, 2004), RM (Sporer, 2004), and LIWC – 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007). SVA involves a review of relevant information, a semi-
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structured interview, CBCA and a Validity Checklist to assess findings related to 
veracity (Akehurst et al., 2011; Brown, 2010; Vrij, 2008). In studies of CBCA some 
criteria are present more often and have more support in lie-truth discrimination. For 
example, ‘unstructured production’ and ‘contextual embedding’ appear in more than 
half of studies involving CBCA, whilst ‘self-deprecation’, ‘related external 
associations’ and ‘pardoning the perpetrator’ appear in only a handful (Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2010). Such differences in the CBCA literature may in part reflect the studies 
being variously conducted as field/in vivo or laboratory/in vitro research. Limitations 
to SVA and CBCA are outlined in Chapter 2. 
RM proposes that recollections of real experiences are developed from our 
perceptual processes whereas false experiences developed from our imagination will 
be cognitive in nature enabling discrimination between truthful and deceptive 
accounts (Bond & Lee, 2005; Masip et al., 2005; Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2008).  RM has 
shown similar levels of deception detection accuracy and similar limitations to SVA 
(See Chapter 2). LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2007 – See Chapter 2) is a technique for 
analysing conversations in order to understand people’s underlying thoughts, motives 
and emotions (Newman et al., 2003). As an approach LIWC has the greatest potential 
for analysing verbal behaviour for deception across interpersonal and CMC 
interactions. 
Differential Recall Enhancement Approaches 
DRE (Colwell et al., 2013 – See Chapter 2) approaches focus on increasing 
behavioural differences between liars’ and truth-tellers through the use of cognitive 
mnemonics, questioning strategy and use of evidence, for example, ACID (Colwell et 
al., 2013), SUE (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015), and cognitive approaches (Vrij, 2015b).  
DRE is considered to assist honest people in their recall and providing more detailed 
and verbose statements whilst deceptive people need to work harder to maintain 
credibility and over-rely on short, carefully constructed narratives (Colwell et al., 
2013). These techniques may overcome the paucity of valid cues to deception 
identified by Hartwig and Bond (2011) although their interview specific context could 
result in difficulties in application to non-interactive contexts. Although validation in 
applied settings is required such techniques may be useful in uncovering verbal 
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deception in interaction whilst application to areas outside of conversational 
interaction and other communication channels is more difficult to assess. 
Nonverbal Approaches 
Nonverbal approaches to deception detection have considered behavioural 
cues including facial expressions and micro-expressions (Ekman, 2001), and finger, 
hand and arm movements (DePaulo et al., 2003) (See Chapter 2). The challenge is 
that non-verbal cues are potentially rare and do not guarantee the presence of 
deception. Furthermore, assigning such cues as being ‘deceptive’, as distinct from 
idiosyncratic behaviour or forms of arousal may bring a potential confound and major 
source of error. In developing a holistic approach to deception non-verbal cues should 
be judged according to context and used alongside other means of detecting deception 
to develop a greater understanding of behaviour. 
Physical deception has been largely neglected as a research focus although 
occurs across a wide-range of areas including sports with athletes feigning 
movements to gain strategic advantage (Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009) and physical 
deception in military campaigns such as the use of dummy tanks during World War 2.  
Such deception in this domain may be uncovered through experience and the 
knowledge of tactics and strategies used by a potential deceiver and contrasting them 
with known capabilities. The physical domain can also manifest in the online 
environment through the proliferation of imagery and video footage of particular 
events (e.g. fake footage of the 9/11 attacks) and as such requires more understanding 
to identify particular vulnerabilities. One emerging area of deception is magic and the 
techniques that are used in magic to misdirect individuals and groups (Gurney, Pine & 
Wiseman, 2013; Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka & Rensink, 2014; Kuhn & Martinez, 2012). 
Although an audience is aware that deception is occurring, knowledge of the 
strategies that magicians use to divert attention may increase ability to detect 
deception in areas where misdirection is common, for example, confidence tricks. 
The Holistic Approach 
To increase ability in veracity assessment across multiple domains and 
contexts a holistic approach to deception is required, with strategies tailored to match 
contextual requirements (See Chapter 2). Through integrating a multiple-cue approach 
(ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a), multiple sources of information, an understanding of the 
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CHAMELEON nature of deceivers (Gozna & Boon, 2010), personality and individual 
differences (e.g. Gozna et al., 2001), and culture (e.g. Bond & Rao, 2004) alongside a 
situationally applicable use of verbal, non-verbal and DRE approaches, a more 
accurate assessment of veracity may be possible. The interpretation and identification 
of deception requires practitioners to incorporate a wide range of factors (Kaina et al., 
2011) including an understanding of background history, culture, personality, 
cognition, surrounding environment and organizational and operational factors 
(Helman, 2007). Further, an understanding of how deception manifests from motives, 
contexts and associated decision-making processes is critical to deception detection. 
This is, especially the case in high stake police, security and intelligence domains 
where a range of challenges are presented to those charged with assessing, identifying 
and responding to threats.  
The multiple-cue approach combines clusters of verbal, paralinguistic and 
nonverbal cues and has the potential to enable greater accuracy in lie-truth 
discrimination in low- and high- stake environments (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; ten 
Brinke & Porter, 2011a; Vrij, Akehurst et al., 2004a; Vrij et al., 2000).  Using verbal 
cues including CBCA criteria, non-verbal cues and facial expressions to detect 
deception in low- and high- stake situations and where rapid judgements are required 
increases accuracy in lie-truth discrimination to the levels of approximately 80-90% 
(ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a; Vrij, Akehurst et al., 2004a; Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij, 
Evans, Akehurst & Mann, 2004).  Although such findings may be context specific and 
base-rates of behaviour may differ, it is important to include a more robust assessment 
of behaviour rather than focussing upon isolated factors in veracity assessment.  
Using multiple sources of information, including multiple narratives, is a 
requirement of any holistic approach to deception detection and employs the use of 
contemporary and traditional methods. Granhag, Strömwall and Jonsson (2003) 
examined pairs of liars and pairs of truth-tellers to uncover how statements may differ 
between multiple suspects in individual interviews across time. Deceivers were found 
to be more consistent in their narrative than truth-tellers (Granhag et al., 2003), 
suggesting that deceivers may overcompensate in maintaining consistency or rely 
upon a pre-ordained script whilst truth-tellers may recall different areas of an event. 
The CAI (Boon & Gozna, 2009; Gozna & Boon, 2010; Taylor & Gozna, 2011 
– See Chapter 2) is a personality led forensic interview approach incorporating a 
wider range of factors than traditional approaches. The breadth and depth of the 
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complexities involved in understanding the CHAMELEON nature of a deceiver 
requires knowledge of motive, personality and likely intent in addition to a talented 
deception detector (Gozna & Boon, 2010). Individual differences may also affect 
people’s ability to detect deception with some individuals more accurate than others 
(Aamodt & Custer, 2006). Work by Ekman and colleagues (O’Sullivan & Ekman, 
2004) have identified individuals who have a ‘natural’ talent for detecting deception 
in laboratory environments, and although these findings have emerged from artificial 
research, it is argued these individuals are best placed to detect deception across a 
range of contexts. The importance of appropriate skills in the detector of deception 
cannot be underestimated, particularly when the various domains and mediums of 
communication are considered. The challenge faced by many organizations is to 
detect deception across many ‘fronts’ and to ensure that those techniques used are 
tailored to the particular need. 
Although there is a temptation to identify and respond to deception as it occurs 
when engaging in interpersonal interactions, the method that has been proven to yield 
greater results is to collate evidence. This can require individuals tasked with 
detecting deceit to experience frustration, however moving into an accusatory phase 
prematurely can result in increased denials. It might be that a denial is irrelevant but 
this will depend on the stakes and context of the deception being identified. The 
principles behind the CAI can be integrated into a holistic approach to deception 
through providing an awareness of the strategies that people use in attempting to 
appear credible and influence conversational partners and the range of variables that 
effect interactions and this will be applicable to both interpersonal and online 
environments. 
Understanding personality traits and disorders, individual differences and 
gender differences (Gozna & Boon 2010; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996; Suckle-Nelson et 
al., 2010) is critical, particularly because of the effect on how people lie, the situations 
they lie in, their motives for lying (Gozna et al., 2001) and how people assess the 
veracity of information (Baker et al., 2012).  Knowledge of a sender’s personality can 
increase our ability to detect deception (Vrij & Graham, 1997) because it enables a 
level of prediction as to how an individual might behave or respond to certain 
situations or questioning. Individuals with high levels of Machiavellianism can be 
more motivated to deceive for self-gain and lack honesty (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996; 
McLeod & Genereux, 2008). Furthermore, manipulativeness and ability to act or role 
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play are associated with lower levels of guilt when engaging in deception (Gozna et 
al., 2001).   
Liars with greater skills in encoding or monitoring their behaviour have 
greater control over their presentation when engaging in deception and can adjust 
their conversational involvement to the person they are interacting with (Burgoon et 
al., 1999). Such skills enable individuals to appear more comfortable and thus more 
credible whilst deceiving others including in their responses to questioning (Burgoon 
et al., 1999; Walczyk et al., 2005). Porter, ten Brinke, Baker and Wallace (2011) 
found that those participants with greater emotional intelligence (EI) were more 
effective at simulating false emotions, but not at concealing genuine felt emotions, 
highlighting the subtlety that individual difference induces when deceiving others. 
Furthermore, individuals high in EI are less susceptive to deceiver’s impression 
management strategies, thus increasing their ability to detect deception (Baker et al., 
2012). This suggests that some individuals will have the ability to feign a reaction to 
an event but only when their true emotional response does not override this.   
In the literature from forensic and clinical mental health and more broadly 
aspects of occupational literature, certain personality characteristics are relevant to the 
consideration of deception (See Chapter 2). Specifically pathological lying and 
instrumental gain can influence motives and behaviour (Taylor & Gozna, 2011) and 
particular personality constructs and those disorders captured under the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 1994).  The dark 
personalities, known as the Dark Triad (Narcissism, Psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism; Paulhus & Williams, 2002) and most recently the Dark Tetrad 
which extends the Triad to include the construct of Sadism (Paulhus, 2013) contain 
aspects of deceitful motives and behaviours. Psychopathy (Cleckley, 1982: Hare, 
1970), Narcissism (Raskin & Hall, 1979) and Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 
1970) should be the focus of certain methods of deception detection with approaches 
tailored accordingly. It is important to understand the influence of personality 
generally and complex/disordered personality when evaluating information in high 
stake contexts and across multiple domains due to the negative impact this might have 
on the detector of lies. 
Cultural differences, religious belief and ideology, and transcultural identity 
are all areas of important consideration when assessing the ability to deceive and 
detect deception. When people are communicating in different languages their ability 
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to detect deception will be affected by language difference leading to implications that 
may benefit the deceiver or the target (Bond & Rao, 2004; Cheng & Broadhurst, 
2005). Further, communication via language interpreters leads to emphasis and 
meaning being literally ‘lost in translation’ or misconstrued and is an increasing 
challenge for those working in police, security and intelligence domains. Deception 
detection abilities across different cultures are similar to chance and comparable to 
accuracy rates from research conducted in Western cultures (Al-Simadi, 2000; Bond 
& Atoum, 2000). The asymmetry of cultural understanding from a Western 
perspective means that certain vulnerabilities are enhanced. For example, 
understanding the North Korean psyche will be more challenging for non-allied 
countries than for those viewing UK or US culture. 
Model Development 
A holistic approach to deception detection drawing from multiple fields and 
approaches in developing a unified framework will enable practitioners to access a 
wider array of tools to detect deception potentially improving ability to assess veracity 
(Whaley, 2006). An in vivo approach to deception detection covers the nuances and 
dynamic nature of the real world enabling the development of a theoretical 
ecologically valid approach to deception detection (Boon & Gozna, 2009). In 
developing a theoretical framework of deception and a framework of individual 
differences a review of traditional and non-traditional approaches was conducted (see 
Appendices 5.1 – 5.2). Each proposed element of the deception and individual 
differences frameworks was assessed by SMEs (N=3) with experience in deception 
detection (3 – 26 years; M=15.67; SD=11.53). Each SME conducting ratings on a 5 
point Likert-type scale of the appropriateness of supporting evidence (Appendices 5.1 
– 5.2), an assessment of utility to a holistic model, whether the element is considered 
universally applicable or context-specific, the elements application to the on- and 
offline domains, the interactivity of the element (the interpersonal dynamics of the 
element), and its application to three potential deception scenarios (see Appendix 5.3). 
Mean averages of rater agreement for the proposed elements and their assessment 
criteria are outlined below (displayed in Table 5.1). 
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Element Appropriate 
Evidence 
Utility Contextual 
Specificity 
Application 
Across 
Domains 
Interactivity Application to 
Police-
Suspect 
Interviews 
Application to 
Online 
Deception 
Application to 
Parole 
Interview 
Verbal 5 3.33 3.33 3 3.67 5 1 5 
Physical 5 3 2.67 3 3.33 5 1.67 3.33 
Social 
Engineering 
5 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 4 3.67 3.33 
Impression 
Management 
5 3.33 3.33 3 3.33 5 5 5 
Written 5 3.33 3.33 3.67 3.33 3.67 5 3.67 
Audio 5 3.33 3 3 3.33 4.33 1 3.67 
Physiological 5 2.67 2.67 2.67 3.33 4 1 1.33 
Mico-
Expressions 
5 3.33 3 2.33 3.33 4.67 1 3.33 
Non-Verbal 5 3 3 2.33 3 4.67 1.67 4 
Identity 5 3 3 2.67 4 4.33 5 4.33 
Plausibility of 
Communication 
5 3.33 3.33 3.33 3 5 5 5 
DRE Approaches 5 2.67 2.33 2 3.33 3.67 1 3.33 
Interaction 5 2.67 2.67 3 3.33 5 5 5 
Personality 5 2.67 3 2.67 2.67 4.67 3 5 
Motivation 5 3 3.67 2.67 3 5 4.67 5 
Stakes 5 3.33 3.67 3.67 3.33 5 4.67 5 
Demographic 5 3.33 3.33 3.33 3 3.67 3 4 
Culture 5 3.33 3.33 3.33 3 3 3 3.67 
Religion 5 3 3 3 3 1.67 1.67 2.67 
Motive/Intent 5 3.33 3.67 3.67 3.33 5 5 5 
Politics & 
Allegiances 
5 3 3 3.33 3 3 3.33 1.67 
Table 5. 1: Holistic Element Assessment
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Through reviewing relevant deception literature across verbal, non-verbal, 
DRE approaches and more recent holistic approaches a framework (displayed in 
Figure 5.1) for detecting deception has been developed, alongside an individual 
differences framework (displayed in Figure 5.2). Utilizing combinations of these 
techniques to match the requirements of specific contexts will enable a more accurate 
assessment of veracity to be developed. 
 
Figure 5. 1: Deception Framework 
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Figure 5. 2: Individual Differences Framework 
The theoretical and individual differences frameworks developed from 
examining the research literature surrounding deception and related areas across 
interpersonal, online and military domains can further be considered as processes of 
interaction across time, that are reflective of changes in the environment rather than as 
singular elements influencing human behaviour. In an examination of forensic 
behaviour across violence in the night time economy, pathways to female terrorism 
and hostage negotiation as a sequence of behaviours rather than variables, Taylor et 
al. (2008) argue that a greater understanding of human behaviour may be developed. 
Adopting this perspective and that of the CAI (Boon & Gozna, 2009) towards a 
holistic and tailored approach to deception detection whilst acknowledging 
personality, individual differences, and culture as surrounding factors effecting 
behaviour of the deceiver and the target, deception may be considered as: i) occurring 
where there is a motive; ii) deceivers strategies will reflect type of interaction and 
communication medium; iii) deception will occur across different communication 
mediums; iv) deception may be detected through multiple approaches reflecting the 
type of interaction and medium; and v) deception detection approaches reflect context 
and availability. 
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Way Forward 
Previous approaches to deception detection are limited as they have focussed 
on weak and isolated cues that may indicate deception but may also indicate other 
forms of emotional and cognitive arousal. Furthermore, research has focussed largely 
on the act of deception in experimental conditions and has neglected real-world 
motives and contexts (Van Koppen, 2012), background personality and individual 
differences (Boon & Gozna, 2009), and the impact of culture. People are potentially 
not good at detecting lies in experimental situations (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) and 
genuine cues to deception in experimental situations are weak (Hartwig & Bond, 
2011) suggesting that in order to improve our deception detection abilities a more 
holistic approach is needed. An awareness of actuarial conditions involved in 
detecting deception is required as no approach has yet reached 100% accuracy and it 
may be considered doubtful that this may be achieved. However, it may be more 
beneficial to examine clusters of cues to deception coupled with a comparison of 
behaviours to baseline behaviours and incongruities between verbal and nonverbal 
behaviours to ensure that a more holistic view of veracity is produced (Aamodt & 
Custer, 2006; Ekman, 2001, p. 147; Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 
2010; Vrij, 2008). 
Future refinement and development of the deception and individual 
differences frameworks proposed should seek to examine a wider breadth of 
knowledge of deception from areas that have not been previously considered as this 
may increase our ability to detect deception (Whaley, 2006). Through incorporating 
academic and practitioner Subject Matter Expert (SME) knowledge across deception, 
security, and intelligence domains a greater understanding of deception and its 
detection may be generated. To enhance our abilities to detect future threats and to 
generate a proactive model of deception the importance of future planning cannot be 
underestimated. Development of future threat scenarios will enable the generation of 
robust, comprehensive responses to deception across interpersonal, online and 
physical domains. In developing a model of deception the operational and experiential 
needs of practitioners needs to be considered in development of a ‘user-friendly’ 
model for individuals with non-psychological expertise. 
To ensure the validity and application of an in vivo holistic approach to 
deception, empirical examination of both individual and multiple elements across 
multiple contexts and domains is required in order to test the robustness, flexibility 
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and dynamism of the model proposed, and its utility in aiding the task of real-world 
deception detection. Such testing would ideally be conducted in empirically valid 
scenarios where individuals are motivated to tell the truth or deceive for instrumental 
gain. Furthermore, research should be conducted in applied settings, for example, 
police interviews, involving audio-visual recording, to assess the application of the 
model to these environments. 
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Chapter 6: Toward a holistic model of deception detection: SME 
validation 
Introduction: 
 Traditional approaches to detecting deception have sought to assess veracity 
through analysing verbal, non-verbal and paralinguistic behaviours (Vrij, 2008). 
Recent approaches have attempted to increase behavioural differences between truth-
tellers and deceivers through increasing cognitive load and tailoring interviewing 
strategies (Colwell et al., 2013). Reid, Gozna and Boon (2012) propose a theoretical 
holistic model of deception incorporating traditional and DRE (Colwell et al., 2013) 
approaches to veracity assessment alongside multiple-cue and multiple-sourcing 
approaches, and a consideration of the effects of culture, personality and individual 
differences, motive and mindset. In this chapter I discuss interpersonal, online, 
military and holistic approaches to deception detection and the further validation of a 
holistic approach to deception through discussions with SMEs including researchers 
and practitioners working in diverse fields of deception. The current chapter builds 
upon the initial model development and piloting outlined in Chapter 5 through 
incorporating the knowledge of a wide range of SMEs across interpersonal, online 
and military deception and related areas to develop a comprehensive model of 
deception detection. 
 
Interpersonal Approaches 
Established techniques for detecting deception in verbal communication 
include SVA (Kӧhnken, 2004), RM (Sporer, 2004), and LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 
2007) (See Chapter 2). Although these techniques were developed for examining 
interpersonal communication there is potential application to mediated 
communication. For example, LIWC has been applied to examine linguistic 
differences between truth-tellers and deceivers in mediated communication (Hancock 
et al., 2005). However, SVA and RM will have limited application to mediated 
environments as they require in depth statements with which to analyse credibility and 
are further reliant on the voluntary provision of information, which, realistically, not 
all deceivers will be willing or able to provide. 
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 Cognitive approaches challenge deceiver’s narrative through increasing cues 
to deception related to cognitive load, whilst increasing truth-tellers ability to recall 
events in regard of more detail and accuracy (Vrij, 2015b) (See Chapter 2). 
Questioning approaches relate to strategic (Hartwig et al., 2006) and tactical (Dando 
& Bull, 2011) interviewing challenge the deceiver’s prepared narratives through 
evidence-disclosure, resulting in sacrifice of statement consistency to maintain 
statement-evidence consistency. DRE techniques have the potential to be adapted to 
online contexts where there is an interactional element (Colwell et al., 2013), although 
it is anticipated that the effectiveness of these techniques will be mitigated by 
conversational involvement of the deceiver and the sophistication of the deception 
employed, including supporting collateral information. In the Reid et al. (2012) 
model, DRE approaches are identified as part of a holistic approach to deception 
where their primary use will be in specific contexts involving conversational 
interaction. 
 Non-verbal approaches to detecting deception focus largely on isolated cues to 
deception including facial expressions and micro-expressions (Ekman, 2001; ten 
Brinke et al., 2011; ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a; ten Brinke, Porter & Baker, 2012), 
and hand and finger movements (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008) (See Chapter 2). 
The nature of behaviour displayed in real-world situations is critical to understanding 
deception, and therefore it is important for the present model development to evaluate 
the application of research from laboratory settings for ecological validity.  For 
example, although offenders may increase body movements when deceiving to 
enhance credibility or distract the observer from their verbal content (Porter, England, 
Juodis, ten Brinke & Wilson, 2008), the content of the discussion, the purpose of the 
interaction, the personality, motive and mindset all require incorporation into the 
interpretation of such behaviour from the ‘baseline’. Understanding the context of an 
interaction in addition to baseline behaviour is critical to identify behavioural 
responses when particular questions are posed (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010) – for 
example, behaviour may change due to questioning around historical trauma rather 
than due to deceit. Through monitoring individuals’ behaviour discrepancies may be 
noted and used to direct follow-up questioning (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). This 
consideration has applicability across interpersonal and online environments utilising 
visual content. 
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Online Approaches 
 Deception detection in online contexts may be challenging (Giordano, George, 
Marett & Keane, 2011) and requires consideration of linguistic patterns (Hancock et 
al., 2005), the use of ‘warrants’ to confirm a sender’s identity (Warkentin, 
Woodworth, Hancock & Cormier, 2010), ‘digital footprints’ and ‘scent trails’ to 
uncover malign intent (Sandham et al., 2011), and adaptations of computer-mediated 
investigative interviewing approaches (Colwell et al., 2013; George, Marett & Tilley, 
2008; Jenkins & Dando, 2011) (See Chapter 3). In mediated communication deceivers 
may present as more verbose, have fewer self-oriented pronouns, greater other-
oriented pronouns, and use more sensory descriptions than truth-tellers (Hancock et 
al., 2005). In regard of the influence of third party opinions, Ott, Choi, Cardie and 
Hancock (2011) examined the linguistic features of online reviews to identify truthful 
and deceptive opinions and found that truthful reviews contained more concrete and 
sensorial language and were more accurate about spatial information, whilst deceivers 
focussed upon elements not directly related to the subject they were reviewing and, in 
contrast to previous research (Hancock, Curry, Goorha & Woodworth, 2008; 
Newman et al., 2003), used more positive language. This has implications for 
understanding the content of opinions and speeches posted in online environments, 
especially in higher stake situations where such views can sway public belief and 
behaviour, for example, reviews may have a large impact on auction fraud, whilst 
deceptive opinions may affect support for on-going regional conflicts. 
 In the online environment the ability to alter true identity benefits those who 
engage in malign acts, regardless of the deceptive nature of the behaviour. Hence 
altering personal information to create a more genuine impression is considered 
acceptable in some contexts, for example, online dating.  However the malign intent 
of a child sexual offender purporting to be a child while grooming a victim, or a 
sadistic stalker who presents in a chameleon manner provides a more concerning 
presentation of behaviour and intent. This becomes further problematic when 
offending behaviour is online and offline and individuals use aliases to reduce the 
likelihood of detection.  The use of ‘warrants’ enable links to be examined between an 
individual’s real-world and online identities (Warkentin et al., 2010) and deception 
may occur more routinely in online chat environments that enable greater anonymity, 
and less often in the use of email where warrants are visible but can be modified to 
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mislead. Although examining ‘warrants’ may be a useful strategy for assessing 
credibility in low-stakes online interactions, in high-stake interactions the levels of 
sophistication employed by groups and individuals to cover their identities and tracks 
are greater, as is the motivation, level of resources and ability to manipulate. 
 Uncovering hidden deception and malign intent across interpersonal and 
online environments can include the identification of ‘digital footprints’, ‘digital 
exhaust’ or ‘scent trails’ that can be coupled with collateral evidence such as 
surveillance footage (Forster, 2012; Sandham et al., 2011). Although rarely the focus 
of traditional deception approaches, examining patterns of behaviour, including email 
communications, online statements and online searches of information about potential 
targets (Forster, 2012) may enable the identification of concealed actions. In a holistic 
approach to deception, a proactive stance is required where potential adversaries are 
being monitored to ensure that information is collated and assessed for deceit. 
Furthermore, there is potential for collected evidence to be later used in investigative 
interviews with which to challenge suspect’s narratives. 
  
Military Approaches 
Approaches to detecting deception in the military environment have focussed 
on ACH (Heuer, 1999; Stech & Elsässer, 2003; Stech & Elsässer, 2004), the Busby-
Whaley Ombudsmen technique, and a more holistic approach to counter-deception 
advocated by Bennett and Waltz (2007) (See Chapter 4). ACH consists of a series of 
steps firstly involving the identification of possible hypotheses, secondly listing 
evidence and assumptions for and against each hypothesis, thirdly drawing tentative 
conclusions about the likelihood of each hypothesis, analysis of the sensitivity of the 
conclusion to significant evidence, and lastly the identification of future observations 
that would confirm or eliminate the hypotheses (Stech & Elsässer, 2003). ACH has 
been applied to historical incidents of deception including the D-Day landings (Stech 
& Elsässer, 2003) and the Battle of Midway (Stech & Elsässer, 2004). To counter 
confirmation biases and aid decision-making Heuer (2005) recommends that there 
should be an increased emphasis on seeking refutations for hypotheses rather than 
confirmations.  ACH is a promising method of supporting decision-making processes 
involved in detecting deception, as there is the potential to incorporate a broader range 
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of factors including human behaviour, motivation, intent and mindset alongside 
evidence developed from HUMINT. 
Whaley and Busby (2002) propose a theory of counter-deception based upon 
approaches applicable to multiple contexts. They identified nine categories of cues 
(pattern, players, intention, payoff, place, time, strength, style and channel) which are 
elements that the deceiver may conceal or reveal during deception (Whaley & Busby, 
2002). The major principle of this approach is the ‘plus-minus rule’ where cues may 
indicate deception by their presence or absence and the ‘congruity-incongruity rule’ is 
suggested where deception may prove challenging to identify and requires further 
investigation (Whaley & Busby, 2002). Techniques argued to detect deception 
include: ‘Locard’s exchange principle’ – where a deceiver may leave evidence at the 
scene and take some away; ‘verification’ – of the deception; ‘the law of multiple 
sensors’ – examination of multiple channels for deceit; ‘passive and active detection’ 
– the examination of current evidence and the search for further evidence; ‘pre-
detection’ – where understanding an adversary’s deception modus operandi, goals and 
capabilities may uncover potential deception; ‘penetration and counterespionage’ – 
uncovering an adversary’s plans through espionage and neutralising adversary 
operatives to protect target infrastructure; ‘the prepared mind and intuition’ – where 
preparation for deception and the intuition to detect it enables counter-deception; and 
‘indirect thinking and the third option’ – the ability to detect potential adversary 
options for deception is required for counter-deception. Whaley and Busby’s (2002) 
final element is the ‘Ombudsman Method’ where irrelevances, discrepancies and 
misdirection are examined alongside indirect thinking and intuition (Bennett & Waltz, 
2007). This approach to deception detection appears promising where elements may 
be adopted towards a holistic approach particularly in regard to using multiple sources 
of HUMINT, and active detection of deception alongside alternative ways of 
considering threats. 
 
Holistic Approaches 
Holistic approaches to deception have sought to use combinations of verbal 
and non-verbal cues (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a), and 
knowledge of background, personality, cognition, culture and environmental factors 
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(Kaina et al., 2011) to increase accuracy in detecting deception. Furthermore, as 
veracity assessment may be adversely affected in cognitively challenging and group 
decision-making environments (Kaina et al., 2011) there is a need to implement a 
bespoke holistic approach to deception detection which incorporates an understanding 
of decision-making to counter potential vulnerabilities. 
Bennett and Waltz’s (2007) counter-deception approach examines 
‘intelligence functions’ including deception cues, deception detection and exposure, 
adversary discovery and penetration alongside ‘operational functions’ incorporating 
mitigation and exploitation of adversary deception. These functions are argued to be 
highly interdependent and present deception as a continuum of functions rather than 
individual elements (Bennett & Waltz, 2007). Human reasoning and self-assessment 
of our own beliefs and methods of intelligence gathering and intelligence-gathering 
channels will identify potential vulnerabilities potentially mitigating the effects of 
deception (Bennett & Waltz, 2007). Multiple channels of information should be used 
to ensure a greater range of HUMINT with which to assess credibility (Bennett & 
Waltz, 2007). Threat and situation assessments are required to understand the 
influences and circumstances in which deception may occur (Bennett & Waltz, 2007) 
and such approaches parallel more recent psychological approaches to understanding 
high-stakes future intent (Gozna & Lawday, 2015). Bennett and Waltz (2007) 
recommend incongruity testing and ACH as tools for detecting deception, and 
combined with psychological deception detection methods outlined by Reid et al. 
(2012) more accurate credibility assessment will occur. 
In order to increase accuracy in the detection of deception in complex 
operating environments, Reid et al. (2012) propose using a combination of verbal, 
nonverbal and paralinguistic cues to deception alongside a consideration of 
personality and individual differences, motive, mindset and consideration of decision-
making. Cues are argued to reflect context and may not be applicable across all 
instances of deception (Adams & Harpster, 2008; Harpster, Adams & Jarvis, 2009). 
The multiple cue approach to the detection of deception has to date incorporated 
consideration of low-stakes (Vrij, Akehurst et al., 2004a), high stakes (Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2010) and rapid judgement (Vrij, Evans et al., 2004) environments and hence 
such evidence supports a holistic, tailored approach. Reid et al. (2012) propose 
multiple-sourcing alongside multiple-cues whereby different sources of information 
can be examined for consistency increasing available knowledge for credibility 
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judgements. The incorporation of the CHAMLEON Approach (Gozna & Boon, 2010) 
into a holistic approach to deception by Reid et al. (2012) highlights that individual’s 
behaviour and the strategies they use to present themselves change across contexts. 
The impact of culture, religiosity and belief system on deception is highly relevant to 
emerging global challenges and its incorporation into a holistic approach to deception 
is required (Reid et al., 2012).  
 A bespoke, tailored approach to deception creates individual assessments of 
veracity across situations and ultimately meets the requirements of practitioners. An 
in vivo approach to research proposed by Boon and Gozna (2009) outlines guidelines 
for conducting research whereby a theoretical model is first proposed and refined 
before validation and application to real-world environments. The current research 
seeks to refine and expand the theoretical holistic approach to deception developed by 
Reid et al. (2012) through interviews with SMEs in deception. In military 
environments there are limited opportunities for practitioners to develop skills 
necessary in countering adversary deception and in deceiving others; to overcome this 
limitation Whaley and Busby (2002) and Whaley (2007) propose an incorporation of 
knowledge from a wide range of areas to identify techniques used to uncover 
deception. Through adopting an in vivo approach to research and incorporating a wide 
range of SME knowledge a more robust approach to deception detection can be 
developed. 
 
Method 
Participants 
An opportunity, snowballing sample enabled the recruitment of 19 SMEs in 
deception and influence. The sample comprised 14 (74%) males and 5 (26%) females, 
of which, 15 (79%) were European and 4 (21%) were North American. The average 
length of expertise within the SME cohort was 17.6 years (SD = 11.46) ranging from 
5 to 42 years’ experience. Participants had expertise in both singular and multiple 
areas of deception and influence. Overall participants had expertise in the following 
areas: interpersonal deception (N = 12), online deception (N = 6), military deception 
(N = 5), influence (N = 2) and personality (N = 4). 
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Materials 
A series of parallel interview schedules were developed for the interpersonal, 
online and military domains of deception and credibility assessment (Appendix 6.1). 
Interview questions were designed to elicit SMEs knowledge of deception to validate 
and refine the holistic model of deception developed in Chapter 5. Interview questions 
were focussed around the environments in which deception occurs, strategies that 
deceivers use to convince others of their credibility, the potential impact of 
personality on deception, current strategies of deception detection and potential ways 
to improve them, parallels between the domains of deception, and the identification of 
potential future threats. For example, the interpersonal deception section contained 
questions including “What strategies do you believe that liars use in their attempts to 
influence people that they are telling the truth? (Include strategies related to verbal 
and nonverbal impression management, the concealment of emotions etc.)”, whilst the 
military deception section contained questions including “Which are the more 
concerning forms of deception in the military context – online or 
physical/behavioural?”. 
 A digital Dictaphone was used to record interviews which were stored 
securely on an Ironkey to ensure security and transcribed verbatim.  Hardcopies were 
additionally stored in a secure environment. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were initially approached via email or face-to-face contact and 
followed up by an email inviting them to participate in research seeking to develop a 
holistic model of deception. Of the 41 individuals who were asked to participate in the 
research, 19 agreed. A general interview schedule was included as an email 
attachment to enable participants to examine the questions being asked of them, 
although interviews were further tailored to SMEs areas of expertise. Due to the 
nature of some of the work undertaken by SMEs approached, two different interview 
schedules were made available to participants, one interview schedule including 
interpersonal and online topics (Appendix 6.2) was provided to participants without 
appropriate clearances and another interview schedule including interpersonal, online 
and military topics (Appendix 6.1) was provided to those participants with appropriate 
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clearances. Once participants had read through the information sheet (Appendix 6.3) 
and agreed to participate in the research they were informed that their data would be 
anonymised and stored in a secure location, that they had a two-week window to 
withdraw their data if they so chose and that their data would be used as part of a PhD 
thesis and in further journal articles (See Appendix 6.4 for consent forms). 
Participants were then interviewed at a location of their choice and convenience. 
Following the interviews participants were debriefed about the aims of the research 
and thanked for their input (see Appendix 6.5). Ethical approval for this research was 
granted by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology of the University of 
Lincoln (see Appendix 6.6). 
 
Data Analysis 
 Responses were transcribed verbatim and treated from a critical realist 
perspective (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Braun & Clarke, 2013) where responses were 
considered as reflecting reality whilst acknowledging they were generated as part of 
the interview procedure. An explanatory thematic analysis (Guest, MacQueen & 
Namey, 2012) at the semantic level was conducted according to the conventions 
outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006 - See Appendix 6.7). First, familiarisation with 
the data set occurred through transcription, and initial idea generation. Second, initial 
coding of relevant data was conducted. Third, codes were gathered together into 
themes. Fourth, themes were reviewed against coded extracts and the entire data set. 
Fifth, clear naming and defining of themes was conducted, followed by the sixth 
stage, construction of the report. The explanatory thematic analysis resulted in the 
generation of 5 meta-themes across the process of deception. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
Findings 
Analysis of SMEs responses led to the identification of 5 meta-themes related 
to the process of deception and its detection, including the meta-themes of ‘Deceiver’, 
‘Intent’, ‘Deception Tactics’, ‘Interpretation’ and ‘Target’ (See Figure 6.1). These 
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themes put forward a comprehensive view of deception from the acts of the deceiver, 
to the intent to deceive, to the components of the deception itself, the processes of 
interpreting information, and the elements of the target itself, including a focus upon 
target vulnerabilities (See Appendix 6.8). These themes highlight a wide range of 
techniques for examining veracity and through adapting these techniques to match 
specific contexts then more accurate deception detection can occur. 
 
 
Figure 6. 1: Holistic Model of Deception 
Deceiver 
The first meta-theme identified from the dataset was ‘Deceiver’, this meta-
theme incorporates sub-themes related to ‘Impression Management’, ‘Stakes’, 
‘Motivation’, ‘Background History’, ‘Deceiver Vulnerabilities’, ‘Target Audience 
Analysis’, and ‘Planning Spontaneity’. The themes examine factors influencing how 
the deceiver makes decisions regarding deception and their potential ability to appear 
DECEIVER 
•Stakes 
• Impression 
Management 
•Motivation 
•Background History 
•Target Audience 
Analysis 
•Planning 
Spontaneity 
•Deceiver 
Vulnerabilities 
INTENT 
•Behaviour 
•Attitude 
•Motive 
DECEPTION 
TACTICS 
•Context 
•Control of 
Information 
• Influencers 
•Replicating Genuine 
Behaviour 
INTERPRETATION 
•Source Attributes 
•Risk 
•Questioning/Intervie
wing Strategy 
•Detecting Methods 
•Surveillance/ISTAR 
TARGET 
•Decision-Making 
•Stakes 
• Individual 
Differences 
•Motivation 
•Capabilities and 
Resources 
 72 
credible whilst deceiving. ‘Impression Management’ examines the strategies which 
the deceiver uses to appear credible to others across different environments.  
“I think it’s about creating an impression in the other person of credibility 
erm and honesty and being able to attach to it so so to an extent the strategies 
can be within the lie erm that the information presented is such that someone 
believes it to be credible and plausible but you can also have additional 
peripheral elements that you present with your verbal deception that just allow 
an impression to be given that you are a credible person” (Participant A: 
Lines 118-123) 
 
Participant A highlights how ‘Impression Management’ requires strategies in face-to-
face encounters that are credible, plausible and create an impression to another that 
you are honest. 
 
“so there’s gonna be a a different form of impression management I suppose 
it’s gonna be at least with a strictly you know linguistic communication you’re 
not gonna be you’re not gonna be as concerned about er what’s going on your 
face or your body language you’re gonna be mainly focussed on you know 
convincing the person of whatever it is you’re trying to convince them through 
your er language” (Participant C: Lines 817-821) 
 
Participant C highlights the changes in forms of ‘Impression Management’ that reflect 
the online environment, where communication can be primarily verbal and less 
emphasis is placed on non-verbal behaviour to convince another person. 
 
“we know from research that when people say that when they lie or intend to 
lie they try to say as little as possible” (Participant G: Lines 173-174) 
 
Participant G shows how ‘Impression Management’ can be very simple in 
how individual’s attempt to adjust their behaviour to appear credible, highlighting the 
variety of strategies that individuals will use to appear credible in different contexts. 
Previous research has focussed upon how people manage their statements (e.g. 
Hartwig et al., 2010) and body language (e.g. Hines et al., 2010) and Gozna & Boon 
(2010) proposed a series of distinct personality-based behaviours which are used to 
influence and persuade others of their credibility. Online approaches to impression 
management have focussed upon the design features of websites and how people 
present themselves, for example, in online dating profiles (Toma, Hancock & Ellison, 
2008). Incorporating ‘Impression Management’ into a holistic model of deception will 
enable practitioners assessing veracity in security and intelligence settings to 
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understand the ways in which people and information are constructed to appear 
credible according to context. 
The ‘Stakes’ of a situation, what the deceiver has to gain or lose, will affect a 
deceiver’s approach to deception in how they formulate deceptive content, how they 
may react across contexts and their success at deception.  
“individual differences account for a lot in terms of what the stakes are to the 
deceiver whether they’re high or not how they need to present it and also how 
they perceive the target of their lie to be in terms of the likelihood of them 
being found out” (Participant A: Lines 106-109) 
 
Participant A explains how the stakes of a committing an act of deception effect how 
the deceiver presents themselves and how they perceive the target of their deception. 
Participant B highlights how the stakes of a situation may also make it easier to detect 
deception as it increases behavioural cues to deception. 
 
“so looking at high stakes situations not only are you more likely to be able to 
detect the lie erm because of like motivational impairment and er all kinds of 
other theories erm that accompany behavioural cues to deception when the 
stakes are high” (Participant B: Lines 65-67) 
 
High-stakes situations may prove more challenging to appear credible (e.g. ten 
Brinke et al., 2011) than in low-stakes situations where deceit may have little 
consequence and impact on cues to deception. High-stakes situations are argued to 
increase anxiety and cognitive load in some deceivers leading to the identification of 
cues to deceit (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). However, in strategic environments 
deceivers may place more emphasis upon carefully designing deception plans to avoid 
highlighting cues to deceit. Hence the sophistication of the planning from the 
perspective of the deceiver should mirror the ability of the lie detector to identify the 
likely strategies and focus of the deceit. 
The ‘Motivation’ of the deceiver will have an impact on how they deceive 
others and the deceiver’s motivation is closely linked to the ‘Stakes’ of the situation:  
“well erm I would say from the (noise) motivated to succeed (noise) will do 
more of the elaborate lies and erm that might then lead to your downfall 
because the wonderful thing is the more you tell people erm the more there is 
to follow up” (Participant H: Lines 270-272) 
 
“you know so if you’re really motivate if it’s very important to you that you 
succeed in the lie you are likely to feel more anxious about it erm which might 
produce some cues but also obviously anxiety can affect your frontal 
functioning so it might exacerbate the effects of cognitive load … so you 
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might also produce more cues related to cognitive load erm and also the more 
motivated you are the more you’re going to try and control your behaviour um 
which will probably have the converse effect or the inverse effect that your 
behaviour becomes more inhibited or rigid” (Participant R: Lines 563-571) 
 
Participants H and R both highlight that the motivation to succeed in an act of 
deception has the potential to negatively effect the deceiver as they will create more 
elaborate acts of deception which may be later verified whilst also increasing potential 
cues to deception related to cognitive load and body language. Participant Q explore 
another important element of motivation, in the need to understand a deceiver’s 
motivation for conducting deception. 
 
“so surely you you cannot conduct interviews or understand deceit or 
anything unless you know the motivations behind why people commit you 
know you’ve got that that’s the key isn’t it I’d say one of the major keys to 
understanding or trying to at least understand” (Participant Q: Lines 832-835) 
 
 
In interpersonal deception, motivation has been found to impair deceiver’s 
ability to deceive others (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang & O’Brien, 1988) as the 
deceiver’s cognitive load and anxiety may increase leading to cues to deception 
appearing (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). However, this may not occur in all 
circumstances as individual differences will have an effect on cognitive abilities 
during interviewing. In the online environment ‘Motivation’ has an enhancing effect 
on deception where cues available to detect deception in the real world are lacking 
(Hancock et al., 2010). This would suggest that motivated deceivers will seek to 
influence others through online communication channels where there is an increased 
chance of success; however, this may be mediated by the deceiver’s expertise in 
deception and the impact of communication channels. ‘Motivation’ will affect how far 
the deceiver is willing to plan their deception and this may vary according to goals 
and the context in which to achieve these goals. 
‘Background History’ of the deceiver, including their personality disposition, 
individual differences, their culture and language, and previous interactions with the 
target is required in a holistic model of deception as this will affect their interactions 
with the target and the strategies they use to deceive them. This includes their mindset 
at the commencement of the deceit.  
“and then the really clever people think of lots of alternative ways of of 
achieving it but the expert deceivers got the the third option which is 
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something so out the box so left field that it it can’t even be classified in the 
alternative ways of thinking” (Participant D: Lines 377-379) 
 
Participant D highlights how a deceiver’ expertise will enable them to develop 
more creative ways of conducting deception, whilst Participant F focuses on 
behaviours associated with explicit personality types which influence their 
interactions with others. Participant Q further expands on this through discussing a 
deceiver’s background with criminality and interactions with law enforcement. 
 
“is psychopathic erm they are certainly capable of lying but the objectives 
there are a combination of impulsiveness or can be a combination of 
compulsiveness and complete disregard for anybody else erm in relation to 
whatever their objective” (Participant F: Lines 262-265) 
 
“from the type of person they are the background whether they’ve had 
interaction with the police before what type of crime we think they might have 
committed” (Participant Q: Lines 551-552). 
 
Knowledge of an adversary’s background history, culture, individual 
differences and mindset factors (Kaina et al., 2011; Porter, ten Brinke, Baker & 
Wallace, 2011) can increase our ability to accurately detect deception; the current 
research further incorporates knowledge of personality and its impact on deception, 
alongside knowledge of previous interactions with the adversary and what the 
outcomes were. Therefore the model considers the dynamic assessment of deception 
over protracted periods of time in addition to situations where an individual lies in a 
spontaneous manner. An individual’s culture and language will present additional 
challenges to veracity assessors as this affects how they will view information 
presented by a deceiver from another culture (Gerwehr, 2006). In multicultural 
operating environments an awareness of the impact of culture is required to avoid 
decision-making errors. Gozna and Boon (2010) highlight that individual’s 
background histories and previous experiences will affect how they will behave in 
future interactions, and these same principles can be applied to the holistic model of 
deception. 
‘Deceiver Vulnerabilities’ will affect how the deceiver will appear credible to 
others and open up pathways of detecting deception. The impact of emotional arousal, 
cognitive load and decision-making biases will adversely affect the deceiver’s ability 
to appear credible. 
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“more cognitive load it just increases all of those um you know theoretical er 
bases for cues to deception and so I think that its its huge in terms of 
increasing the amount of behavioural leakage” (Participant B: Lines 296-298) 
 
Participant B states that through increasing cognitive load there is a potential 
to increase behavioural leakage in the deceiver and which in turn increases theoretical 
cues to deception making the deceiver more vulnerable. Participant R identifies a 
potential deceiver vulnerability in the specific context of emotional appeals where 
deceiver’s display fake emotions which may enable them to appear credible but 
actually help to detect their deception. 
 
“when I’m looking at appeals um one of the things that I’ve noticed is that 
people who are making deceptive appeals they tend to put on these displays of 
fake emotions they pretend to cry quite often” (Participant R: Lines 64-67) 
 
The lack of emotions in some contexts adversely affects deceivers whereby 
they fail to present emotions that are expected and that truth-tellers often experience 
(ten Brinke & Porter, 2011a). Cognitive load adversely affects deceivers as it reduces 
capacity to present a credible argument (e.g. Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011a). 
These vulnerabilities in the deceiver can be exploited during the ‘Interpretation’ 
phase of the model and cues to deceit identified. 
When seeking to influence others, especially in strategic contexts, ‘Target 
Audience Analysis’ is often conducted which will enable an influencer to develop an 
enhanced understanding of the audience and identify key individuals and 
organisations to target. 
“I think a lot of the time we don’t we think that there’s a one size fits all 
approach to how people tell a lie but I think from the liars’ perspective they 
have to tailor their deception to the target” (Participant A: Lines 112-114) 
 
Participant A states that there is a need to understand that deceiver’s tailor 
their act of deception to the target and that not all deceivers use the same strategy. 
Participant K expands the concept of undertstanding the target further through 
incorporating specialist knowledge from cultural advisors and academics before 
developing further knowledge through interaction with potential targets. The approach 
stated by Participant K expands how understanding the target may be expanded from 
just one target to larger audiences where different influence approaches may be 
required. 
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“when you’re doing a target audience analysis phase you should er especially 
with social media that’s when you start so not only do you have you’re 
cultural advisors not only do you have your you know you’re academics 
coming to you and saying well this you know I’ve researched the history of 
this country and this is how it developed blah blah blah all that could be stuff 
that you need to know you should immediately have a team starting to talk to 
people in the area to see if if the er if academias er research balances with 
today’s reality” (Participant K: Lines 580-594) 
 
“provide false information er but they they’re able to provide that false 
information because their audience or the subject that that they’re trying to 
convince wants to be convinced and because they are in at that time under 
those emotional conditions they are gullible” (Participant M: Lines 380-383) 
 
Participant M shows how understanding a target’s emotions at different points 
of time may make the more vulbnerable to deception. An influencer’s ability to 
successfully conduct ‘Target Audience Analysis’ affects their ability to influence the 
target through whatever strategy has been selected for influence, and deceiver skill 
will play a role in how effective this is (Mackay & Tatham, 2011). Although ‘Target 
Audience Analysis’ as a concept has emerged from strategic environments the idea of 
influencers carefully selecting and exploiting the target can be seen in both 
interpersonal and online environments. 
The deceiver may carefully develop or spontaneously perform an act of 
deception to a specific target and ‘Planning Spontaneity’ emerged as a sub-theme in 
the data. 
“if you’re looking at an interview somebody who had been arrested and has 
been suspected of commitment of an offence so we are kind of the inquisitor in 
changing them if I am trying to convince somebody that I am a wonderful 
person erm in interview for a job or be it er to join er I don’t know a secret 
(noise) I have to actively do something more to convince somebody I have to 
more… that I am a genuine person so that’s its its different levels and different 
levels of preparation” (Participant H: Lines 227-234) 
 
Participant H explains how different levels of preparation are required for 
different interviewing situations where there is a need to appear credible. 
Alternatively Participant J explains how there is often a lack of planning in some 
phishing emails as the deceiver is targeting people who are more vulnerable meaning 
they do not place as much emphasis on the presentation of the emails. 
 
“you typically find all kinds of English grammatical and usage errors um 
rarely do you find er graphics or or email layouts that actually look 
professional um so I think people just don’t people are are kind of going for 
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the low hanging fruit anyway and I guess for for the low hanging fruit you 
don’t really need to have that professional of a of a presentation” (Participant 
J: Lines 222-226) 
 
Participant N shows how individuals with specific personality types, for 
example, psychopaths, may not place much emphasis on planning and are more 
spontaneous in their behaviour. 
 
“they actually they aren’t what ive seen in c connection with cases is 
psychopaths aren’t very good liars what they do is deny anything anything 
they did until er the the point in time that it’s a er its its undeniable” 
(Participant N: Lines 247-249) 
 
The level of planning that the deceiver puts into their deception will affect 
their ability to convince others that they are credible (Strömwall & Willén, 2011). The 
current research highlights that poor planning can be identified or that deceiver’s 
strategies may subsequently collapse from challenges to their narrative. However, in 
long-term strategic deception, planning will play far great emphasis highlighting 
adversaries should be monitored and assessed for threat. 
 
Intent 
A need to understand the ‘Intent’ of the deceiver emerged from the data as a 
meta-theme, whereby understanding an individual’s motive and intent for engaging in 
deception will enable preparation for adversary deception to prevent vulnerabilities 
(Gozna & Lawday, 2015). From the analysis it is apparent that SMEs believe that 
deception only occurs when there is intent: 
“if you’re interviewing somebody who you know has a sexual interest in 
children and you know that they want to be released from prison they will be 
highly motivated to present to you in a positive honest and credible fashion 
regardless of whether or not they have every intention on release from prison 
of abusing another child” (Participant A: Lines 197-201) 
 
Participant A shows how intent to be released from prison will guide the 
manner in which an offender will present themselves as credible and honest, whilst 
Participant F shows an individual being interviewed will have an intent to deceive to 
avoid incriminating themselves. 
“and suddenly it all becomes very hazy at important bits charitable people 
might say that this is dissociation I’m saying it’s because they don’t want to 
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go there and incriminate themselves further motive and personality once 
again” (Participant F: Lines 51-53) 
Participant M highlights intent for deception through the need to increase 
survivability in a combat situation. 
“is making somebody believe I’m somewhere where I’m not if I’m in an 
aeroplane and I’m very much aviation based if I’m in an aeroplane and 
somebody is looking at me with a radar then er I want to destroy his 
perception I want to er effect his situational awareness even if its only slightly 
it can cau it can give me a greater survivability’ (Participant M: Lines 37-41) 
 
These differning intents to deceive whether to avoid being incarcerated for an 
act of criminality or to increase survival chances in a combat situation show a strong 
need to understand that deception occurs which there is intent. Past research has 
sought to uncover malign intent through questioning strategies (Granhag & Knieps, 
2011), however it may be more pertinent to understand intent as part of a holistic 
approach to deception where the intent to deceive is regulated by adversary aims and 
motives and how situational elements will affect the timing of when deception occurs. 
This presents implications for how research into deception detection is conducted 
where participants are often automatically assigned to deception or truth-telling 
conditions excluding an individual’s intent to deceive in specific contexts. 
 
Deception Tactics 
The third meta-theme of ‘Deception Tactics’ emerged from the dataset where 
the role of context is highlighted and different tactics for controlling information, 
influencing and deceiving the target are outlined. Sub-themes related to ‘Deception 
Tactics’ include: ‘Context’, ‘Control of Information’, ‘Influencers’, and ‘Replicating 
Genuine Behaviour’. 
‘Context’ plays a large role in which tactic the deceiver will employ against 
the target, and how the situation, including communication channel, may change the 
form of interaction. Online communication has changed elements of the deception 
context, where there is a greater, scale and reach of deceit and the potential for 
anonymity in interactions. 
“at deception then erm exactly the same principles are employed now really er 
with regard to the military some of the contextual changes are obviously the 
rise of technology a proliferation of communications technologies extended 
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range ability to deploy force at range for example use of drones” (Participant 
D: Lines 54-57) 
 
Participant D has extensive experience in military deception and agues that the 
same principles exist behind deception although there has been contextual changes 
with the development of communication technologies which have increased the range 
for deception. 
 
“we’re now doing amazon reviews where we look at the language of deception 
and um we find some really interesting things around (real) reviews fake 
reviews and they differ depending on erm what the context is and I think this is 
a really important point that the online world is making very clear to us and 
that is um when we look at language and deception we can’t be thinking about 
universal cues erm if we ever should have been thinking about universal cues 
… something like Pinocchio’s nose in language we need to think about what is 
the actual deception context and what are the psy psychological and 
psycholinguistic implications for that context” (Participant P: Lines 187-197) 
 
Participant P has been conducting research across a variety of online 
environments and his identified linguistic differences between different mediated 
environments. Participant P refers to the need for understanding cues to deception 
within context rather than seeking cues to deception that are the same across all 
contexts. Participant R describes context from a different perspective where 
individual’s being interviewed for crimes will have different deception tactics 
reflecting their specific crime. 
 
“these people being interviewed you know some of them are lying about erm 
burglary some of them are lying about murder some of them are lying about 
rape and I think it’s likely that behaviours related to deception might also be 
context specific” (Participant R: Lines 98-101) 
 
Previous research into deception has generally ignored the context of 
deception and how this impacts upon interactions between individuals and whether 
cues to deception are actually generalizable across contexts. Research by Gozna and 
Boon (2010) highlights understanding that people will behave according to the 
context they are in, this can further be expanded to how groups and organisations may 
seek to influence and deceive others according to the situation. The holistic model of 
deception places a strong emphasis upon context and the situational factors that may 
lead to a deceiver choosing a specific tactic of deception. 
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‘Control of Information’ enables the deceiver to control what information is 
portrayed to the target. Through increasing the amount of information the target 
receives, the deceiver can increase target ambiguity and cognitive load as there will be 
more information to process reducing the target’s ability to respond to a situation. 
Through decreasing the amount of information the target receives target ambiguity is 
also increased as the target will have less information with which to assess veracity. 
“why is it that that individual erm suddenly became excessively fluent erm and 
it may be of significance but in psychoanalytic erm therapy erm blocking and 
fluidity erm excessive fluency are key signs when someone’s trying to conceal 
something” (Participant F: Lines 568-570)  
 
Participant F refers to the deceiver controlling information through either 
reducing or increasing information as an attempt to conceal other information. This 
tactic is also shown by Participant H who describes a form of deception by concealing 
information completely.  
 
“the main thing then if you do it about law enforcement context that’s the key 
thing I don’t have to tell you a lie I just say no comment” (Participant H: Lines 
131-132) 
 
Participant R highlights a more extensive form of fluidity discussed by 
Participant F where deceivers may increase the amount of information they provide, 
potentially as a strategy to distract the target. 
“pleaders displays of erm fake emotion er some of them go into very long 
involved detail about um their version of events that day” (Participant R: 
Lines 247-249) 
 
Deceivers often seek to control the way in which they present information 
whether verbal, non-verbal or physical to others and previous research has highlighted 
that deceivers may give shorter statements to their target to control their narrative and 
ensure consistency (Hartwig et al., 2007), but may also increase the number of 
individual details within their statement (Morgan et al., 2011), potentially as a way of 
distracting the target from the deceptive content. Understanding how the deceiver may 
control information and the way in which they choose to release this information is 
required in detecting deception as this affects the strategy used to detect that 
deception. 
‘Influencers’ highlights the various strategies that individuals use to persuade 
the target of their credibility. 
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“so those th so those are the strategies actually you know so the gangmaster 
would say I’m ru I’m I’m doing this fraud to keep all these people er er you 
know from from starvation you know that’s what I’m doing it for the greater 
will” (Participant E: Lines 557-559) 
 
Participant E refers to gangmasters who often hire groups of foreign workers 
to perform manual labour in agricultural and industrial employment. However, there 
is also fraud in such areas which the deceiver seeks to justify that they are actually 
performing a service through employing individuals. 
 
“an image erm from um Syria of a father with his baby in his arms and a 
woman er reaching out to him er and behind er are are some really really 
badly destroyed buildings and it looks like this guy is running away with his 
child and his wife is in a state of panic actually what came out was the fact 
that erm  the guy is walking down a street in Syria erm and his wife is just 
asking can you give me the baby … but it’s been manipulated now why I use 
that situation is if people are involved in the Syrian mission area” (Participant 
K: Lines 200-208) 
 
Participant K outlines a case of deception from the on-going Syrian Civil War, 
where a powerful, emotionally arousing influencer is used through portraying 
vulnerable individuals as fleeing conflict when that is not the case. However, the 
image may manipulate the target’s perception meaning they will be more likely to 
believe the image. Participant T describes another form of influence through the use 
of humour as this again effects decision-making in the target and they will be more 
likely to find such deceptions credible. 
 
“just to pick up on any sort of rumour and as long as it’s entertaining and 
interesting and fits with their world view then they’ll repeat it you know” 
(Participant T: Lines 430-432) 
 
There are a large number of techniques that can be used to influence others in 
everyday interactions, whether deception is occurring or not. Research examining 
persuasion tactics has identified key areas for influencing others (Cialdini, 2007) 
which has been applied to real-world activities, for example, advertising strategies. 
However, examining the impact of influence tactics in deception has been relatively 
neglected and the proposed model seeks to incorporate these. 
One technique of appearing credible to others is through ‘Replicating Genuine 
Behaviour’, whether the perception of genuine behaviour is based upon lay beliefs or 
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upon actual understanding of how to replicate behaviour an awareness of both will be 
required to understand how differing individuals and adversaries will behave. 
“heh er I mean they were definitely trying to replicate emotions that you 
would expect to be present in the those er situation and which were present in 
the genuine pleaders so they were trying to replicate this expression of 
sadness” (Participant B: Lines 180-182) 
 
The ability to appear genuine is an important tactic for deceivers; Participant B 
describes how deceptive pleaders attempt to replicate emotons which genuine 
pleaders show. Participant D provides an example of physical deception from warfare 
where there reality was replicated through making equipment look like it had been 
destroyed. 
 
“they also did um created a made it look like a er they’d been a fuel explosion 
and half the stuff was wrecked when it (wasn’t)” (Participant D: Lines 1450-
1451) 
 
Participant T refers to how phishing emails replicate genuine emails through 
offering plausible messages that the target may expect in their daily lives. 
 
“erm you know a senior office gets er an email that says hi Fred its Mike erm 
I’m gonna be in London next week I’m going to this conference erm you might 
be interested in it you know just you are the links below and you say it well 
you know dear friend Mike’s a good guy and he’s in London next week I 
wonder what conference is about and you know you you click on it and then 
you’re infected” (Participant T: Lines 707-710) 
 
Replicating genuine behaviour and appearance is a strategy that individuals 
seek to use in deceiving others (Hartwig et al., 2010), however, this strategy may not 
always be effective as certain behaviours are harder to replicate in some contexts 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). To date psychological research into exploring how 
deceivers replicate genuine behaviour has mainly focussed upon examples of 
deception in low-stakes environments where individuals may not have time to 
develop a plan for deception that often occurs in the strategic environment. Further 
understanding of the strategies that people use in high-stakes environments to appear 
genuine to others is required. 
 
Interpretation 
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The fourth meta-theme of ‘Interpretation’ emerged from the dataset and lists 
the varying techniques and areas of focus which are used in the detection of deception 
across different communication mediums. Identified sub-themes for the 
‘Interpretation’ enable an analysis of information: ‘Source Attributes’, 
‘Questioning/Interviewing Strategy’, ‘Detection Methods’, ‘Surveillance and ISTAR’, 
and ‘Risk’. The wide range of techniques uncovered for assessing veracity may also 
enable the development of bespoke strategies for detecting deception reflecting 
contexts in which deception occurs. ‘Source Attributes’ examines factors 
(consistency, plausibility, credibility and prominence) that enable a source, whether 
the source is an individual in a face-to-face setting or information in an online 
domain, to appear credible.  
“ways of detecting inconsistencies er erm sort of assessing um how congruous 
information is and (noise) indicators of detecting anything anomalous or that 
stands out” (Participant D: Lines 719-721) 
 
Participant D refers to examining information to look for inconsistencies or 
information that stands out with which to detect deception. Whilst Participant P refers 
to how the plausibility of online contexts helps to make judgements of credibility. 
 
“simple as that to the look and feel of the er online space” (Participant P: Line 
519) 
 
Participant E explains how looking at the consistency of information can help 
uncover deception through making sure that two sets of information matches each 
other. 
 
“line a he ga he he he obviously you know to the officer yeh this is my name 
date of birth address line s line c so we we course lying and no such person 
exists okay line s line c cos well I I was coordinating the activities so I said 
well look this is an easy one here line a and line c will have two matching 
dates of birth” (Participant E: Lines 1076-1080) 
 
Through examining these factors of what makes the source itself credible a 
more considered judgement of the source may be made. Past research in interpersonal 
deception has examined these factors as separate elements (e.g. Vrij, Granhag, Mann 
& Leal, 2011b) rather than seeking to combine them enabling more accurate 
judgement about information. Research examining the credibility of websites has 
taken a more holistic approach to examining the source for credibility (e.g. Fogg et 
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al., 2003). However, offering clear guidance on factors that enable analysis of sources 
across different communication channels as outlined above is required. 
 When interacting with potentially deceptive individuals in dyadic or triadic 
conversation ‘Questioning/Interview Strategy’ plays an important role in the 
generation of information to examine for deception or identify discrepancies for 
further examination, although as a factor it may not be applicable to all contexts.  
 “get them wound up then you go through you break it down as part of the 
cognitive interview break it down into their topics again … you let them go 
through each you summarise it they agree to it even though you know half of 
its lies” (Participant Q: Lines 664-668) 
 
Participant Q, an expert in interviewing, outlines how the cognitive interview 
may be used for questioning deceivers through discussing their statements extensively 
before requiring the deceiver to agree to their statement even if this contrasts with 
external evidence. Participant E refers to another questioning strategy probing 
questions are used to generate information. 
 
“don’t know its re a really good questioning strategy to ah ask an open 
question followed by a series of probing questions … and as the interview 
goes along and you you know really get that micro details of the story er then 
then then (just) the ratio of probing questions increases to the open question 
because you really are you’re getting them to talk on one thing” (Participant 
E: Lines 1278-1284) 
 
Participant B refers to CBCA, a series of criteria assessments, as a strategy for 
detecting deception. To be effective Participant B states that CBCA requires a good 
interview highlighting the importance of the interviewing and questioning strategy in 
deception detection. 
“we’ve got a pretty good idea in terms of CBCA which of course requires um 
requires a good interview if you’ve got a crappy interview then you can’t do 
the CBCA properly erm so I think you need to marry the interviewing er with 
deception detection” (Participant B: Lines 390-393) 
 
Questioning and interviewing of individuals has often generated information 
for further analysis and also has the potential for usage in conjunction with some 
verbal methods of detecting deception. Its inclusion in a holistic model to deception is 
required for usage in when we are interacting with individuals in interpersonal 
environments, and modern approaches to detecting deception have been employing 
this (e.g Colwell et al., 2013; Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011a). 
 86 
Established techniques for examining information and intelligence for veracity 
emerged from the data set and ‘Detection Methods’ provide a range of techniques to 
detect deception from psychological and military backgrounds. Techniques to detect 
deception include: verbal, non-verbal, pictorial, neuropsychological, paralinguistic 
and techniques used by military and intelligence personnel.  
“and I think that’s why er again as you know one of the few nonverbal 
behaviours that in recent times has been found across a number of studies to 
significantly relate to lying is a a reduction in hang hand and finger 
movements” (Participant G: Lines 309-312) 
 
Participant G refers to one deception detection method examining hand and 
finger movements as these behaviours may reduce when an individual is engaged in 
deception. Participant C describes another detection method where individuals are 
required to maintain consistency to appear credible, if they do not maintain 
consistency then their deception may be detected. 
 
“so identifying particularly particular kinds of linguistic patterns I think is is 
definitely the way to go there er the parallels you still have to keep your story 
straight” (Participant C: Lines 822-824) 
 
Participant D describes military and intelligence analysis approaches for 
detecting deception. Such approaches have been developed to detect deception in 
warfare. 
“there are a number of formal military processes for conducting intelligence 
analysis er which are geared around detecting deception there’s Heuer’s 
analysis of competing hypotheses… er there’s the er there are various signal 
detection methods er there’s the Whaley Busby ombudsman technique” 
(Participant D: Lines 104-109) 
 
These techniques will be utilised as part of a toolbox approach where the 
techniques used will fit the requirements of the situation. Previous research has begun 
to explore the use of multiple techniques to detect deception (e.g. Bennett & Waltz, 
2007) and has found higher accuracy levels in detecting deception (Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2010). 
To uncover intelligence for assessment ‘Surveillance and ISTAR’ will enable 
the generation of information through varying surveillance techniques depending on 
the availability of channels for retrieving information and evidence. 
“is the question cos some would say well how do you know it’s true why would 
anyone tell you and then you have to make some judgements and you have to 
look at other sources to see how they tie in you know if if somebody if you 
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want to know about say erm a Chinese aircraft for example I mean there are 
there will be pictures of it on a on a web” (Participant G: Lines 101-105) 
 
Participant G refers to one technique of generating information for detecting 
deception through checking different sources for information including searching 
online. Participant D describes how with technology the ability to search for more 
information to check facts has become wider and faster which will enable a greater 
ability to generate information for analysis. 
 
“the technology erm which means things like ISTAR become more … wide 
ranging more real time er more forms of sensor erm computer technologies 
for supporting decisions support sense making situational awareness” 
(Participant D: Lines 60-63) 
 
Participant K describes the potential of social media for identifying key 
influencers which will aid the detection of deception. 
 
“that’s what social media is all about monitoring erm output from a potential 
influencer” (Participant K: Lines 513-514) 
 
Through adapting the use of ISTAR techniques to examining deception in 
interpersonal and online environments changes in the way in which deception is 
detected can be made. ISTAR techniques traditionally generate intelligence about an 
adversary which can then be used to inform decision-making, whilst in approaches to 
deception detection focus has been on identifying cues to deceit, though combining 
both approaches verbal and non-verbal behaviour can be analysed alongside other 
intelligence, which reflects how deception is often detected in real-life (Park et al., 
2002). 
In examining information for veracity there is always an element of ‘Risk’ 
involved where incorrect decisions may have large consequences for organisations 
and an ability to examine risk is required.  
“some techniques that are heavily statistical for example so you’re numerical 
abilities may come into into play there erm the critiquing processes the ability 
to again juggle risk and probability” (Participant D: Lines 406-409) 
 
Participant D refers to the difficulties the target may have in detecting 
deception through numerical techniques and how they assign risk. Participant P 
discusses how deception occur across multiple environments and the associated 
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challenges in responding to some deceivers who may use coded messages to 
communicate. 
 
“touches on all aspects of human life in the same way that mainstream 
deception does so you see everything from terrorism concerns where erm 
terrorists use chatrooms to send coded messes messages to each other” 
(Participant P: Lines 303-306) 
 
Participant Q highlights that there is no universal way of detecting deception 
for every individual in every context, and that strategies need to be tailored to the 
environment. Such an approach will reduce the risk of reliance upon techniques that 
will be effective in some but not all contexts. 
“but there’s no in my opinion that exists full proof way of detecting deceit … 
that every time it will catch the right person in the right scenario the right 
situation” (Participant Q: Lines 283-285) 
 
The impact of ‘Risk’ on deception has been generally neglected within the deception 
literature with techniques focussing upon percentage of accuracy. However, in real-
life situations relying upon probability may prove problematic, through adopting 
multiple approaches to deception detection adverse risk can be reduced.  
 
Target 
The final meta-theme of ‘Target’ emerged from the dataset which focuses 
upon the targets decision-making abilities and the factors that may affect the ability to 
accurately detect deception. Identified sub-themes that will affect the target are: 
‘Decision Making’, ‘Stakes’, ‘Individual Differences’, ‘Motivation’, and ‘Capabilities 
and Resources’. ‘Decision Making’ and how we make sense of the world is key to 
effectively detecting deception and mitigating risk. However, decision-making biases 
and attribution errors that the deceiver exploits may adversely affect the ability to 
detect deception. 
“better to allow them to have to work to assemble patterns of information to 
generate sense of what what’s going on and that to be wrong but because 
they’ve invested the cognitive effort in forming that understanding that whole 
range of factors working for you there in terms of er investment” (Participant 
D: Lines 221-224) 
 
Participant D argues that the target’s decision-making may be exploited if you 
present them with limited information and they then invest resources in an attempt to 
detect deception, meaning that they will be more biased in their decision-making. 
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Participant E discusses a further bias in decision-making where the target did not 
check for further information as the deceiver made the target feel like they had 
succeeded in their job, therefore they were more vulnerable to deception. 
 
“that motivation to be a social worker actually … the amount was congruent 
was was  was was quite consistent with her story cos if this this story 
happened to be true … then she’d been a success as a social worker” 
(Participant E: Lines 836-841)  
 
Participant J discusses the need to be suspicious about individuals you are 
interacting with, which may prove a useful strategy for detecting deception in some 
circumstances. However, it may also lead to incorrect judgements regarding 
credibility. 
 
“that er you know you’re never gonna know for sure who you’re dealing with 
and you should probably be suspicious … erm all the time of of the person 
you’re talking to and and what they represent themselves as” (Participant J: 
Lines 454-458) 
 
Decision-making biases have partially explained the reasons for poor accuracy in 
detecting deceit (See Chapter 2), and an awareness of these biases and the decision-
making process and their impact on the ‘Interpretation’ process is recommended to 
reduce error in detecting deception. 
The ‘Stakes’ of a situation will affect the receiver and how they will judge a 
situation where potential deception may be occurring, 
“looking at high stakes situations not only are you more likely to be able to 
detect the lie erm because of like motivational impairment and er all kinds of 
other theories erm that accompany behavioural cues to deception when the 
stakes are high er but I mean if you catch that lie it actually makes a 
difference” (Participant B: Lines 65-68) 
 
Participant B examines the impact of stakes on the deceiver as this will affect 
their ability to appear credible and enhance the target’s ability to more accurately 
detect deception. Partipant G states that the stakes and consequences of deception 
affect both the deceiver and the target. 
 
“I’d put that in obviously wed put in the the stakes the consequences er both 
for the the sender of the truth lies … and for the receiver” (Participant G: 
Lines 580-583) 
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Participant P outlines how the stakes are a high for the target across a range of 
areas where there is potential for deception. 
 
“the stakes you know couldn’t be higher when it comes to terrorism to fraud 
er say even somethings that seems as simple as hiring people (you know 
there’s) fraud there erm can huge costs for a company erm” (Participant P: 
Lines 309-312) 
 
In everyday acts of deception the lies are often of little consequence and are 
used to maintain social harmony (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) therefore the target of that 
deceit may be less likely to question a situation, however, in cases where deception of 
strategic interests then stakes and the consequences of a decision will have a larger 
impact on the target and how risk is assessed. 
A wide range of ‘Individual Differences’ affect our ability to accurately judge 
others including the detection of deception: 
“I’ve looked at you know aspects of the judge so are people who are high in 
emotional intelligence better at judging another person’s personality” 
(Participant S: Lines 19-21) 
 
Participant S describes how individuals with specific personality traits are 
better able to judge others personality, suggesting that individuals with such traits will 
best be placed to detect deception. Participant G also argues for the selection of 
individuals best placed to conduct interviews through their past performance. 
 
“in the broader context of if you were selecting people who already within an 
organisation of an ef (noise) fective nature … to be the hopefully be their best 
interviewers… interrogators … what things would you be looking for and of 
course the most reliable guide is their past performance” (Participant G: 
Lines 550-558) 
 
Participant Q provides an example of someone with the ability to effectively 
provide support for interviewing. 
“I have the profiler knowledge but also have the interview knowledge so I 
work on cases a lot I’m working on about seven cases at the moment giving 
advice on the interview” (Participant Q: Lines 145-148)  
 
Through understanding receiver individual differences (e.g. Aamodt & Custer, 
2006) awareness of potential vulnerabilities and advantages emerges, and through 
understanding these vulnerabilities the risk of deception can be mitigated. There are 
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also implications in the selection of interviewers and deception detectors based upon 
their personality and individual difference factors. 
The target’s ‘Motivation’ to detect deception will affect their ability to 
accurately detect deceit. 
“got that motivational impairment effect I mean if we know that something is 
really on the line then you’re trying much harder you’re feeling more 
emotion” (Participant B: Lines 292-294) 
 
Previous research has identified that motivated individuals are often less 
accurate in detecting deception (Porter et al., 2007), and this may occur where 
individuals rely upon lay strategies for detecting deception rather than cues identified 
by research. However, where individuals are motivated and have expertise in 
identifying genuine cues to deceit, motivation may have a reduced impact on 
decision-making errors. 
The target’s ‘Capabilities and Resources’ will affect their ability to detect 
deception. Through understanding what ‘Capabilities and Resources’ are available 
the target will be able to ensure that they can recover information across varying 
communication channels and they will have sources of expertise with which to 
analyse received information. 
“say oh I was so drunk I can’t remember anything right and people say that a 
lot in terms of strategies oh I can’t remember which is brilliant because then if 
they say ooh but we’ve got evidence of you doing this there’s CCTV footage of 
you” (Participant H: Lines 172-175) 
 
Participant H provides an example of how target resources may be used in the 
aid of an investigation as they can provide evidence that an individual is deceiving. 
Participant O states that we can use resources including experts to provide advise on a 
deceiver’s claims which can help in the judgement of credibility. 
 
“you know this is much talked about you say and he says well gosh how could 
they have done that you know when we would be struggling if we tried to do 
the same thing you see so this is why you need technical experts to say can 
they actually enrich u uranium” (Participant O: Lines 167-170) 
 
Participant P refers to the benefits of mediated communication as a resource in 
detecting deception where deceptive messages or communications will stay there 
forever meaning that such information can be verified against other available 
evidence. 
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“recordability er the traces that all of our conversations leave is we can now 
take (there’s that) email message I can now go compare that to other peoples 
er sense of the events or actual physical evidence” (Participant P: Lines 259-
261) 
 
The resources that are open to the target will enable a greater understanding of a 
situation whereby drawing information across differing communication channels 
together with expertise in the area deception may be occurring in will enable more 
informed judgements of credibility. 
 
Implications 
The Holistic Model of Deception (HMD) integrates IDT (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996) and features-based models of credibility (Fogg, 2002; Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal 
& Zualkernan, 1992; Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008; Metzger & Flanagin, 2013; Whitty et 
al., 2012). The HMD proposes that the context will affect the form of interaction used, 
how the deceiver will behave in that interaction and the techniques that will be 
deployed to detect deception. Multiple interpretation techniques, where applicable, 
can be used simultaneously to detect deception building upon recommendations by 
Porter and ten Brinke (2010) that multiple-cues to deception are used, multiple 
sources will also be used alongside an awareness of personality, individual 
differences, mindset and background history.  
Reid et al. (2012) proposed a model of deception which focussed upon the 
elements of deception and provided a framework of individual differences that will 
affect the deceiver and the target. The HMD has built upon this model through the 
examination of diverse deception elements and individual differences across the 
deceiver, their intent, their strategy, ways of interpreting information and the target. 
Understanding the process of deception requires an iterative process where the HMD 
will be revised in future to reflect new developments in understanding of the deceiver, 
their intent, deception tactics, strategies of interpreting information and assessing 
credibility and understandings of the target’s decision-making processes. 
   
Limitations 
 93 
 The current research sought to validate and refine the holistic model of 
deception detection proposed by Reid et al. (2012) by incorporating SME knowledge 
from a range of research and practitioner backgrounds. Volunteer bias suggests that 
this sample may not be representative of all SMEs in the field of deception and related 
areas and the specificity of the sample is acknowledged. Difficulties were encountered 
in accessing participants from security and intelligence backgrounds due to security 
reasons; therefore it is acknowledged that there may be other techniques for detecting 
deception in military environments that the research has not incorporated into the 
holistic approach to deception. Further research may seek to address this issue 
through securing access to an SME sample with military and intelligence 
backgrounds. 
 
Future directions 
The current research validates and refines the model of deception proposed by 
Reid et al. (2012); however, although strategies used to detect deception proposed by 
this model are outlined by SMEs there is a requirement for empirical validation. 
Future research should seek to examine the applicability of the model to real-world 
deception challenges, with a specific focus towards the online environment as an 
emerging area of risk. ‘Red teaming’ presents an option for large scale strategic 
deception where rigorous analyses of the HMD can occur in a simulated real-world 
environment (DCDC, 2013). 
The ’Deceiver’ meta-theme proposed by the current research states a strong 
requirement for cultural knowledge to understand an adversary and what may affect 
their attempts at deception and its detection. In addition the focus on the mindset of 
individuals at any particular time when there is the need to identify future intent and 
incorporate an understanding of risk requires broader perspectives to be taken.  
Developing knowledge of these strategies may mitigate risk of deception. However, 
there is a current lack of research into cultural variations in how people deceive and 
seek to deceive others, specifically in the online environment, which presents 
additional challenges in an increasingly globalised world where individuals from 
differing cultural background interact on a daily basis, therefore future research 
should seek to address these concerns. 
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In assessing credibility there is always an element of risk involved in making 
decisions, especially in high-stakes environments where there may be large 
consequences for incorrect decisions. The current research has identified as sub-theme 
of ‘Risk’ in interpreting information that future research should examine in depth to 
acknowledge the element of risk involved in detecting deception and produce 
guidelines for reducing risk in high-stakes deceit. 
 
Conclusion 
 In seeking to develop a holistic model of deception, the model proposed by 
Reid et al. (2012) has been partially validated and refined through a series of 
interviews conducted with SMEs across the field of deception and influence. The 
current findings expand upon previous research into deception through formulating 
deception as a process whereby the deceiver conducts deception to achieve an aim 
motivated by their goals and affected by their culture, personality and mindset.  The 
deceiver’s choice of tactics and strategies with which to deceive will be reflective of 
context, communication channels and resources available to them, whilst the target 
has a large number of techniques with which to interpret information and assess 
credibility, and the target in turn will be affected by individual differences, available 
resources and decision-making ability. In conclusion, it is argued that taking a more 
holistic perspective to viewing deception is required to mitigate risk. 
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Chapter 7: Cultural similarities and differences in credibility 
assessment strategies in interpersonal and online domains. 
 
Introduction: 
 In a historically infamous lack of understanding of culture, mindset and 
ideology, following a meeting between the then UK Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain and the German Chancellor Adolf Hitler a paper was signed declaring 
that Hitler would not start a war leading to Chamberlain to declare on 30
th
 September 
1938 “peace for our time”, however war was declared less than a year later. This lack 
of understanding had massive implications upon the rest of the 20
th
 Century and in 
shaping modernity, indeed Bond and Rao (2004) argue that in all cultures there are 
those who seek to exploit others, highlighting the need to understand culture to 
increase resilience against risks posed by deception. With the rise of the Information 
Age, globalisation and CMC, there is an even greater need for understanding the 
impact of culture, mindset, religiosity and ideology on assessing information related 
to forensic and security interests. The current research defines culture as “the set of 
cognitions and practices that identify a specific social group and distinguish it from 
others. In essence, ‘culture’ is the expression of group norms at the national, racial 
and ethnic level” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005, p.616). The current chapter aims to build 
upon the cross-cultural research discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and the need for 
understanding how individuals assess credibility across differing communication 
mediums, which with increasing technological usage is required to increase resilience 
against deception. In this chapter interpersonal and mediated approaches to credibility 
assessment and the impact of culture on credibility assessment are examined before 
presenting broad strategies used by individuals from Western and Eastern cultures to 
assess credibility across these domains. 
Psychological research into credibility assessment has primarily focussed on 
behavioural cues to deception which individuals from Western cultures use in 
attempts to accurately assess veracity, whilst neglecting behavioural cues to the truth, 
and differences in strategies used by other cultures to assess credibility. More recent 
research has begun to focus on the strategies people use to assess credibility in online 
environments. The impact of immigration means that there are now large émigré 
populations globally, increasing the requirement to understand the relationship 
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between culture and decision-making regarding credibility – for example 
distinguishing between true and false asylum applications and the identification of 
illegal immigrants. 
Interpersonal Credibility Assessment 
Individuals from Western cultures hold a variety of beliefs regarding cues to 
credibility in interpersonal encounters, with a particular emphasis on eye gaze 
aversion and grooming behaviours (Vrij, 2004). These beliefs are held by a wide 
range of individuals from lay and law enforcement backgrounds (Vrij, 2004) and are 
argued to be linked to beliefs regarding deception as an emotionally taxing behaviour 
(Ekman, 2001). In particular cues associated with nervous behaviour (Lakhani & 
Taylor, 2003; Taylor & Hick, 2007) and incongruent emotional displays (Kaufmann, 
Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid & Magnussen, 2003) are believed to indicate deception 
across situations and such cues to deception are believed to increase in high-stakes 
contexts (Lakhani & Taylor, 2003; Taylor & Hick, 2007). Further, Taylor and Hick 
(2007) found that some individuals believe eye contact to increase in more serious 
deception, potentially as tactic to appear more credible in response to the belief that 
deceiver’s avoid eye contact. Cues related to plausibility, consistency and greater 
length of verbal response are further related to perceived credibility and truthfulness 
rather than deception (Lakhani & Taylor, 2003). 
In a meta-analysis examining the relationship between perceived cues to 
deception and actual cues to deception, Hartwig and Bond (2011) found that a 
potential explanation for why people are bad at detecting deception in interpersonal 
contexts is due to a lack of strong cues to deception rather than people using incorrect 
cues when detecting deception. Hartwig and Bond’s (2011) findings suggest that 
people may actually be more discerning in their strategies used to detect deception 
than previous research suggests (e.g. Global Deception Research Team, 2006
1
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However, these findings apply explicitly to the interpersonal environment and may 
not be transferrable to mediated conditions where deception cues and detection may 
differ due to the relatively recent rise of mediated communication in overall human 
evolution (Hancock, 2015). Furthermore, Hartwig and Bond (2011) do not specify 
whether their meta-analysis incorporated research examining the perceived cues to 
deception of those from other cultures rather than Western ones, it is argued to be 
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crucial that an understanding of the strategies that people from other cultures use to 
assess credibility is required. 
When seeking to assess credibility of others the primary focus of research has 
been on the detection of deception rather than that of truth (Adams & Jarvis, 2004). 
SVA (Köhnken, 2004) was initially developed to distinguish between truthful and 
deceptive accounts of children’s accounts of sexual abuse in Sweden and Germany 
and has since been applied to assess credibility across other areas of deception and 
deception in other cultures. When applied to the context for which is was developed 
SVA and its CBCA component has achieved high accuracy in use by experts in 
distinguishing between truthful and deceptive narratives of child sexual abuse 
(Akehurst, Menton & Quandte, 2011). However, these techniques have to date not 
been applied to CMC and will be affected by people’s experience of CMC alongside 
the interactional context. 
In an examination of the everyday strategies that people use to detect 
deception, Park et al. (2002) asked participants to recall information, including how 
they discovered the lie, from a previous deceptive interaction. Participants relied on 
information provided by third parties and on physical collateral evidence with 
deception being detected over a period of time ranging from days to months (Park et 
al., 2002). These findings highlight further methods of credibility assessment beyond 
eye gaze aversion (Global Deception Research Team, 2006). As Park et al. (2002) did 
not rely on immediate judgements of credibility and enabled participants to report 
strategies other than observing verbal and/or nonverbal behaviour their findings are 
argued to more accurately reflect how individuals detect deceit in the real world. It is 
likely that general strategies of assessing credibility will be transferrable across 
cultures; however, understanding the subtle differences in how individuals from other 
cultures present themselves in turn reflects judgements of credibility formed by those 
from other cultures (Vrij, 2004).  
Computer-Mediated Credibility Assessment 
Credibility assessment is required across the digital domain where issues 
reflect a continuum of detecting deception in mediated interactions to assessing 
credibility of websites or phishing emails. Increasingly society is reliant on 
information that is only available online furthering the need for understanding online 
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credibility assessment strategies (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). There is evidence that 
people feel more confident in detecting deception online when there is more 
familiarity or predictability – any alteration from this indicating deception (Boyle et 
al., 2008); however, the reliance on the familiar can generate biases which could 
impede the reliability of such strategies (Boyle et al., 2008; Carlson & George, 2004; 
Carlson & Zmud, 1999).  
People may use source credibility (Briggs, Burford, De Angeli & Lynch, 
2002), reputation (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013) and trust (Blanchard, Welbourne & 
Boughton, 2011), website design (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Fogg et al., 2003) 
visual and textual information (Toma, 2010), warrants (Blanchard et al., 2011; 
Thompson, 2009; Warkentin et al., 2010) and reviews (Ott, Cardie & Hancock, 2012; 
Ott et al., 2011; Thompson, 2009) to assess credibility of information with strategies 
varying across source and context (Flanagin & Metzger, 2007) (See Chapter 3). Some 
of these strategies are anticipated to be universal whilst others will be more affected 
by cultural differences in which features are used to assess credibility. Generally, 
strategies used to assess credibility in interpersonal environments will be employed in 
CMC reflecting the relatively recent advent of recorded conversation (Hancock, 
2015). 
Research examining trust in online advice has found that people rely upon 
cues including good website design, source credibility, predictability and 
personalisation (Briggs et al., 2002). Trust is increased by adhering to group norms 
and online group identity (Blanchard et al., 2011). Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, 
individuals who adhere and belong to the same online community may be perceived 
as more credible than outsiders. Individuals who present greater links to their real-life 
identity when communicating online are more likely to be perceived as trustworthy 
(Blanchard et al., 2011; Warkentin et al., 2010). Trust, however, is context dependent, 
with Toma (2010) arguing that in online dating greater trust is associated with textual 
than visual information due to the potential for manipulation. It is further likely that 
individuals will seek further information from other sources to ascertain credibility 
and trustworthiness (Park et al., 2002).  
Credibility Assessment across Cultures 
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Deception is argued to be an evolutionary trait found in varying forms in 
cultures throughout the world (Bond & Rao, 2004). Individuals are argued to make 
sense of the world through their prior experience which is shaped by their culture and 
ideology and this will affect socially determined decision-making processes (Furner & 
George, 2012; Gerwehr, 2006). Culture has been broadly conceptualised as reflecting 
behavioural differences between individualistic and collectivist cultures (Hofstede, 
1983), which are argued to inform how we interact others and whether emphasis is 
placed upon the individual self or the collective self (Bond & Rao, 2004). Culture 
may further be conceptualised as impacting on an individual’s cognition, mindset and 
behaviour whether that be within a social identity, an occupational identity to a larger 
national or supra-national identity. In particular religiosity has a strong impact on 
mindset and behaviour as evidenced by groups such as the IRA and the Islamic State 
(IS) and understanding how this impacts behaviour is crucial in high-stakes 
interactions (Campbell, 2006; Stempel, 2013). 
In interpersonal environments people from different cultures rely on a number 
of strategies to detect deception focussed around an examination of primarily non-
verbal behaviour, for example, eye gaze aversion and inconsistent behaviour, and 
these strategies are argued to be consistent across cultures (Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006). These stereotypical cues to deception have been found to be 
unrelated to actual cues to deception suggesting a potential explanation as to why 
people are not accurate in detecting deception. Cues to deception in Chinese online 
groups show that deceivers communicate less, have lower complexity and higher 
diversity in their messages than truth-tellers (Zhou & Sung, 2008). 
Although research has explored cues to deception in interpersonal 
environments across cultures and has further explored judgements based upon website 
features and presentation, little research has sought to explore whether individuals 
employ similar strategies to assess credibility across both interpersonal and mediated 
environments and the extent to which culture effects such judgements. The current 
research seeks to examine the strategies that people use to assess credibility, including 
cues to deception and truth, in interpersonal and online contexts. To detect deception 
and potentially deceive others across cultures there is a requirement to understand 
their preconceptions, beliefs, intentions and capabilities to ensure resilience against 
deception and to more effectively plan deception (Gerwehr, 2006). 
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Method: 
Participants 
An opportunity, snowballing technique enabled the recruitment of 38 
participants aged 19 to 63 (M = 24.67, SD = 10.34) from Eastern (9 Chinese, 7 
Indian) and Western (21 British, 1 Australian) cultures. The sample comprised of 22 
Western participants (14 female, 8 male) and 16 Eastern participants (7 female, 9 
male) from a community and student background. The participants from Eastern 
backgrounds were all foreign born but now UK residents, therefore the participants all 
have experience of Western cultures which will affect the way they interpret 
information, compared to individuals from Eastern backgrounds with no direct 
experience of living in a Western culture. Volunteer bias and the location of 
recruitment in a city in the East of England suggest that this sample may not be 
representative of all UK national and Eastern cultures, and the specificity of this 
sample is acknowledged. 
Materials 
 An interview schedule was developed based upon previous research into the 
strategies that people use to assess credibility in interpersonal and online 
environments (See Appendix 7.1). Interview questions were focussed around 
interpersonal and online situations participants have been deceived in, strategies 
individuals use to detect deception and truth, and strategies individuals may use to 
deceive others online whilst appearing credible. A sample question about strategies 
used to assess credibility in interpersonal situations is “Are you able to tell when 
someone is lying to you?  How?  Are there any particular things that people do or say 
when they lie that help you to detect deception?”, whilst a sample question about 
strategies used to assess credibility online is “Have you ever needed to assess the 
credibility of sites when you are online?  How have you gone about doing this?  What 
do you think are the characteristics of a site when you might be a little suspicious?”.   
 An electronic Dictaphone was used to record interviews with participants, and 
the interviews were then stored on an Ironkey to ensure security. 
Procedure 
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 Participants were initially approached via face-to-face interactions inviting 
them to participate in an interview study where they will be asked a series of 
questions regarding the strategies they use to assess credibility in interpersonal and 
online situations. Those participants who agreed to participate in the research were 
interviewed in a location of their choice and comfort, where they were informed of 
their ethical rights and that the interview would be electronically recorded for later 
analysis (See Appendix 7.2 for the Consent Form).  
Data Analysis 
Responses were transcribed to ensure a verbatim account of the interview was 
recorded. Participant responses were treated from a critical realist perspective (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006), where responses are treated as reflecting reality whilst 
acknowledging that responses are generated as part of the interview procedure. 
Separate explanatory thematic analyses, combining deductive and inductive 
approaches (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012), at the semantic level were conducted 
for Western and Eastern participants following guidelines outlined by Braun and 
Clarke (2006) and Braun & Clarke (2013 – See Appendix 6.3). The first stage of 
analysis involved transcribing the data to ensure a verbatim account of the interviews. 
The second stage of analysis involved familiarisation and noting items of interest 
across the dataset. The third stage of the analysis consisted of coding the whole 
dataset. The fourth stage of the analysis involved searching for themes across the 
codes. The fifth stage of analysis consisted of reviewing the themes to explore the 
relationships within and between them. The sixth stage of analysis involved defining 
and naming the themes, and the final stage of analysis consisted of writing the report 
and linking the themes to research. Following the completion of separate explanatory 
thematic analyses for the UK national and Eastern participants a qualitative 
comparison of the separate themes (Guest et al., 2012) was conducted to enable the 
identification of potential similarities and differences in the strategies used by 
participants in assessing credibility in interpersonal and online contexts. 
Analysis and Discussion: 
Findings 
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An explanatory thematic analysis (Guest et al., 2012) examining both 
inductive and deductive themes from a critical realist perspective focussing on the 
semantic content of responses lead to the identification of 93 codes and 13 themes in 
Western participants and 62 codes and 12 themes in Eastern participants (See 
Appendices 7.3 – 7.4). These themes uncovered strategies that individuals across 
cultures use to assess credibility in their daily encounters with in-real-life and online 
interactions and strong similarities were found across cultures in the strategies used. 
Cross-Cultural Themes 
‘Behavioural Baseline’ emerged as a theme from the dataset where individuals 
from Western and Eastern cultures assessed credibility on the basis of familiarity and 
knowledge of what a person’s normal behaviour is perceived to be allowing them to 
identify behavioural changes which they perceived as indicating deception. 
“I think people who you know better and spend a lot of time with will be easier 
to detect deception or not through whether their behaviour is like out of 
character or whether they’re acting differently but if you don’t really know the 
person well (pause) I think it would be harder to identify whether they’re lying 
or not” (W3: 7-11) 
 
Participant W3 describes how they believe that can detect deception through 
familiarity with an individual and monitoring for changes in behaviour, however, if 
you do not have prior knowledge of that individual it may be hard to identify whether 
such changes are indicative of deception. Participant E9 also argued that if you have 
prior knowledge of an individual then you will be able to see a behavioural chance 
when deception is occurring. 
 
“If you know someone before then it is easier to see if there is a behaviour 
change before and after a lie is told” (E9: 5-6) 
 
Such an approach to assessing credibility relies heavily upon previous experience 
with the interactional partner, suggesting that as a strategy its effectiveness may be 
limited to specific contexts. An examination of behavioural baselines has been 
recommended as a tool for detecting deception (Ewens, Vrij, Jang & Jo, 2014; 
Navarro, 2003), although Ewens et al. (2014) recommends small talk is not used to 
establish such baselines rather baselines should be developed from comparable 
behaviour. As a strategy of assessing credibility changes in baseline behaviour will 
need to be examined to see whether they actually indicate cues to deception or are a 
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reaction to another factor. Some forms of deception also seek to condition the target 
over an extended period of time where subtle changes in baseline behaviour may be 
hard to detect requiring other forms of credibility assessment (Macdonald, 2007). 
 ‘Verbal Behaviour’ emerged as a theme in participants’ responses where there 
was a focus on the verbal content of statements and associated paralinguistic 
behaviour which enabled participants to form credibility assessments of others. 
“plus their story is very detailed” (E5: 16) 
 
Participant E5 stated that they were more likely to believe an individual if they 
had a detailed story. Another examination of verbal behaviour was identified by 
Participant W7 who argued that if an individual did not provide information then they 
were less likely to be seen as credible. 
“I think it was mostly sort of reluctance to give away more information than 
they needed to, sentences were short, they didn't elaborate on anything, like 
conversation didn't flow naturally” (W7: 21-22) 
 
Respondent from both Western and Eastern cultures focussed on areas of verbal 
content including sentence length, how detailed a story was, and more paralinguistic 
areas such as whether a conversation flowed naturally as opposed to delayed 
responses by their interactional partner. Such examinations of verbal behaviour have 
been found to differentiate between truth-tellers and deceivers (e.g. Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2010). 
 ‘Non-Verbal Behaviour’ as a theme explores the credibility assessment 
strategies associated with body language, facial expressions, nervous behaviour and 
eye contact which are believed to indicate that deception is occurring.  
“nervousness, like twiddling with your fingers or playing with your hair or 
looking off at funny angles” (W1: 7-8) 
 
Participant W1 identifies several non-verbal behaviours which they believe are 
indicative of deception, for example, finger movements and gaze directions. In 
contrast Participant E5 focusses on a more general element of body language arguins 
that negative body language was indicative of deception. 
 
“probably their body language, was very negative so I picked up on that” (E5: 
9) 
 
Participants’ focus on these cues reflects stereotypes of cues to deception (Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006) some of which have no link to deception, for 
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example, eye contact (Wiseman, Watt, ten Brinke, Porter, Couper & Rankin, 2012), 
although blushing may occur during some deceptive interactions (Yue, Harmer, Guo, 
Adams & Hunter, 2014). These findings highlight the continued need to educate 
individuals about genuine cues to deception, which they need to focus their credibility 
assessment efforts towards. The focus on non-verbal behaviour for assessing 
credibility in face-to-face interactions has the potential for transfer to interactive 
online environments and further research should explore the impact of non-verbal 
behaviour on credibility judgements in these environments. 
 Credibility assessments can focus on examining “Consistency” across content, 
behaviour and time to uncover truth or deception, and this strategy has application 
across in-real-life and online interactions. 
“more dramatasism put on it in like later, like later, like tellings of the story. 
So first of all, something tiny happened, and then the next time you hear the 
story it was more than that” (W1: 19-21) 
 
Participant W1 examines the consistency of a story and argues that such 
narrative may not be credible if the story does not remain consistent. Consistency was 
also identified by Participant E10 as a way to examine credibility where an individual 
may change their story, but also make different statements to different people 
suggesting that the individual was not credible. 
 
“Their story was conflicting, erm, they kept going back on what they were 
saying and they were different things to different people as well” (E10: 11-12) 
 
Examining consistency has been used to increase behavioural differences between 
truth-tellers and deceivers in strategic and tactical interviews (e.g. Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, Wolf, Vrij & Roos af Hjelmsäter, 2011) and is argued to be a useful tool 
in detecting deception. However, the use of consistency by participants has not been 
towards improving questioning strategies to detect deception but as a more passive 
approach examining another individual’s behaviour. The use of consistency to assess 
credibility by individuals from Western and Eastern cultures highlights the flexibility 
of techniques that individuals use to assess credibility based upon available 
information, which has previously not been identified as a lay technique of credibility 
assessment. The assessment of consistency over a period of time reflects findings 
from Park et al. (2002) that individuals often detect deception at a later date. 
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However, this may leave individuals open to exploitation by the deceiver, particularly 
in dynamic environments where there are often time constraints on decision-making. 
The theme of ‘Plausibility’ emerged from both Western and Eastern cultural 
datasets and was used as a strategy for assessing credibility in both in-real-life and 
online interactions.  
“just like what they said was just very over the top. Erm the story wasn’t very 
realistic in a way” (W5: 12-13) 
 
Participant W5 argues that if a statement is not plausible then it is not credible, 
whilst Participant E1 states that when purchasing a product online if the situation is 
not plausible then deception may be occurring. 
 
“general knowledge how can you get a mobile for just 10 pounds or 20 pounds 
(pause) you know something like that” (E1: 63-65) 
 
Individuals have been argued to make judgements of credibility based upon 
plausibility in interpersonal interactions (Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Magnussen & 
Wessel, 2010) and the current findings suggest that individuals from Eastern cultures 
may also use plausibility as a cue to deception. The use of plausibility in assessing 
credibility in online environments also highlights its potential as a cue to deception 
across contexts, although in high-stakes environments plausibility may not be so 
effective in detecting deception by experienced deception practitioners. 
Respondents from both Western and Eastern cultures used techniques for 
credibility assessment associated with the ‘Verification’ of information through 
checking facts, examining links between online and in-real-life identities and 
examining information across multiple sources. 
“obviously on Amazon; a user rating, you know, their rating. So I’ll have a 
look at how many things they’ve sold, you know, err if they’ve been on the 
website a lot, so I’ll just check their rating, as far as shopping goes” (W2: 
148-150) 
 
Participant W2 describes the verification of information in online 
environments through checking across different sources to examine the credibility of 
information. Participant E4 also describes the verification of information in online 
environment across several sources as this is perceived as being more credible. 
 
“I look at whose written it basically, and how many people have written it. If 
it’s just one person then it’s likely not to be credible, but if there’s several of 
them it’s a bit more trustworthy” (E4: 34-38) 
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‘Verification’ is an emerging technique for assessing credibility across contexts which 
focuses on the amount of verifiable details used by truth-tellers and deceivers (Nahari, 
Vrij & Fisher, 2012; Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2013) and use of this approach by lay 
individuals as a credibility assessment technique shows that people do use techniques 
which have empirical validation. However, some methods, particularly use of 
reviews, for verifying information suggested by participants require caution as they 
may also be deceptive and part of a larger deception operation (Ott et al., 2012; Ott et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, as warrants present suggested links to in-real-life identities 
(Warkentin et al., 2010) and enhance credibility adversaries may use false warrants as 
a method to enhance their deception and appear credible to their target. 
‘Judgements and Biases’ emerged as a theme in credibility assessment where 
individuals from Western and Eastern cultures referred to intuitive judgements and 
judgements based upon experience, whilst biases were also identified in how people 
assessed credibility across in-real-life and online environments. 
“I think basically because I think I’m a person who tend to who tend to believe 
believe others” (E2: 57-58)  
 
Participant E2 identifies a vulnerability in their own decision-making as they 
state they are likely to believe other people, whilst Participant W4 states that such 
judgements of credibility are instinctive. 
 
“it’s instinctive it’s you like or you dislike them” (W4: 137) 
 
The accuracy of judgement in deception detection may be affected by a range of 
biases including the truth bias (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Granhag & Strömwall, 2000) 
of which some individuals were aware and on the basis of which people are argued to 
operate in interactions (Levine, 2014). As both Western and Eastern participants had 
similar biases regarding judgement errors in detecting deception this lends further 
support to Bond and Rao (2004) in their argument that beliefs regarding deception are 
to some extent universal. Intuitive judgements also emerged as a form of credibility 
assessment and such judgements were often guided by first impressions. This strategy 
may have potential for errors as first impressions may actually impede accurate 
credibility assessment (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). Although intuition and 
unconscious assessments of credibility may prove more accurate than direct measures 
in some environments (ten Brinke, Stimson & Carney, 2014). Reduced accuracy in 
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credibility assessment may be linked to difficulties in accessing such unconscious 
judgements and the effects of explicit cognitive judgements (ten Brinke et al., 2014). 
‘Aversion of Risk’ emerged from the dataset of both Western and Eastern 
respondents where individuals may seek to increase their resilience against deception 
by avoiding or treating with caution situations in which they may be deceived. This 
theme was particularly applicable to online environments and may be due to 
respondents’ heightened awareness of deception in such environments. 
“If he if he was to ask ask my personal information and uh you know 
something like my mobile phone number my email address my even my y’know 
credit card account y’know I wi- you know try to avoid it s- you know to stay 
away from them perhaps” (E2: 240-242) 
 
Participant E2 states that they would seek to avoid risk if an individual was 
trying to gain access to personal information. Participant W4 highlights the range of 
areas where risk may occur in online environments, suggesting the need to be cautious 
of online interactions. 
 
“um you know there’s thousand people out there on the Internet not just in 
terms of um the you know the sexual um predators but also uh financial um 
predators uh organised crime etcetera etcetera there are lots of websites that 
aren’t real websites that are there just to um extract your financial details” 
(W4: 177-181) 
 
As strategies of avoiding risk and increasing resilience against deception they may be 
particularly effective in environments in which deception rather than truth is 
anticipated, where individuals have been warned about deception (George et al., 2008; 
Modic & Anderson, 2014) and where people may have previous experience of 
deception (Wright et al., 2010). Although these strategies may be deemed effective in 
reducing harm from deception, further research is required to see how effective 
people may be in instigating such techniques in their daily activities. 
‘Impression Management’ emerged as a theme across both in-real-life and 
online environments where respondents from Western and Eastern cultures were more 
likely to judge sources as credible if they were well presented or reflected perceived 
genuine behaviour. 
“by the way they talk and the way they try to come across to people that 
they’re talking to, they might come across as trustworthy even though you 
know you might not necessarily see them in person”  (W6: 87-89) 
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Participant W6 focuses upon the way in which an individual interacts with 
others and by the way they talk. Participant E6 focuses upon how attentive an 
individual is as a sign of credibility, with that further reinforced through not sharing 
confidential information with others. 
 
“when you actually stand and talk to them and you realise that they are 
listening, and then next day not everybody knows what you talked about , they 
kinda kept it to themselves, and they remember what you say” (E6: 47-49) 
 
This theme reflected the ways in which an interactional partner’s presentation and 
behaviour enhances their credibility towards the target. Individual’s focus on how 
others appear as a source of judging credibility increases the target’s risk of being 
deceived as deceivers often engage in impression management strategies to appear 
more credible (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2010). To increase resilience against impression 
management practitioners should be informed of the ways in which deceivers may 
seek to appear credible towards the target. 
There were a variety of tactics occurring within the theme of ‘Social Influence’ 
in in-real-life and online environments and across cultures which are influential in 
how people form judgements of credibility.  
“you have to build trust with someone and offer them to trust you back” (W2: 
228) 
 
Participant W2 refers to what has been termed as reciprocity (Cialdini, 2007) 
where individuals are more likely to judge credibility and be influenced by those with 
whom behaviour is reciprocated. Participant E2 identifies being shown respect as a 
sign of credibility and trustworthiness, highlighting the different ways in which trust 
may be developed. 
 
“I think if they show respect show respect to me and err they err I mean they 
easier to to be approached and uh you know this kind of person” (E2: 123-
124) 
 
However, even though such behaviour is oft perceived as credible and influential, this 
does not mean that the source is actually credible. These findings suggest that 
individuals from both Western and Eastern cultures may be deceived by information 
sources they perceive as credible. To counter this individuals must focus attention and 
credibility assessment strategies towards areas of behaviour that are either verifiable 
or more accurately differentiate between truth-tellers and deceivers. 
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‘Website Presentation’ as a theme plays an important role in how respondents 
from Western and Eastern cultures were likely to judge credibility of online 
information. 
“but if I think that a site looks quite unprofessional or a bit dodgy then I’d be 
more inclined to stay away from it” (W5: 76-77) 
 
Participant W5 deems a website to not be credible if its appearance is not 
professional, and a similar strategy is used as well by Participant E3 where there is a 
focus on text and font as to whether a website may be seen as credible. 
 
“I didn’t check before when I…online…But I think if the website is fake there 
is very similar to the real…so just depends on the err…text and the…err…font, 
something like that” (E3: 57-59) 
 
Sites were argued to be credible if they were well presented, had a clear layout and 
appeared professional to the respondents from both Eastern and Western cultures. 
This reflects findings by Fogg (2002) and Flangin and Metzger (2007) in how 
individuals assess credibility of websites based upon their features and content. At 
first glance such a strategy will be useful in filtering out websites of spurious content, 
however, some deceptive websites can appear highly credible even if they are not and 
further techniques may be required to assess content for veracity. 
Western and Eastern respondents’ ‘Experience of Internet’ affected how they 
were able to assess credibility in online interactions, with perceived anonymity, a 
perceived lack of cues to deception and difficulties associated with lack of face-to-
face interaction proving challenging to respondents. 
“Erm… probably being anonymous like that’s the biggest thing, like making 
sure that people can’t track where the information’s come from” (E10: 80-81) 
 
Participant E10 highlights anonymity as an area of concern in online 
interactions. Anonymity was also identified by Participant W12 who distinguished 
between being able to monitor someone face-to-face but it proved challenging to 
assess credibility by text alone. 
 
“I am if it’s someone, if its face to face, so you can see what their saying but 
I’m not very good at it by like text or something” (W12: 15-16) 
 
Respondents lacked knowledge regarding how people interact in online environments 
with anonymity perceived as a large threat, and respondents sought to use strategies to 
assess credibility in online environments which they used in real life. Focussing on 
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verbal content in online environments will enable credibility assessment methods 
based on verbal and linguistic analysis (e.g. Colwell et al., 2013) to be used where a 
focus on the non-verbal behaviour, which is filtered out in online environments, is not 
required for analysis. 
Culturally-Specific Themes  
 One major culturally-specific theme of ‘Response to Questioning’ emerged 
from the Western culture dataset. This theme explored an approach used by Western 
individuals to assess credibility in others by examining their interactional partner’s 
responses to questioning, including how and whether they responded. 
“be prepared to talk to me if they erm erm run away from me or erm you know 
don’t want to have an- avoid me in the street then I wouldn’t be inclined to 
trust them with anything or talk to them about anything” (W4: 133-136) 
 
Participant W4 identified an individual’s response to further interactions as 
effecting their judgements of credibility as individuals who avoided further 
interactions were deemed not trustworthy. Participant W11 states that further 
questioning of an individual may be used to examine an individual’s narrative further 
and their subsequent response helps to judge credibility. 
 
“even if they say something a little bit differently and then by questioning 
further it will probably start to unravel a bit” (W11: 12-13) 
 
This approach highlights that individuals engage in active strategies for assessing 
credibility which reflects techniques of strategic and tactical questioning (Dando & 
Bull, 2011; Hartwig et al., 2006; Levine, Shaw & Shulman, 2010) to detect deception 
in others. Such an approach to credibility assessment is also transferrable to online 
interactions (Colwell et al., 2013; George et al., 2008). This strategy indicates that 
Western individuals may have explicit awareness of how to increase accuracy in 
assessing credibility in others; however, further research is required to examine how 
people actively engage in such techniques during interaction. ‘Responses to 
Questioning’ may have emerged as a culturally-specific theme for Western 
individuals due to cultural differences related to power distance, the individualism of 
Western cultures and differences between holistic and analytic cognition (Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi & Norenzayan, 2001; Norenzayan, & Nisbett, 2000). Individualistic 
cultures may be more willing to question others, whilst collectivist cultures may seek 
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to maintain social harmony and may not be willing to challenge perceived authority 
(Colwell et al., 2013). Eastern cultures are argued to be field dependent where they 
focus on an individual’s relationship with their environment to form judgements, 
whilst Western cultures are argued to be more analytic and focus upon the individual 
in making judgements (Nibett et al., 2001; Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000). Such a 
difference in causal cognition may explain why Western cultures may seek to further 
question individuals regarding their credibility whilst, Eastern cultures may rely upon 
the surrounding context with which to form judgements of credibility. Further 
research may seek to explore whether individuals from collectivist cultures are willing 
to question others’ credibility. 
Potential similarities in strategies used to assess credibility by Western and 
Eastern cultures may be explained through cultural evolution where individuals 
experience in Western culture has affected how they interpret information (Gerwehr, 
2006). As the individuals from Eastern cultures interviewed in the current research 
have had more interaction with Western cultures and will affect how they make sense 
of their environment.  
Building upon both the Global Deception Research Team (2006) and Park et 
al. (2002) the current research has identified a range of techniques which individuals 
use to assess credibility in interpersonal and online environments, with participants 
using some strategies for both domains. Although some of the strategies used were 
incorrect for accurately detecting deception (e.g. eye contact and gaze direction), a 
large number have the potential for useful credibility assessment strategies (e.g. 
verification, consistency and plausibility) and further research should seek to educate 
individuals in accessing and selecting the most effective strategies for credibility 
assessment to increase resilience against threat, particularly in online communication. 
For those strategies which are incorrect in detecting deception and may be used by 
adversaries, deception planners may seek to exploit these through following deception 
planning guidelines (Gerwehr, 2006). 
Similarly to Park et al. (2002) the strategies used to assess credibility by the 
participants are not claimed to be representative of all strategies which people use, nor 
will the strategies be useful for every context in which credibility assessment is 
required. The participants were not asked to develop strategies for specific contexts; 
instead the strategies which emerged from the dataset may be treated as general 
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strategies which individuals may select according to context and their previous 
experience in credibility assessment.  
Limitations 
 Self-reports of strategies used to assess credibility may not be representative 
of all strategies that individuals use to assess credibility as people may have limited 
insight into their own decision-making processes (Strömwall, Granhag & Hartwig, 
2004). However, individuals offered a range of strategies to assess credibility some of 
which reflect techniques currently being used to assess credibility in psychological 
research (e.g. plausibility, consistency, use of warrants). Strategies were also offered 
for credibility assessment which experimental paradigms may not enable individuals 
to use (Park et al., 2002) and have thus not been identified by previous research. 
Whether or not these individuals use these strategies effectively to detect deception 
requires further research. 
Current research provides awareness of the strategies which individuals from 
different cultures state they use in credibility assessment, it may be that other 
strategies have not been identified by the current research. Although there is an 
awareness of multiple perceived strategies of credibility assessment not all of these 
strategies are correct, and it is yet to be seen how individuals may employ strategies 
when assessing credibility. Gerwehr (2006) states that field dependence will affect 
how cultures interpret information related to the surrounding context. Suggesting that 
individuals from collectivist cultures may be more likely to interpret information 
according to surrounding context, whilst individuals from individualistic cultures may 
not use surrounding context to interpret information (Gerwehr, 2006). 
The culturally-specific theme of ‘Responses to Questioning’ as a strategy used 
by Western participants to assess credibility may only be limited as it was only 
identified by a small number of Western participants. This would suggest that the 
current findings need to be taken with caution as it may not be representative of all 
Western individuals and requires further exploration to ensure reliability of this 
theme. 
Future Directions 
 114 
The current chapter has outlined similarities and differences between the 
strategies used in credibility assessment across interpersonal and online environments 
by respondents from Western and Eastern cultures. With deception occurring across a 
wide range of cultures it is particularly important to understand such strategies of 
credibility assessment, and an exploration of further cultures is required (Gerwehr, 
2006), including cultures which reflect areas other than national identity, and how 
cultural fluidity may affect credibility assessment. 
An awareness of the risks posed in assessing credibility was highlighted by 
respondents who sought to use caution in engaging with elements of online behaviour. 
Research has recently sought to warn individuals about the potential for deception in 
online environments (e.g. Modic & Anderson, 2014) and new approaches are required 
for increasing resilience against deception. In interactional contexts resilience may be 
increased through the adaptation of DRE approaches to online environments (Colwell 
et al., 2013). In non-interactional online environments resilience may be increased 
through education regarding online deception followed by testing to ensure that 
lessons have been learned.  
Identifying credibility assessment strategies used by other cultures should also 
focus on identifying the credibility assessment strategies used by adversaries from a 
different cultural background. To persuade and influence others it is essential to 
understand their culture and background history to develop targeted strategies 
(Mackay & Tatham, 2011). Such a concept is equally applicable to conducting 
deception operations where understanding the target and how they may be influenced 
to achieve the objective is part of the deception planning process (Gerwehr, 2006). 
Through understanding an adversaries credibility assessment strategies it may be 
possible to conduct more effective deception and influence campaigns to achieve 
objectives, and further research is required to explore this area. 
Conclusion: 
The current chapter has focussed upon exploring the similarities and major 
differences between credibility assessment strategies used by individuals from 
Western and Eastern backgrounds use to assess credibility in interpersonal and 
mediated environments. A large number of similarities were found across both 
cultural backgrounds in how credibility is assessed reflecting past research (e.g. Fogg, 
2002; Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Park et al., 2002). The major 
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difference between cultural groups was that respondents from Western backgrounds 
were more likely to seek to challenge their interactional partners to uncover deceit. 
General strategies for assessing credibility were found to reflect current and emerging 
research into deception detection, suggesting that individuals may perceive beneficial 
strategies of credibility assessment and future research should seek to increase 
individuals’ awareness of such strategies and how they can be used to assess 
credibility particularly in mediated environments. 
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Chapter 8: Risk Assessment in Deception: Presenting DARN and 
DRAT  
 
Introduction: 
In regard of deception and the assessment of future threats, it is critical to 
consider the concept of risk as underpinning practitioner decision-making. The 
detection of deception and risk assessment have historically been intertwined when 
considered in the context of decisions in forensic and legal domains, however the 
application of structured risk assessment methods to security and military domains 
has to date been neglected. Chapter 8 builds extensively upon Chapter 6 through 
developing a new approach towards detecting deception based upon examining the 
risks posed through an in-depth understanding of the deceiver’s and target’s 
capabilities and the cues to deception identified from the interviews with SMEs. This 
chapter will discuss the challenges of risk assessment (actuarial and clinical 
judgements) within the forensic domain and present the development of two 
structured tools which are relevant for the detection of deception in computer 
mediated and interpersonal environments. 
Risk is defined by Skeem and Monahan (2011, p. 38) as “a correlate that 
precedes the outcome in time, with no implication that the risk factor and outcome are 
causally related”. Adapting Hart’s (1998, p. 122) definition of violence risk 
assessment “as the process of evaluating individuals to (1) characterize the likelihood 
they will commit acts of violence and (2) develop interventions to manage or reduce 
that likelihood”, deception risk assessment can be defined as “the process of 
evaluating individuals, groups and organisations, whether state or non-state, to (1) 
characterise the likelihood they will commit acts of deception and (2) develop 
interventions to manage or reduce that likelihood”. Although perfect prediction is an 
unattainable goal (Ericson 2006), through conducting risk assessments UK 
vulnerability to threats may be reduced (Aven & Renn, 2009), whilst providing an 
audit trail of how decisions were made (Goble & Bier, 2013). Risk assessments are 
argued to inform relevant decision-makers and stakeholders about potential threats 
that may need immediate action, whilst providing options for risk prevention or 
mitigation (Aven & Renn, 2009). The deception risk assessments outlined in the 
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current chapter will consist of a continuing assessment procedure, predictions of 
future deception and suggestions for mitigating or preventing acts of deception.  
Actuarial Approaches 
Actuarial approaches to risk assessment and management seek to quantify risk 
and produce an outcome focussing on the probability of risk occurring in a given 
situation. Actuarial approaches have focussed upon a number of behaviours, including 
future risk of violence (Grann, Belfrage & Tengström, 2000; Helmus, Babchishin & 
Hanson, 2013) and sexual offender recidivism (Hanson, Lunetta, Phenix, Neeley & 
Epperson, 2014; Hanson, Sheahan & VanZuylen, 2013; Helmus et al., 2013). 
Actuarial approaches to risk assessment have risk factors and items developed from 
empirical research, for example, the Risk Matrix-2000 (Thornton et al., 2003), which 
are based upon collating the characteristics of individuals who are re-convicted 
following release from prison. Although considered a relatively reliable starting point 
to determine likely future risk of harm, the actuarial methods do not incorporate 
consideration of attrition within the legal system – that is, the likelihood of a case 
being ‘dropped’ between the allegation of the offence being made and the case being 
heard in court. Generally though, such approaches have found comparable 
assessments of risk across different risk assessments in predicting violent behaviour, 
with no assessment outperforming another (Grann et al., 2000; Helmus et al., 2013; 
Ho, Thomson & Darjee, 2009). In some circumstances actuarial approaches to risk 
assessment have utility (Hanson et al., 2014), when combined with consideration of 
dynamic factors in regard of risk.  In the consideration of high-stake deception risk 
assessment the combination of static and dynamic risk factors are required. 
Actuarial risk assessments can be categorised into unmodified and modified 
approaches (Monahan, 2012). Unmodified actuarial risk assessments identify, 
measure and combine the scores of risk factors and argue that the process is then 
complete (Monahan, 2012). Modified actuarial risk assessments, however use the 
same approach of the identification, measurement and combination of a score of risk 
but produce a probabilistic outcome rather than a definitive decision (Monahan, 
2012). It is acknowledged that the presence of rare factors can affect outcomes of risk, 
and due to the idiosyncratic nature of risk, they may not appear as a static factor on 
actuarial assessments (Aven & Renn, 2009). To counter this assessment weakness, 
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clinical reviews of actuarial risk assessments are required and an allowance for 
flexibility in the approach is critical. 
The reliance on static factors in some measurement tools fails to allow a more 
considered judgement to be made in regard of risk (Blacker, Beech, Wilcox & Boer, 
2011), despite the refinement over time with the inclusion of updated empirical 
evidence (Hanson et al., 2014). As deception is argued to be context dependent and 
individual’s strategies will change according to their strategic aims, actuarial risk 
assessments in isolation are likely to fail in capturing the broad range of issues to be 
considered. When applied to the challenges of detecting deception, it is critical to 
have the capacity to draw from a range of sources in order to ensure judgements can 
be underpinned by an evidence-based approach. 
Structured Professional Judgement Approaches 
The ‘structured professional judgement’ (SPJ) model of risk assessment 
considers elements of clinical decision-making with a focus on an individual’s 
characteristics and strategies of intervention and management to reduce risk (Boer, 
Tough & Haaven, 2004; Cook, Murray, Amat & Hart, 2014; Douglas & Reeves, 
2010; Kebbell & Porter, 2012; Kropp, Hart, Lyon & Storey, 2011). SPJ risk 
approaches are argued to provide more accurate assessments of risk by combining 
actuarial and clinical judgement approaches (Blacker et al., 2011; Doyle & Dolan, 
2006). The basis for such assessment of future risk emphasises the interpersonal 
interaction with the individual concerned in addition to broad collateral information to 
inform judgements (Kebbell & Porter, 2012). Hence although there is a structure to 
the particular risk assessment task (e.g., violence, stalking or arson), the assessor can 
use discretion in regard to the level of emphasis placed on different pieces of evidence 
and the associated confidence with which evidence informs judgements (Kropp et al., 
2011). It is argued that SPJ assessments have an advantage over actuarial approaches 
through the incorporation of risk management strategies which are developed in 
response to the assessed level of risk posed. Similarly in the detection of deceit (cf. 
risk), the ability to make a judgement in regard of a particular threat has to occur on a 
continuum of likelihood. This is comparable to the national security ratings which are 
underpinned by evidence in regard of the level of severity and imminence of a threat 
to the UK. SPJ risk assessments support practitioner decision-making through the 
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application of assessments which reflect up-to-date scientific knowledge and clinical 
practice (Kropp et al., 2011), enabling a focus on a number of factors which are 
identified as being of high relevance and are useful in practice (Cook et al., 2014; 
Gozna & Lawday, 2015). Items on SPJ risk assessments may be scored to assess the 
risk that each factor may pose so that a profile of risk can be identified and tailored to 
an individual. For example, the Historical-Clinical-Risk Management V³ (HCR-20: 
Webster, Douglas, Eaves & Hart, 1997) scores risk factors as to whether they are 
absent (0), possible or limited presence (1), and definitely present (2) and further 
incorporates the use of collateral evidence to inform these decisions and in turn this is 
transferred into scenario planning of future risk. This enables practitioners using the 
assessment to clearly establish the factors that are particularly pertinent to the 
judgement of risk. When applying this process to deception detection and the 
assessment of future threats, practitioners will be required to make judgements about 
the deceiver’s characteristics regarding factors identified in the HMD (See Chapter 6) 
and design the strategies of management and intervention according to risk factors 
developed from empirical research. 
The basis for structured risk assessment tools (e.g., HCR-20: Douglas & 
Reeves, 2010 and Stalking Assessment and Management: Kropp et al., 2011) is the 
concentration on historical and current behaviours whilst anticipating future 
behaviours, principles which are transferable to the assessment and management of 
high-stake deception. Recent research has sought to expand the use of SPJ risk 
assessments from the assessment of violence and other criminal acts and focus on 
issues of national security (Beardsley & Beech, 2013; Kebbell & Porter, 2012; 
Monahan, 2012; Roberts & Horgan, 2008). SPJ approaches to terrorism have been 
developed to examine risk of terrorism (Kebbell & Porter, 2012; Monahan, 2012), 
whether a detained individual may be likely to reengage with terrorism and whether 
employees hold beliefs supportive of terrorism (Monahan, 2012). 
Static Risk, Dynamic Risk and Warning Behaviours 
Static risk factors are argued to not change, or change very little or very 
slowly over the course of time, for example, gender of victim and age of first offence 
(Douglas & Skeem, 2005; Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann & James, 2012; Wilson, 
Desmarais, Nicholls, Hart & Brink, 2013). Static risk factors may be used to 
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determine the level of deception risk posed over the course of time, but they will not 
determine all risk and behaviour will change according to an individual or groups’ 
current aims and motives. In contrast, dynamic risk factors fluctuate in nature and 
severity over the course of time and these are linked to changes in overall risk 
(Douglas & Skeem, 2005; Wilson et al., 2013). 
Dynamic stable risk factors are enduring changeable characteristics which in 
the current context, link to deceptive behaviour, whilst dynamic acute risk factors are 
rapidly changeable characteristics that may indicate behaviour will occur within a 
short period of time. Dynamic factors are argued to provide a target for intervention 
or treatment in the case of violence risk assessment (Meloy et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 
2013), and in the case of deception dynamic risk factors can be identified and risk 
management strategies activated. An awareness that behaviour changes over the 
course of time rather than remaining indefinite is required for assessing risk (Douglas 
& Skeem, 2005) and this is applicable to deceptive behaviour. 
Warning behaviours are argued to be acts which provide evidence for 
accelerating or increasing risk (Meloy et al, 2012; Meloy, Hoffmann, Roshdi & 
Guldimann, 2014). These behaviours are acute and dynamic changes of pattern in 
behaviour which may aid in structuring a practitioner’s judgement of risk from the 
actor and require risk management strategies to be enabled (Meloy et al., 2012). 
Previous research into warning behaviours has focussed on areas of violence risk 
assessment including murder, assassinations and terrorism (Meloy et al., 2012). 
Identifying key warning behaviours of future threats enables a consideration of 
deception and can therefore produce more tailored, comprehensive risk assessments 
and management strategies.  
Security and Terrorism Risk Approaches 
 The increased focus on the assessment of risk in national security 
environments has been largely in response to global acts of terrorism which have 
resulted in mass civilian casualties (e.g., September 11
th
 and July 7
th 
attacks). Risk 
assessment in security environments have involved assessment of state and non-state 
actors, with these assessments often built around adversary capabilities and intentions 
(Bennett & Waltz, 2007; Garrick et al., 2004; Koblentz, 2011; Nguyen, 2002; Willis, 
Morral, Kelly & Medby, 2005; Yang, Wang, Bonsall & Fang, 2009), although some 
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incorporate target vulnerabilities (Koblentz, 2011; Piegorsch, Cutter & Hardisty, 
2007; Willis et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2009), how adversaries may identify targets 
(Strandberg, 2013) and consequences of attacks (Willis et al., 2005; Yang et al., 
2009). These approaches tend to consider actuarial and probability approaches which 
have potential flaws (Aven & Renn, 2009; Brown & Cox, 2011; Garrick et al., 2004). 
Particularly as different terrorist and extremist groups have very different motives for 
engaging in terrorism (Jacques & Taylor, 2008), organisational structures and 
targeting strategies where casualties may or may not be intended (Wilson & 
Lemanski, 2013) and this reflects the type of weapons used (Wilson, Scholes & 
Brocklehurst, 2010), requiring a more contextual and dynamic understanding of how 
risks posed by terrorism emerge. A key challenge in seeking to assess the risk of 
deception by adversaries is to move beyond actuarial risk assessments assessing 
probability of risk, but instead to adopt SPJ approaches which provide evidence-based 
decision-making guidance across interpersonal and mediated environments and 
outline risk management strategies. 
 
Rationale for deception risk assessment tools 
Deception research recommends that approaches consider the cognitive 
complexity of conducting deception leading to less detailed and consistent accounts 
and more controlled behaviour and appearance than truth-tellers (Vrij, 2004, 2008). 
However, as much as the academic approach to deception has attempted to ground 
research outcomes in the real-world (Vrij, 2004); there remains a dearth of work 
adopting a scientist-practitioner model for the understanding of high-stake threat. The 
HMD argues that further consideration is required to target vulnerabilities, culture, 
and individual differences and personality factors (See Chapter 6). The purpose of 
developing dynamic and iterative risk assessment tools has been to provide a 
standardised, systematic and practical framework for gathering, considering and 
managing information in high stake decision-making. 
The Deception Assessment Real-time Nexus
©2015
 (DARN) and Deception Risk 
Assessment Technique
©2015
 (DRAT) risk tools are intended for individuals and teams 
in security environments making decisions regarding deception and associated threats 
across real-world and computer-mediated domains with the intention of eradicating or 
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diminishing adversary threats. The DARN tool focuses on identifying ‘warning 
behaviours’ suggestive of possible deception and as such is a screening tool that can 
be adopted for use in isolation, or preceding the use of DRAT. The DRAT tool 
provides a full-scale risk assessment of deceptive behaviour including future scenario 
development and associated risk management strategies and this can be employed for 
longer term threat assessment as a standalone, or following the use of the screening 
tool DARN. 
Deception Assessment Real-Time Nexus
©2015
 
Figure 8.1 presents the DARN model and the stages of analysis, whilst 
Appendix 8.1 illustrates the DARN screening tool. The DARN screening tool 
provides practitioners with stages of analysis and enables a description of the context, 
the monitoring of any changes in adversary behaviour before identifying relevant 
evidence and assessing information for risk of deception.   
Methodology – Tool Development 
In order to adopt a standardized approach to the development of the DARN 
tool, the methodology adopted in the development of the Comprehensive Assessment 
of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP – Cooke, Hart, Logan & Michie, 2012) was used. 
This was considered to provide a systematic method for the development of a 
practitioner tool. The content of the items presented in the DARN tool were identified 
from a comprehensive review of psychological and military research and practice, 
alongside SME input (see Chapter 6) to construct a conceptual decision-making 
model focussing on the collection and analysis of information. This precedes any 
recommendations for counter-deception and risk management strategies outlined by 
the DRAT to respond to adversary deception operations. 
Following the methodology outlined by Cooke et al. (2013) the first stage of 
the DARN development consisted of an extensive literature review covering a wide 
range of areas related to deception and its detection across interpersonal, online and 
military environments (e.g. verbal and non-verbal behaviour, personality, decision-
support tools), however this review did not consider physiological approaches 
towards deception detection due to their limited potential in operational environments 
(see Chapters 2-4). Reliance on a top-down approach to formulating deception should 
be avoided as such approaches focus on only one area of research and ignore greater 
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complexities. As such a bottom-up approach to the literature reviewed in model 
development has been conducted as this enables identification of strengths and 
weaknesses in current approaches and established whether a new model is required, 
and the result of such work is presented as a theoretical holistic approach to deception 
detection (see Chapter 5). 
The second stage of designing DARN reflected input from SMEs (see Chapter 
6) and the manner in which they conceptualised deception. Following interviews with 
open-ended questions, SME responses were examined and led to the development of 
the HMD (see Chapter 6). The HMD outlines how deception occurs from the deceiver 
to the target, and identified further areas of deception that had not previously been 
considered during the literature review. These findings have been used to inform the 
development of the DARN. 
The final phase of development refined the large number of identified items 
into a screening-tool version of a full scale SPJ risk assessment for detecting 
deception. This process involved arranging similar items together, for example, the 
DARN groups together the different forms of HUMINT that can be used to inform 
judgement of credibility (See Figure 8.1) and strategies of credibility assessment 
included were identified from research and SME responses (see Chapter 2 – 6). The 
DARN process is highlighted in Figure 8.1, whilst the descriptions of the DARN 
components are outlined below. 
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Deception Assessment Real-time Nexus
©2015
 Components 
Context 
Usual 
Suspicious 
Acute 
Intelligence, 
Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance 
-Human Intelligence 
-Open Source Intelligence 
-Social Media Intelligence 
-Communications Intelligence 
 
Low Risk 
No Further 
Action 
Situation Expertise 
Consistency Implicit 
Concern 
Plausibility 
DRAT 
Future Threat 
Figure 8. 1: The Deception Assessment Real-Time Nexus Process©2015 
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Future Threat Scenario Development 
 As presented in Chapter 9, the importance of specific and generic future threat 
scenarios are critical for the focus of the screening and full risk assessments. This can 
incorporate scenarios which are considered to be a higher likelihood in terms of 
threats to the UK, i.e., an IS motivated threat, whether a lone wolf or co-ordinated 
attack or alternatively threats that might be considered of lower imminence but high 
severity were they to occur. In regard of the risks associated with such threats, it is 
important to consider a holistic approach while incorporating critical involvement of 
the human aspect of all individuals involved at all levels. 
Context 
 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is used by security and 
intelligence organisations as a technique for collecting intelligence about adversaries 
through which a behavioural pattern can be developed and then used to inform 
operations (DCDC, 2011; Henderson & Pascual, 2008 – see Appendix 8.2). ISR is 
defined as “activities that synchronise and integrate the planning and operation of 
collection capabilities, including the processing and dissemination of the resulting 
product” (DCDC, 2011, p 1-9). The technique focuses intelligence collection broadly 
across human, electronic and geophysical information (DCDC, 2011). However for 
the purpose of the present risk assessment tools, it is the emphasis on the human 
element of information communication and behaviour that is considered to be of 
primary importance and ultimately the main source of evidence for the assessment of 
risk. HUMINT focuses on intelligence derived from information collected or provided 
by human sources including information recovered from debriefings and investigative 
interviewing (DCDC, 2011). Further information relevant to understanding and 
detecting human deception can be developed from OSINT (where information is 
publically available and recoverable for analysis), social media intelligence 
(SOCMINT – any information retrievable from social media technologies, e.g. 
Facebook and Twitter), and communications intelligence (COMINT – where 
information is developed from electronic communications, e.g. emails). Through ISR 
techniques an understanding of context and usual adversary behaviour may be 
developed. 
Once intelligence has been gathered and assessed for credibility according to 
the range of techniques advocated by the HMD (see Chapter 6) a baseline of usual 
adversary behaviour can be developed, from which changes in baseline behaviour 
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may indicate deception. Furthermore, if the adversary behaviour is usually deceptive 
than there is a high risk of deception occurring and a full-scale risk assessment will be 
required. In deception research, changes in behavioural baseline have been examined 
and are argued to indicate that deception may be occurring (Ewens et al., 2014; 
Navarro, 2003; Vrij & Mann, 2001 – See Chapter 6, Appendix 6), although any 
change in behaviour will need to be confirmed as deception. 
Suspicious Behaviour: This relates to alterations from normative behaviours 
which might be indicative of actions warranting increased focus and attention. In 
regard of suspicious behaviour, it is important that practitioners have flexibility to 
identify alterations that they (from their own expertise and experience) are against the 
norm or an expectation. A change in usual adversary behaviour, for example, there 
may be conflicting information from human sources compared to news channels 
compared to previous synthesis, might indicate a cause for concern although the 
context in which this occurs needs to be assessed more broadly with a breadth of 
factors. 
Acute Behavioural Change: In risk assessments, an acute change in usual 
behaviour, for example, multiple sources may all start reporting the same information 
regarding adversary intentions, and/or the identification of key warning behaviours 
will be identified as a cause for concern and will require a full risk assessment (Meloy 
et al., 2012) and this principle will be applied to assessing risk of deception by 
adversaries. 
Situation Expertise 
 Situation expertise will be required for analysing different sources of 
intelligence generated from ISR, for example, expertise in detecting deception will be 
required for areas including HUMINT, OSINT, SOCMINT and COMINT to analyse 
intelligence. Further, some experts have been found to have greater accuracy in 
detecting deception than others (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Wright-Whelan, 
Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2015) and such experts should be identified for deployment 
in intelligence-gathering processes. 
Consistency 
 Once evidence has been developed through ISR capabilities checks for 
consistency of this evidence are required. Consistency can be examined across 
multiple areas, for example, between past and current behaviour, between current 
behaviour and adversary policies and aims, between current behaviour and known 
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capabilities, and between multiple sources of evidence. Examining consistency of 
evidence and statements has been used within investigative interviews and is a 
promising technique for detecting deception (e.g. Dando & Bull, 2011; Hartwig et al., 
2006). 
Plausibility 
 Once evidence has been recovered checks for plausibility are required. 
Research into deception detection has focussed upon using plausibility to discern 
between truth-tellers and deceivers verbal statements (e.g. Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal & 
Mann, 2011; Vrij, Leal, Mann & Fisher, 2011). Plausibility can be further used to 
assess other areas of credibility. 
Concern of Targeting – Implicit belief 
 There may be an implicit belief, suspicion or scepticism that the adversary is 
engaging in targeting or deception operations, which would suggest that follow up 
assessment is required to assess these beliefs. People may have an implicit belief that 
deception is occurring based on their observations (Evanoff, Porter & Black, 2014; 
ten Brinke et al., 2014), increasing the need for a follow-up examination to 
substantiate such beliefs. Scepticism towards information has the potential to increase 
accuracy in identifying deception (Forgas & East, 2008; Kim & Levine, 2011), 
although it may reduce accuracy in detecting truth (Kim & Levine, 2011). Suspicion 
that something out of the ordinary is occurring and might indicate deception means 
that a full risk assessment is required to confirm or refute these suspicions (Bobko, 
Barelka & Hirshfield, 2014; Bobko, Barelka, Hirshfield & Lyons, 2014)  
Activating the DRAT 
 Once intelligence about the adversary has been analysed for consistency, 
plausibility and judgements made regarding suspicious behaviour levels of risk 
regarding adversary behaviour can be developed. Levels of threat can be constructed 
from the intelligence available from multiple factors or from key critical factors which 
indicate acute risk and the level of risk will reflect the context. Practitioners will 
prioritise risk as follows: 
- High Risk – Prioritise and Activate DRAT 
- Medium Concern – Activate DRAT 
- Low Concern – Do not activate DRAT but continue to monitor  
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Risk levels will be reviewed and revised on a regular basis in operational 
circumstances through deploying ISR capabilities (DCDC, 2007, 2011). 
 
Deception Risk Assessment Technique
©2015
 
To meet the challenge of managing deception risks the ‘Deception Risk 
Assessment Technique’ ©2015 (DRAT- See Appendix 8.3) has been developed for use 
following the DARN or for use as a standalone risk assessment tool.  
Methodology 
In developing the DRAT, the work of Skeem and Monahan (2011) in 
assessing risk through SPJ approaches is drawn upon. SPJ approaches are argued to 
have two components to how risk is constructed: (a) identifying valid risk factors and, 
(b) determining a method for scoring each of these factors. Consistent with Webster et 
al. (1997) the presence of risk can be identified from both a single critical item or 
from a combination of items, therefore, presenting a combined risk score for overall 
level of risk is not required. 
(A) Identifying Valid Risk Factors 
In developing the DRAT risk factors a logical item selection method outlined 
by Cooke et al. (2012), Douglas and Skeem (2005), Douglas and Reeves (2010), 
Kebbell and Porter (2012) and Kropp et al. (2011) was selected, whereby a thorough 
review of the deception related literature was conducted, alongside the incorporation 
of the findings and themes developed from interviews with SMEs where risk factors 
with empirical and practitioner support across multiple samples and contexts were 
selected to form a conceptual model of deception risk. Following identification, items 
were separated on a rational basis into risk factors (Cooke et al., 2012). Appendix 9.4 
provides a list of the risk factors and examples of research which supports their 
inclusion in the DRAT. This list is not exhaustive and will be subject to change with 
the incorporation of further research as required, or items dropped from the model if 
irrelevant in applied settings (Cooke et al., 2012). 
(B) Scoring Risk Factors 
In scoring risk factors, the situation identified by the analyst is described and then 
the item is coded following SPJ guidelines (Douglas, 2014) for low, medium or high 
 129 
risk, for example, the analyst identifies the presence of sadism in the deceiver, 
therefore the risk factor is scored for high risk. Some items may actually decrease risk 
posed by adversaries, for example, if an adversary lacks capabilities they will have a 
low risk score. The presence of critical items and/or the identification of risk across 
multiple items will lead to the activation of deception detection and risk management 
strategies. Consistent with other SPJ approaches no assumption is made that all items 
will be applicable for all individuals (Douglas, 2014). 
Deception Risk Assessment Technique
©2015 
Components: 
Following the identification of risk factors from psychological and military 
research (Appendix 8.4), the elements of the DRAT are presented in Table 8.1 whilst 
the sections the factors fall under are described in detail below: The ‘Context of 
Deception’ section of risk factors refers to the situation and context in which 
deception occurs. Risk items in this section include: the situation, the actors, current 
threats, communication medium, online communication characteristics, and in-real-
life communication characteristics. Together these factors enable an understanding of 
how deception may occur, which in turn will affect the strategies used to detect 
deception and manage associated risks.  
The ‘History’ section of risk factors seeks to understand and develop a profile 
of the adversary through examining previous non-deceptive adversary behaviour to 
develop a baseline of ‘normal’ behaviour. Development of a behavioural baseline will 
enable UK capabilities to monitor for changes in adversary behaviour that may 
indicate deception is occurring. Further understanding of past acts of deception by the 
deceiver towards the UK and others will enhance knowledge of adversary deception 
strategies, although it is anticipated that these strategies may vary depending on 
context (Gozna & Boon, 2010). 
The ‘Nature of Deception’ section of risk factors considers the different 
strategies used to deceive others, and provides indicators of potential forms of 
deception within each risk factor, which may or may not be rated for presence 
depending on practitioner requirements (Douglas, 2014). Deceivers can create and 
identify vulnerability in the target which they then aim to exploit through a variety of 
techniques, for example, through ruses (Hansen, 2008) and through exploitation of 
target hopes (LeMire, 2002). Deceivers can condition the target into expecting a 
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certain pattern of behaviour, which the deceiver is then able to exploit, for example, 
the Soviet-Czechoslovakia Campaign 1968 (Whaley, 2007). Deceivers actively 
engage in impression management through controlling their verbal and non-verbal  
Table 8. 1 The Deception Risk Assessment Technique©2015 
Risk Factor Elements 
Context of Deception Situation 
Actors 
Current Threats 
Communication Medium 
Online Communication Characteristics 
In-Real-Life Communication 
Characteristics 
History Previous Behaviour – Non-Deceptive 
Previous Deceiver Interactions – UK 
Previous Deceiver Interactions – Others 
Nature of Deception Create and Identify Vulnerability and 
Exploit 
Conditioning the Target 
Impression Management 
Control of Information 
Credibility Enhancers 
Social Influencers 
Deceiver Risk Factors Deception Doctrine 
Gains Vs Losses 
Motivation 
Capabilities, Resources and Experience 
Deception Spontaneity → Planned 
Cognitive Performance 
Language 
Personality and Individual Differences 
Belief System 
Target Vulnerability Factors Who is the Target? 
Stakes 
Motivation 
Target Characteristics 
Mindset – Cognition 
Mindset – Affect 
Capabilities – Information, Surveillance, 
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) 
Risk Scenarios Elements 
 Nature 
Severity 
Imminence 
Frequency/Duration 
Likelihood 
Risk Management Strategies Elements 
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 Monitoring 
Supervision 
Target Inoculation  Planning 
Other Considerations 
 
behaviour in order to appear credible to others (Hartwig et al., 2010; Hines et al., 
2010). Such behaviours may be difficult to identify without knowledge of impression 
management strategies. Deceivers’ use further strategies of control of information, 
including increasing and decreasing the amount of information available to the target, 
in order to create ambiguity and/or increase noise and cognitive load in the target 
reducing their decision-making abilities (Macdonald, 2007). There are credibility 
enhancers which are used as strategies for the deceiver or information presented by 
the deceiver to appear more credible to the target, for example, website appearance 
(Flanagin & Metzger, 2007) and appearing objective (Ott et al., 2011). Tactics of 
social influence may also be used by adversaries to influence and deceive others 
through a variety of means (Cialdini, 2007; Henderson, 2007). 
The ‘Deceiver Risk Factors’ section provides risk factors which affect the 
deceiver’s ability to conduct deception. The adversary may have deception doctrine, 
which governs the circumstances in which deception operations are allowed, however, 
this may not be applicable to non-state actors, or adversaries who are not limited by 
ethical and legal considerations. Adversary deception may be effected by the 
perceived gains and losses of deception, with lower risk for the target associated with 
high losses and low gains for the adversary. Adversary motivation may also pose risk 
to the deceiver as it may affect how much effort is placed into constructing the 
deception, and deception has the potential to be enhanced online (Woodworth, 
Hancock, & Goorha, 2005). Adversary capabilities, resources and experience will 
affect their ability to research, plan and conduct deception operations (Mackay & 
Tatham, 2011), and if these capabilities are lacking their ability to deceive will be 
reduced. Adversary deception may be spontaneous, planned or along a continuum of 
both, and this will affect how the adversary and the information they present are 
perceived by others (Strömwall &Willén, 2011). The adversary’s cognitive 
performance will affect the risk they pose to the target, as deception is argued to be a 
cognitively demanding task (Vrj, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011a), those adversaries 
with greater cognitive abilities will pose an increased risk to the target. Language will 
also affect the level of risk posed by the deceiver to the target, whether this is through 
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the deceiver being able to construct deception to appear credible to the target, or to the 
target’s ability to accurately assess information or conduct investigative interviews in 
a different language (Colwell et al., 2013). Personality and individual differences 
factors will affect how the adversary conducts deception and the way in which they 
portray themselves to the target (Taylor & Gozna, 2011). Dark personalities will add 
additional challenges and risks to the target (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). The 
adversary’s belief system, their identity, culture, religion, politics and allegiances will 
affect how they interpret the world and influence their interactions with others which 
will shape the motive and context from which deception occurs. Understanding the 
adversaries belief system will help to reduce risk involved from deception. 
The ‘Target Vulnerability Factors’ section links to risk factors which may 
affect the target’s ability to accurately detect deception and enable adversary 
exploitation of vulnerabilities. Identifying who the specific target is required in order 
to assess risk posed, for example, if the target is a key-decision maker then risk may 
be increased as deception may have greater consequences. The target stakes in 
assessing individuals or information for deception may pose risk as high-stakes may 
increase cognitive and/or emotional arousal reducing the deceiver’s ability to assess 
credibility (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Target motivation to detect deception 
potentially increases risk due to the motivational impairment effect (DePaulo & 
Kirkendol, 1988), where assessment ability is reduced by increased motivation. 
Target characteristics in how information is perceived and assessed can present risk as 
some characteristics can negatively affect ability to detect deception (Baker et al., 
2012). The target’s mindset with focus on cognition will affect how information is 
analysed by groups and individuals, however, adversary deception may seek to 
exploit this area and decrease target cognitive performance through a variety of tactics 
(Henderson, 2007). The target’s mindset will affect how information is processed and 
is again an area that adversary deception will seek to exploit (Henderson, 2007). 
Target capabilities, in particular ISR capabilities, are linked to risk, as if these 
capabilities are reduced or unable to effectively monitor adversary behaviour then risk 
may be increased (Henderson & Pascual, 2008). 
Guidance on Risk Assessment Use: 
Following the completion of the DRAT and the identification of items which 
indicate risk from adversary deception operations, future scenario generation, 
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deception detection and risk management strategies can be implemented to reduce the 
impact of adversary deception. 
Case Formulation 
 Upon completion of the risk assessment formulation of deception risk is 
required (Douglas, 2014; Hart & Logan, 2011). Case formulations seek to combine 
information from the risk assessment into an easy to understand narrative of why the 
adversary has behaved in this manner (Logan, 2014), which will then enable 
predictions of their future behaviour and the design of risk management to address 
specific adversary risk factors and reduce risk to target capabilities (Douglas, 2014; 
Vess, Ward & Collie, 2008). 
Future Scenarios 
 Following the DRAT, and identification of risk factors showing the increased 
likelihood of deception the generation of future deception scenarios can occur. Future 
scenarios are generated in SPJ approaches as part of the process of mitigating and 
managing risk (Douglas, 2014; Hart & Logan, 2011). The current research develops 
risk scenarios from the SPJ approach where scenarios are developed from available 
evidence and practitioner judgement rather than upon probabilities. Hart and Logan 
(2011) recommend the generation of multiple scenarios, based on research, theory, 
and experience and case evidence. This will enable the generation of best case, worse 
case, linear (adversary behaviour remains the same) and twist (target or nature of 
deception may change) scenarios (Douglas, 2014; Hart & Logan, 2011). Future 
scenarios of adversary behaviour can be developed to focus on: The nature of who is 
being targeted, what type of deception is likely to be committed, the strategy 
employed to influence the target, deceiver motivation; the severity of harm, including 
physical harm, to the target and whether deception will occur across multiple 
communication channels; the imminence of the threat and identification of warning 
signs of increased imminence; the frequency and duration of the deception; and how 
likely it is for this deception to occur (Appendix 8.3). Through generating a future 
scenario of deception, risk management strategies may be developed as part of a 
proactive approach towards deception detection and risk mitigation (See Chapter 9). 
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Risk Management 
Following the identification of potential adversary deception operations and 
the generation of risk scenarios where it is anticipated the adversary will target, risk 
management strategies can be developed reflecting the intensity of the risk posed 
(Douglas, 2014). Risk management strategies have been applied in previous SPJ 
approaches, for example, the HCR-20 uses risk management strategies to reduce risk 
of future violence by offenders (Douglas, 2014). The DRAT proposes risk 
management strategies focussing on: monitoring the adversary through context 
specific techniques and identifying circumstances under which risk should be 
reassessed, for example, through ISR capabilities (DCDC, 2007, 2011); supervision of 
the adversary should focus upon identifying surveillance strategies to manage risk and 
any forms of possible restriction of the adversary to reduce risk, for example, through 
Counter-ISTAR measures (Henderson & Pascual, 2008); and target inoculation 
planning should focus on enhancing the protection of targets, and identifying 
vulnerabilities which may be guarded against, for example, deployment of OPSEC 
capabilities (DCDC, 2007) and Defensive Counter-Psychological Operations 
(PSYOPS) capabilities (DCDC, 2007). Other considerations in risk management 
should also be examined to identify circumstances in which risk might increase or 
decrease and if there are any other techniques for reducing risk available to the target, 
for example, drawing attention to demonstrably false claims by the adversary through 
Offensive Counter-PSYOPS (DCDC, 2007). Once management strategies have been 
implemented ISR should be used to monitor change in adversary behaviour (Davies, 
Black, Bentley & Nagi, 2013; DCDC, 2007). 
Communication of Deception Risk 
Once practitioners have scored items for risk they will be able to inform key 
stakeholders of which items are or are not indicative of risk, the level of risk they are 
deemed to be, the risk management strategies that are required and the reasons for 
their judgements (Heilbrun et al., 2004). In complex decision-making environments 
there is debate as to whether risk should be communicated via probabilities or ratios 
of risk (Bachishin, Hanson & Helmus, 2012; Hanson, Babchishin, Helmus & 
Thornton, 2012) or through describing individual items and the risk that they may 
pose based on their behaviour (Scurich & John, 2012). These approaches may reflect 
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differences between contexts and audiences (Babchishin et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 
2012; Scurich & John, 2012). The current approach will communicate risk based upon 
individual items of risk, the behaviour that led to the risk and risk management 
strategies which can be deployed; such an approach will reflect the multiple pathways 
to deception. 
Decision-Making Biases in Assessing Risk 
Individuals and organisations are argued to struggle in assessing risk due to 
heuristic biases, which can lead to over and underestimation of risk and may also 
influence how risk assessments are modified over the course of time (Koblentz, 2011 
- See Chapter 2). Biases linked to underestimation of risk include: ‘hindsight bias’ 
where focus on previous failures leads to future false alarms; and the availability 
heuristic where people judge the frequency of an event by how easy it is to imagine 
and ignore challenging risks (Koblentz, 2011). Biases linked to the overestimation of 
risk include: ‘salience bias’ where distinctive stimuli are more likely to attract 
attention and disproportionately affect judgement, and the affect heuristic where 
individual perceptions of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ influence our perception of risk 
(Koblentz, 2011). Further, ‘confirmation’ and ‘disconfirmation’ biases can have a 
strong effect on how risk is assessed as analysts may seek information which supports 
their pre-existing beliefs, for example, CIA analysts selected intelligence to support 
their informant’s assertions about Iraqi CBRN capabilities (Koblentz, 2011). 
Awareness of these biases is required when assessing risk, and practitioners should be 
encouraged to discuss their analysis with others to overcome such biases. 
 
Validation and Future Directions: 
 The DARN and DRAT models outlined above are in construction phase and 
require further validation and amending through case study, and empirical 
approaches, before testing in applied settings. It is anticipated that not all items of risk 
will be seen in all adversaries and that items of risk may present in different ways in 
different adversaries as a wide range of state and non-state actors from different 
cultures and background seek to conduct deception against the UK and Allies. There 
are potential limitations with this approach as how each item is assessed may be 
interpreted differently according to the biases and motivations of the analyst, to 
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counter this an awareness of decision-making biases is required and it is 
recommended that analysts discuss their findings to counter such biases. Some items 
are likely to be more measureable than others presenting further challenges in 
assessing risk, and further research is required to identify such items and establish 
further guidance for use of the risk assessments. 
Measures of Effectiveness 
 Measures of effectiveness (MoE) of risk assessments are often judged by their 
ability to predict recidivism rates amongst offenders, for example, Hanson et al. 
(2014) examined the predictive ability of the Static-99/R in assessing recidivism of 
sex offenders. This approach to MoE often argues that actuarial and SPJ approaches 
to risk assessment are roughly equal in predicting future risk (McDermott, Dualan & 
Scott, 2011; Yang, Wong & Coid, 2010). However, such claims require further 
examination as SPJ approaches often integrate risk management as part of case 
formulation and advise strategies to reduce risk (e.g. Kropp et al., 2011), which would 
have a biasing effect on any future comparisons between approaches.  
 A systems approach to examining MoE (Mackay & Tatham, 2011) would 
examine change in the adversary’s behaviour across multiple sources. ISR capabilities 
can be deployed to monitor adversary behaviour and identify changes in behaviour 
that may indicate risk reduction, for example, a return to usual behavioural patterns, 
or the identification of false information. In assessing risk of violence Wilson et al. 
(2013) conducted risk assessments regularly over the course of a year to monitor 
changes in levels of risk and violence and such an approach of regularly assessing 
adversary risk is required to ensure that risk management can adapt to risks posed. 
Once risk of deception has been identified clear ways of measuring adversary 
behaviour change are required which can be measured via ISR capabilities to ensure 
that these changes have been met, or to adjust risk management strategies depending 
upon context. Further research should seek to explore ways of measuring reductions 
in risk of adversary deception following identification and management. 
Content Validation 
The content of the risk assessment requires further refinement and validation 
to ensure its usefulness as a diagnostic instrument. One technique for such validation 
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and refinement is through prototypical analysis as a method of analysing a construct’s 
core components (Broughton, 1990). Such a technique has been used in the analysis 
of psychopathy assessments (Kreis, Cooke, Michie, Hoff & Logan, 2012) to examine 
how far items are representative of the constructs being examined. Further research 
should examine how representative of deception, its detection and associated 
behaviours the items in the DARN and DRAT are, as considered by SMEs in 
deception. 
Case Studies 
Conducting the risk assessments on case studies of strategic deception will 
provide an illustration of how the DARN can effectively screen for potential 
deception before the full DRAT assessment is conducted in operational environments. 
Case studies have frequently been used to assess predictive ability of counter-
deception approaches, for example, Elsaesser and Stech (2006) outline how ACH-CD 
can be applied to the Battle of Midway, suggesting that case studies of historical and 
current threats will provide useful initial assessment of these techniques. Previous 
research into deception detection has often been conducted at group level and a 
requirement for adopting case studies is needed to examine whether deception 
detection approaches are effective in single cases (Evans, Houston & Meissner, 2012). 
However, as case studies do not allow strong inferences of validity and reliability to 
be made (Cook et al., 2014) further testing via simulation and in operational 
conditions is required. 
Red Teaming 
 The development of recent DRE approaches to detecting deception (Colwell et 
al., 2013) have primarily used student populations (e.g. Leal, Vrij, Mann & Fisher, 
2010) to examine the ability of such approaches in detecting deceit. However, this 
approach may not reflect the reality of high-stakes strategic deception by state and 
non-state actors where adversaries may have particular skill sets in conducting 
deception. In testing the DARN and DRAT, red teaming (DCDC, 2013) is the 
preferred option. Red teaming is beneficial across a range of areas related to defence 
science including in testing intelligence and security and testing systems from an 
adversary perspective (DCDC, 2013). Red teaming the DARN and DRAT will enable 
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thorough testing and assessment of the models alongside the identification of 
strengths, weaknesses and further ways of improving the outlined approach to 
identifying risk of deception before operational implementation (DCDC, 2013). Red 
team members should be experienced practitioners in the areas of deception and 
influence as such individuals will be able to present a credible challenge in assessing 
the ability of the DARN and DRAT to identify risk of deception. 
Conclusion: 
 This chapter examines the research surrounding risk assessments used in 
forensic and clinical environments for assessing risk of violence, stalking and sex 
offences and approaches to assessing risk in security environments. Actuarial and 
probabilistic approaches to risk assessment were found wanting, whilst SPJ 
approaches to assessing risk whilst providing risk management strategies were 
identified as a logical next step in assessing adversary risk of deception.  
Through a review of relevant empirical and practitioner research related to 
deception across different domains a screening tool and risk assessment were 
developed for assessing risk of adversary deception. The DARN proposes a decision-
making model which leads to the identification of potential and apparent adversary 
threats, leading to the activation of the DRAT which conducts a full risk assessment, 
before outlining potential future scenarios  based on adversary behaviour and risk 
management strategies which negate risk posed by the adversary to friendly 
capabilities. Further steps are required to validate and refine this approach to risk 
assessment through case studies of existing and current threats and red teaming to 
identify, strengths, weaknesses and areas for improvement of this approach to 
mitigating adversary threat. 
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Chapter 9: Future Threat Scenario Assessment and Development: A 
Proactive Approach to Deception Detection. 
Introduction 
In deception detection research, approaches have traditionally focused upon 
previously experienced events or in response to current operational challenges, 
however, in forensic, security and intelligence domains there is an intrinsic need for 
understanding the risk of future threats and to incorporate consideration of deception 
into this process, both in real-time and to proactively respond to forthcoming 
challenges. Technological interconnectedness creates ever more complex challenges 
which can occur where future threats will not only come from state and terrorist 
actors, but from the increasing sophistication of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs – 
EUROPOL, 2013). Hence the multi-faceted nature of future threats which cross 
multiple criminal domains and occur on a transnational basis illustrate the 
requirement to develop UK capabilities to proactively detect and investigate (HM 
Government, 2013) while increasing resilience against such threats (Fussey, 2011; 
McFarlane & Hills, 2013). 
Through developing potential scenarios of future threats a comprehensive risk 
assessment may be conducted and a response developed in order to negate risk to UK 
interests (Buytendijk, Hatch & Micheli, 2010; Fotr, Špaček, Souček & Vacík, 2015; 
Miller & Waller, 2003). Scenarios for the purposes of the current research are defined 
as “descriptions of possible futures that reflect different perspectives on the past, the 
present and the future” (van Notten, Rotmans, van Asselt & Rothman, 2003, p. 424). 
This provides a useful focus on the construction of future scenarios although Ramírez 
and Selin (2014) argue for the need to include context and purpose. This chapter 
explores and presents reactive, active and proactive approaches to deception detection 
and outlines the need for a future-focussed approach to detecting deception, presents 
scenarios and risk assessments of future threats. Chapter 9 develops further the work 
of Chapter 8 through developing future scenarios of the potential threats that the risk 
assessments will be tasked with mitigating. Following the development of potential 
future scenarios the risk assessments developed in Chapter 8 were conducted on two 
of the scenarios to provide an example of this new approach towards deception 
detection. 
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Reactive Approaches to Past Transgressions 
 Methods of examining materials as an assessment of credibility have been 
historically employed (see Chapter 2 for a detailed description). This includes SVA 
(Rassin, 2000) and RM (Sporer, 2004). There is limited evidence focusing on the use 
of such tools in the determination of future threat although there are elements of both 
methods that could be usefully applied to understanding risk. Recent evidence 
(Akehurst, et al., 2015) has supported the use of elements of such tools in the 
detection of malingering in regard of physical and psychological illness. Although 
nonverbal approaches to deception detection have sought to examine facial 
expressions, microexpressions (Ekman, 2001) and hand and finger movements 
(DePaulo et al., 2003) for cues to deceit there is limited evidence to support the utility 
of such approaches and therefore multi-modal approaches are considered to warrant 
further investigation and supports a holistic approach. 
Deception detection in military environments is often reactive in nature with 
intelligence analysis often conducted ad hoc to accommodate the dynamic nature of 
theatres of operation (Heuer, 2005). Techniques for detecting deception in military 
environments include ACH (Heuer, 1999; Stech & Elsässer, 2003; Stech & Elsässer, 
2004), the Busby-Whaley Ombudsman technique (Whaley & Busby, 2002) and a 
counter-deception approach advocated by Bennett and Waltz (2007) (See Chapters 4 
and 6). ACH uncovers deception through generating multiple hypotheses and 
weighing these against available evidence (Stech & Elsässer, 2003). This approach 
parallels that of police investigations where evidence is sought to identify suspects. 
The use of ACH in detecting future threat has the potential for operational utility, 
particularly if based on a considered understanding of the target of the assessment and 
the potential options open to them. The Busby-Whaley Ombudsman technique detects 
deception through examining discrepancies, misdirection and irrelevancies alongside 
indirect thinking (Whaley & Busby, 2002) – this incorporates a focus that enables a 
broader consideration of innovative thought and maintaining openness in decision-
making – therefore potentially avoiding confirmation bias. The holistic approach to 
counter-deception advocated by Bennett and Waltz (2007) comes into effect once an 
awareness of deception has occurred (Bennett & Waltz, 2007) therefore identifying 
potential future threats for which strategies may be developed to mitigate the effects 
of adversary deception while giving the impression of being deceived. 
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Active Approaches 
Active approaches to detecting deception in interpersonal interactions have 
sought to increase behavioural differences between truth-tellers and deceivers through 
increasing cognitive load (Vrij, 2015b), adapting questioning strategies to circumvent 
deceiver’s impression management strategies through asking unanticipated questions 
(Vrij, 2015b) and contrasting interviewee’s statements to evidence (Dando & Bull, 
2011; Granhag & Hartwig, 2015 – See Chapter 2). Active approaches in deception 
detection involving interactions between sender and target are assumed to be closer to 
reality (George, Marett & Tilley, 2004). However, such approaches focus primarily 
on increasing cognitive load to detect deception and ignore how future deception 
occurs from the surrounding context, whether political or social. 
Active strategies in detecting mediated deception have sought to examine cues 
to deceit across grammar, plausibility, claims and inconsistencies with experiential 
norms (Grazioli, 2004). However, features-based models of credibility (e.g. Grazioli, 
2004; Johnson et al., 1992) are reliant upon an individual’s experience of using a 
communication medium and suggesting that unfamiliarity will result in difficulties in 
detecting deceit. In protecting organisations from insider threat a more active 
approach to deception detection is required where individuals’ deviations from usual 
behaviour and normal language may indicate threat (Santos et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 
2013) enabling a response to be developed to mitigate further risk. Individuals within 
organisations may further be vulnerable to threats posed by social engineering 
approaches (Larson, Jones, Rashid & Baron, 2015; Stajano & Wilson, 2015); 
therefore a holistic understanding of deception and the multiple ways in which 
organisations may come under threat is required alongside means of increasing 
resilience against threats through strategic planning.  
Active approaches towards mediated deception have applied interviewing 
techniques from interpersonal environments (Colwell et al., 2013; George et al., 
2008). ACID (Colwell et al., 2013 – See Chapter 2) has been adapted to detecting 
deception in synchronous computer-mediated communication (CMC) and found that 
honest statements are often longer and more detailed than deceptive ones. Although 
these approaches are more active in their assessment of credibility through seeking to 
challenge deceivers’ accounts, they are focussed around an individual act of deception 
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rather than deception at a strategic or operational level and do not provide techniques 
for target inoculation. 
Proactive Approaches 
To reduce future risk recent approaches in deception research have focussed 
on uncovering malign intent (Burgoon et al., 2009; Mac Giolla, Granhag & Vrij, 
2015), illicit planning activities (Morgan, Rabinowitz, Hilts, Weller & Coric, 2013; 
Morgan, Rabinowitz, Leidy & Coric, 2014) and deterring individuals from 
committing deception (Leal, Vrij & Mann, 2015; Palasinski & Svoboda, 2014). In 
particular, these approaches have assumed that it may be possible to counter potential 
acts of terrorism such as in public spaces including airports and borders (Burgoon et 
al., 2009; Nunamaker, Golob, Elkins, Burgoon & Derrick, 2015; Vrij, Granhag et al., 
2011b). Vrij, Granhag et al. (2011b) argue that malign intent in airport settings can be 
uncovered through examining cues to plausibility, contradictions and spontaneous 
corrections. Furthermore, Vrij, Leal et al. (2011) found that when questioning 
individuals engaged in a mission to deliver a package to another ‘agent’ that cues to 
plausibility enabled discrimination between truth-tellers and deceivers. 
Strategic interviewing of individuals on their intentions and corresponding 
planning activities has also been advocated to detect future threats (Clemens, Granhag 
& Strömwall, 2011). Although useful in securing evidence for prosecution before 
incidents may occur (Clemens et al., 2011), this approach relies upon previously 
gathered evidence with which to question subjects so may not be applicable to all 
situations. Further issues may arise when seeking to detect deception in highly 
complex, low-base rate environments where adversaries may construct credible 
appearances over a period of time in preparation for deception operations. 
In detecting deception related to bio-threats in low-base rate environments, 
Morgan et al. (2014) and Morgan et al. (2013) found that modified cognitive 
interviewing outperforms human judgement, apart from experienced interviewers, in 
detecting bio-threats. Morgan et al. (2014) and Morgan et al. (2013) increased the 
validity of their research through recruiting participants who worked with chemicals 
and would have knowledge of how bio-threats may be created reflecting the 
complexity of human behaviour in real-world interactions, highlighting the ability of 
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modified cognitive interview techniques to identify deception between both truth-
tellers and deceivers with bio industry experience. 
Undercover interviewing in field settings (Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann & Hillman, 
2013; Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope & Leal, 2012) has sought to be proactive in detecting 
deception and presents an alternative to formal investigative interviews which may 
affect on-going investigations, including undercover operations. Through engaging a 
target before an official interview there is potential to aid future investigation through 
highlighting inconsistences in narrative and alibis between the undercover and formal 
interview (Jundi et al., 2013). However, undercover interviewing focusses on a target 
that has already been uncovered which does not reflect the reality of how all future 
threats are detected following their manifestation. To anticipate and respond to 
strategic deception an even more proactive response is required where a response is 
developed in advance to counter anticipated future threat. 
Approaches to increasing resilience against crime and terrorism have focussed 
upon the use of surveillance, deterrence and target hardening against threats (Coaffee 
& Fussey, 2015; Fussey, 2011; Leal et al., 2015; Palasinski & Svoboda, 2014). Target 
hardening measures have sought to influence offenders’ decision-making through 
decreasing the attractiveness of potential targets, for example, appearances of 
surveillance to decrease online fraud (Palasinski & Svoboda, 2014), whilst increasing 
the likelihood of the offender being caught and reducing the likelihood of the offender 
acting on their intentions (Fussey, 2011). Other approaches to resilience have 
focussed upon the proactive identification and resolution of systems vulnerabilities 
before they are exploited by adversaries (McFarlane & Hills, 2013; Wallace & Lofi, 
2014). Such an approach highlights the benefits of anticipating threats and scenario 
planning will provide a useful lens with which to inoculate targets against deception. 
Proactive surveillance of potential threats is required to reduce the risk of 
casualties from acts of terrorism, whether committed by ‘lone wolves’ or groups 
(Gordon, Sharan & Florescu, 2015). A ‘lone wolf’’ will be harder to apprehend than a 
group, as there is less chance of intercepting communications, and identifying and 
infiltrating networks (Gordon et al., 2015). Techniques for tracing such individuals 
include, online monitoring of purchases, communications surveillance and 3
rd
 party 
informants (Gordon et al., 2015). Highlighting the need for sophisticated approaches 
employing multiple techniques to detect future threats involving deception. 
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Warning and priming individuals about the possibility of deception in their 
online interactions may reduce the truth bias whilst increase their suspicion and 
subsequent effort towards detecting deception (George et al., 2008; Modic & 
Anderson, 2014). Warning and priming individuals increases their ability to detect 
deception in online environments (George et al., 2004; Grazioli, 2004), although this 
may also increase false positives which then need to be disconfirmed to detect truthful 
information (Biros, George & Zmud, 2002). If individuals are aware of the risks 
posed by being in a situation, particularly when there are threats posed by terrorism, 
then they will be less likely to engage in that situation (Gray & Wilson, 2009). 
Through proactively warning individuals about deception and risk processes of 
mitigation against such threats are activated and through exploring the potential of 
future risks comprehensive responses can be developed to meet such challenges. 
Proactive policies are being adopted by various nations including the UK and 
Spain in order to mitigate current and future threats posed by terrorism (BBC, 2014; 
Gil-Alana & Barros, 2010). In the UK individuals returning from current conflict 
areas are being identified and arrested on their return, before they are placed into 
programmes run by the ‘Prevent’ strategy on counter-terrorism (BBC, 2014; HM 
Government, 2011). The ‘Prevent’ strategy will challenge those individuals who have 
become radicalised during their time in Syria, thus proactively seeking to prevent 
individuals from engaging in political violence upon their return to the UK. In 
challenging the activities of ETA in Spain, proactive strategies of banning political 
parties related to ETA were effective in reducing funding available to conduct 
terrorist activities and are far more effective than reactive punitive measures which 
further alienated the population (Gil-Alana & Barros, 2010). Through adopting 
proactive strategies for reducing risk it is anticipated that there will be less threat to 
UK interests. 
Scenarios for Future Planning 
There is a crucial need to focus on foresight and possible future environments 
to address future threats rather than focussing on reactive approaches (McFarlane & 
Hills, 2014). Individuals often form judgements based on available information which 
may be biased (Hogart & Soyer, 2014; Kahneman, 2011), creating scenarios will 
encourage creative thinking in response to future challenges. Scenario use for 
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examining futures has been conducted across a wide range of areas, including in 
strategic planning (Bakker, 2012; DCDC, 2010a; 2010b; 2014), management and 
business (Mante-Meijer, van der Duin & Abeln, 1998; Wright, 2005) and in the risk 
assessment and management of offenders (Douglas, 2014; Hart & Logan, 2011). 
Scenarios may be used as decision-making tools to overcome limitations and enable 
preparation for the unexpected and the construction of meaning from uncertainty and 
ambiguity through developing creative future responses (Amer, Daim & Jetter, 2013; 
Buytendijk et al., 2010; De Jouvenel, 2000; Bowman, MacKay, Masrani & 
McKiernan, 2013; Durance & Godet, 2010; Fotr et al., 2015; Godet & Roubelat, 
1996; Inayatullah, 2008; Varum, & Melo, 2010; Wright, 2005). When organisations 
capacity to make sense is challenged by unexpected phenomena, which cannot be 
located within existing mental models, rejection of such phenomena can lead to 
potential threats (Wright, 2005). Constructing wide-ranging future scenarios enables 
future planning to be conducted in a holistic approach enhancing the ability to deal 
with uncertainty (Amer et al., 2013). Scenarios are argued to be socially constructed 
narratives which integrate predetermined events with critical uncertainties to 
encourage future-thinking and are not predictions or forecasts of the future (Wright, 
2005). Scenario generation allows further exploration of futures that may not be 
influenced by understanding past behaviour of the actors involved but through 
exploring unknown unknowns, events which may be hard to probabilistically examine 
(Ramírez & Ravetz, 2011). DCDC (2014) refers to ‘shocks’ and Ramírez and Ravetz 
(2011) refer to ‘feral futures’ both of which are considered as low probability events 
which have large consequences and may be difficult to manage and control requiring 
a need for the development of techniques that may help to mitigate such threats. 
Godet (2000) argues that acceptable solutions are needed to meet the 
challenges posed by future scenarios. Adapting this perspective if analysts are able to 
construct future scenarios involving deception and threat then new perspectives of 
deception detection can be developed and deployed to meet such challenges. In a 
proactive approach to deception detection an awareness of the unexpected is required 
and through scenario building it is argued that greater sense can be made out of 
potential future threats. However, as events are being examined into the future, some 
degree of extrapolation and imagination is required alongside the examination of 
current events (DCDC, 2014).  
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Rationale 
Taking a proactive approach to deception is required to mitigate current and 
future threats. Through understanding how possible future deception will materialize 
a more comprehensive response may be developed to counter such threats, otherwise 
we will remain open to adversary exploitation. Whaley and Busby (2002) refer to 
‘predetection’ as a method of detecting deception where through understanding and 
predicting an adversary’s deception style, aims and capabilities will challenge 
adversary deception. This principle can be expanded to examine the future threats that 
adversaries may pose and proposing strategies to challenge those threats. A proactive 
approach to deception detection will examine potential future scenarios and construct 
a robust risk assessment for analysing emerging threat. 
 
Scenario Development: 
When seeking to take a proactive stance towards deception detection of future 
events it is pertinent to tailor responses to plausible future threats across a range of 
contexts (Douglas, 2014; Hart & Logan, 2011). A variety of threats may emerge from 
current on-going conflicts in Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia 
alongside a growth in OCGs (EUROPOL, 2013) and how these impact on UK 
interests requires an understanding of how global trends will shape the world to come. 
As part of the ‘Strategic Trends Programme’, the Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre (DCDC) outlines future scenarios of key factors in science and 
technology, resources, social, geopolitical and military areas (DCDC, 2010a; DCDC, 
2010b; DCDC, 2014) whilst EUROPOL (2013) conducts an assessment of serious 
and organised crime and how these effect European and UK interests. Although it is 
important for strategic purposes to propose potential future scenarios it is 
acknowledged that these scenarios may not actually occur, but rather are examples of 
how risk assessment approaches (See Chapter 8) can be used to examine deceit in 
potential future events. The current research will develop scenarios based upon the 
critical realist and constructivist ‘Intuitive Logics’ methodology (Amer et al., 2013; 
Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns & van der Heijden, 2005; Ramírez & Selin, 2014; 
Wilkinson, Kupers & Mangalagiu, 2013) where scenarios are developed primarily 
through qualitative techniques and offer narratives of potential futures rather than 
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probability-focused futures (Fotr et al., 2015; Ramírez & Selin, 2014; Wilkinson et 
al., 2013).  
Method 
The project goal 
The explorative approach to scenarios is a qualitative approach examining the 
structural uncertainty of futures to gain awareness and critical insight (Börjeson, 
Höjer, Dreborg, Ekval & Finnveden, 2006; van Notten et al., 2003). The explorative 
approach has clearly defined goals (van Notten et al., 2003), and the current research 
focuses on deception issues-based scenarios to examine how risk assessment and 
management can be used to meet future challenges. 
Process Design 
An assessment of current events and the risks they pose to UK interests led to 
the development of scenarios for current and future threats. The explorative approach 
(Börjeson et al., 2006) examines a subject from a wide-range of perspectives, and is 
set in the future allowing for long-term change. In the current approach a wide-range 
of perspectives are required to analyse potential threats to the UK in the present and 
future. The explorative approach can be split into external and strategic scenarios, the 
current research focuses on external scenarios which examine factors beyond the 
control of actors and can be used to develop robust-strategies to meet such challenges 
(Börjeson et al., 2006). Qualitative or narrative scenarios are considered appropriate 
for analysis of complex situations where there are high levels of uncertainty as they 
enable greater flexibility in adapting to threats (van Notten et al., 2003). Probabilistic 
reasoning in assessing futures is often difficult to interpret by audiences providing 
further justification for the use of narrative formulations (Hogarth & Soyer, 2014). 
When generating techniques from an explorative approach for external threats 
(Börjeson et al., 2006) surveys, workshops and the Delphi method may be used. The 
current approach modifies this in designing scenarios for current and future threats 
with a desk-based method of data collection (van Notten et al., 2003). This approach 
included a literature search of recent Government publications (DCDC, 2010a; 
DCDC, 2010b; DCDC, 2013; EUROPOL, 2013; HM Government, 2013), academic 
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and journalistic articles surrounding historical and current events (See Appendix 9.1), 
alongside SME knowledge generated from Chapter 6 to generate the future scenarios 
(See Appendix 9.2). 
Scenario Content 
In ensuring transparency in the construction of future scenarios (Coates, 2000; 
Godet, 2000), the scenarios developed are all examining potential threats to the UK 
from a variety of perspectives for which varying forms of deception by the adversary 
is required. These scenarios may be considered complex (van Notten et al., 2003) as 
they focus across multiple actors, factors, sectors and time and spatial areas and have 
differing amounts of information available to the analyst for assessing threat. 
Complex systems often have an unpredictable nature and are driven by the 
relationships within and between actors and their affects across the system (Wilkinson 
et al., 2013). Complex scenarios may more accurately reflect future events and the 
risk management strategies required to mitigate threat. 
The ten scenarios developed focus around key themes with historical 
precedent related to: deception about weapons capabilities (e.g. Sadam Hussein and 
Iraq); energy conflicts (USAID, 2010), for example, Nigeria (Klare, 2014); 
radicalisation/diaspora (e.g the July 7
th
 Bombers and recent Lee Rigby case); insider 
threat (e.g. Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning); territory and resource disputes 
(e.g. UK-Argentina; Sudan-South Sudan); internal intercultural conflict (e.g. 
Highfields – Leicester); religious conflict (e.g. Pakistan – India); intelligence-
gathering (e.g. BBC, 2013); UK organised crime (e.g. BBC, 2015); and exploitation 
of 3D printing (e.g. 3D printed guns – VICE, 2013) (See Appendix 9.2). Due to the 
wide-range of variables affecting potential future scenarios a holistic approach is 
required to face the myriad challenges to the UK. 
Results - Scenario Assessment: 
Scenario Validation 
Consistency techniques are useful for ensuring consistency between or within 
scenarios, Börjeson et al. (2006) state that consistency testing is often carried our via 
qualitative and potentially implicit means. The current research used three SMEs in 
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deception with 3 – 26 years experience (M=15.67; SD=11.53) to validate each 
scenario on a Likert-type scale of one to five (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree) across each scenarios plausibility, consistency, utility/relevance, challenge, 
novelty and creativity (Amer et al., 2013). The results of such validation are outlined 
in Table 9.1.  
 
Table 9. 2: Scenario Validation Table 
Scenario Plausibilit
y 
Consistenc
y 
Utility/ 
Relevanc
e 
Challeng
e 
Novelt
y 
Creativit
y 
Weapons 
Capabilities 
5 5 5 5 4.17 4.17 
Energy 
Conflicts 
5 5 5 5 4.17 4.17 
Radicalisatio
n and 
Terrorism 
5 5 5 5 4.17 4.17 
Insider Threat 5 5 5 4.67 4.17 4.17 
Territory and 
Resource 
Disputes 
5 5 5 4.67 4.17 4.17 
Internal 
Intercultural 
Conflict 
5 5 5 4.67 4.17 4.17 
Religious 
Conflict 
5 5 5 4.67 4.17 4.17 
Adversary 
Intelligence 
Gathering  
5 5 5 4.67 4.17 4.17 
UK OCGs 5 5 5 5 4.5 4.5 
3D Printers 5 5 5 5 4.5 4.5 
 
Scenario Risk to the UK 
 Following the scenario validation each scenario was further rated on a 5 point 
Likert-type scale by the three SMEs according to which area, for example, individual 
or group, each scenario effects (see Table 9.2) and which area of infrastructure each 
scenario effects (see Table 9.3). Taken together these assessments show that as each 
potential act of future deception effects differing areas of the UK in differing ways a 
more tailored approach to deception detection is required focussing across a wide-
range of behaviours. 
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Table 9. 3: Scenario Impacted Area 
Scenario Individual Group Non-
Governmental 
Organisation 
National Global 
Weapons 
Capabilities 
5 5 5 5 5 
Energy 
Conflicts 
4 3.33 3.33 5 5 
Radicalisation 
and Terrorism 
4 4.67 3.33 4.67 4.33 
Insider Threat 
 
3.67 3 3.33 4.67 4.33 
Territory and 
Resource 
Disputes 
3.57 3.67 3 5 4.33 
Internal 
Intercultural 
Conflict 
3.67 5 3.33 4.67 3.67 
Religious 
Conflict 
4.33 4.33 4.33 4.33 5 
Adversary 
Intelligence 
Gathering  
3.33 4.67 4.33 5 4 
UK OCGs 3.33 3 3.33 4.33 4.33 
3D Printers 3.33 4.67 3.33 4.67 4.33 
 
Table 9. 4: Scenario Impacted Infrastructure 
Scenario Technology  Financial Social  
 Development Infrastructure  Internal 
Conflict 
International 
Conflict 
Weapons 
Capabilities 
5 5 5 3 5 
Energy 
Conflicts 
4.33 4.67 4.67 2.33 5 
Radicalisation 
and Terrorism 
3 4 4 5 4.67 
Insider Threat 4.67 4 4 2.67 3.67 
Territory and 
Resource 
Disputes 
3 3.67 3.67 2.67 5 
Internal 
Intercultural 
Conflict 
3 3.33 3.33 5 3 
Religious 
Conflict 
3.33 4 4 4 4.33 
Adversary 
Intelligence 
Gathering  
4.33 4.67 3.67 3.67 4.67 
UK OCGs 2.67 2 3.33 3 2.67 
3D Printers 4 4 3.33 4.33 4.67 
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Threat Response 
The following section will outline a tailored strategy for analysing threat and 
risk of deception in two scenarios examining: diaspora groups susceptible to 
radicalisation; and detecting adversary intelligence gathering. The DARN and DRAT 
(See Chapter 8) propose groundwork for early-warning and identification of risk of 
deception, before outlining risk management strategies to negate risk of deception. In 
developing new risk assessments case studies of how these assessments work provide 
useful guidance in their application to assessing and managing risk (Beardsley & 
Beech, 2013; de Vogel, ven den Broek & de Vries Robbé, 2014; Logan, 2014). Risk 
formulations should be simple, coherent and informative (Logan, 2014) and this 
process is required in case formulation of risk of deception to ensure practitioners and 
stakeholders have awareness and understanding of risk management strategies. 
Adapting a perspective from violence risk assessment, evaluations of deception risk 
should take into account both factors which may harm the UK but also consideration 
and implementation of factors that may increase protection (de Vogel et al., 2014). 
Such an approach is taken in the current research where the DARN and DRAT are 
applied to two scenarios with potential consequences for the UK. 
Radicalisation and terrorism in diaspora groups 
Risk Assessment: 
There is risk of terrorism by diaspora groups within the UK instigated by 
groups from their home nations. The major concern is the concealment of developing 
and coordinating attacks using homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Such 
attacks will be targeted against the general public in an attempt to influence decision-
makers and undermine public confidence in authorities. Identifying the potential 
location of such an attack is required to increase resilience against posed threats. 
Actors will be highly motivated to use deception to conceal their activities 
from the general public and intelligence agencies. Such activities and deception 
operations will be guided by the actors’ radicalised world views, with potential 
reference to religious texts and teaching from extremist scholars providing 
justification for violence and deception towards other ideologies. Deception will be 
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used in concealing in-real-life and online communications regarding their malign 
activities, in the purchasing of compounds used to make IEDs and the locations where 
the IEDs are constructed. Deception will also occur in target reconnaissance in-real-
life and online environments and in the concealment of movement of IEDs to selected 
targets. 
Analysts should anticipate deception by adversaries as there are large gains 
and little cost to the adversary even if they are apprehended. Prior to the identification 
of actors it is difficult to analyse their capabilities, knowledge and experience and the 
effect of personality on their behaviour although some tentative conclusions regarding 
adversary resources may be made from resources available to previously apprehended 
groups. 
The stakes are high for analysts to accurately detect deception due to the 
potential casualties if the deception is not identified and this will increase the 
analysts’ motivation to detect deception, from which decision-making biases may 
emerge. To counter potential biases analysts are recommended to discuss their 
findings with others. There are a large range of resources available to the analyst with 
which to detect deception and they can select tactics according to context. 
Risk Formulation 
There is an acute risk of deception by the actors towards the general public 
and intelligence agencies in real-life and online interactions where actors are sourcing 
materials for IEDs, conducting target reconnaissance and concealing their activities 
from others. The motive for the deceivers’ behaviour is to conduct a terrorist attack to 
support ideological and political beliefs. Successful deception would lead to potential 
casualties and fatalities amongst the general public, damage to infrastructure and the 
economy and a loss of confidence in the security services and decision-makers. 
Actors will use a variety of tactics to deceive others regarding their activities. 
Firstly actors need to conceal their activities through controlling information by 
blocking and concealing access to their behaviour and intentions. Secondly, actors 
will need to condition the targets that they are buying materials from to appear 
credible and will need to condition anyone they interact with in reconnaissance efforts 
to again appear credible. There are a range of tactics available to achieve these aims 
including verbal and non-verbal impression management, linguistic and behavioural 
characteristics that increase credibility (e.g. positivity, convincing and mimicry), and 
forms of influence (e.g. appearing authoritative and attractive). 
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Warning signs of increased risk may be linked to actors beginning to attempt 
to buy materials for IEDs, conducting reconnaissance and moving IEDs to the target 
location. Through conducting surveillance against such threats changes in behaviour 
may be identified and acted upon. 
Risk Management 
To increase resilience against malign activities the identification of individuals 
is required to monitor their in-real-life and online behaviour. Monitoring this 
behaviour will enable identification of when individuals are researching targets and 
purchasing materials capable of constructing IEDs. Techniques including HUMINT, 
image intelligence (IMINT) (photographs of activities) and COMINT (monitoring of 
phone conversations and online activity) will provide clearer evidence of the 
extremists’ progress towards constructing IEDs and when they may be likely to 
conduct an attack, enabling intervention by authorities before the attack is conducted. 
Activity should not be restricted until the actors’ are in the final stages of 
planning the attack, unless there has been a sudden change in behaviour, in an attempt 
to uncover further actors or contacts through social network analysis and to ensure 
there is substantial evidence for prosecution. If there is a sudden change in adversary 
indicating escalating threat then they should be apprehended due to the risks involved. 
A range of techniques can be utilised to increase resilience against this threat. 
Intelligence analysts should be made aware that deception may be occurring through 
concealment of information as well as other approaches. Companies selling materials 
that can be used in constructing IEDs should be informed of potentially deceptive 
buyers and should develop systems to record who buyers are (e.g. through ID and 
CCTV footage) and the reasons for which they require these materials. CCTV and 
visible guardianship should be displayed at potential target locations to reduce the 
likelihood of threats to these locations, although the effectiveness may depend on 
adversaries’ willingness to conduct the attack in the face of punitive consequences. 
Analysts should be aware of changes in domestic and foreign affairs that may 
have an effect on the adversary behaviour and whether this will require a 
reassessment of risk accordingly. 
(See appendix 9.3 for full scale risk assessment) 
Detecting adversaries and their intelligence-gathering 
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Risk Assessment 
Current risk reflects on-going in-real-life and online adversary intelligence gathering 
efforts by multiple known and unknown actors affecting UK capabilities and interests, 
with particular cause for concern regarding the spreading of misinformation and 
potential for information theft whether through social engineering or insiders and the 
resultant damage this can cause to UK interests, use of resources and image. 
 Adversary doctrine highlights the use of deception across a range of contexts 
and communication modes and is often used in interactions with other nations to 
increase global strategic position. Previous experience of adversary behaviour has 
indicated their wide-range of resources and consistent usage of deception across a 
range of contexts in achieving a range of goals, focussing usual adversary deception 
strategies and tactics enables a profile of their behaviour to be developed. 
Actors will be highly motivated to convince others that they and the 
information they present is credible and their cognitive and language abilities will 
reflect their planning spontaneity and selection of strategies they perceive as effective 
in deceiving others across multiple channels. Personality will affect adversary 
behaviour, with a minority of individuals potentially having more Machiavellian 
behavioural characteristics in their exploitation of the target. 
In detecting adversary intelligence-gathering and misinformation there are 
important stakes in identifying and protecting areas of exploitation, which will 
increase target motivation to detection deception based upon empirically validated 
behavioural cues to deceit rather than subjective beliefs. Vulnerabilities occur 
amongst deception detection amongst lay individuals who lack awareness of 
deception cues across communication channels. Analysts have a large number of 
analysis and surveillance techniques which can be deployed to meet challenges posed 
in uncovering adversary intelligence-gathering and deception operations, however, the 
general public may not have these techniques or knowledge and may be influenced by 
adversary misinformation, which in turn, may affect wider concerns in the UK. 
 
Risk Formulation 
Deception will be potentially already occurring and on-going and may only stop once 
adversary aims have been met or they have been apprehended. Concealment of 
intelligence-gathering will be targeted towards intelligence analysts and decision-
makers. Verbal and non-verbal impression management skills will enable adversary 
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actors to condition and develop trust with the target over a period of time so that the 
target is likely to find later behaviour credible. Tactics will be used to exploit the 
targets’ hopes, fears and emotional state, alongside the use of ruses to direct the 
target’s attention and resources away from key areas of exploitation. Such tactics 
make prove more effective in deceiving the general public than intelligence analysts. 
Adversaries’ will use a range of context-dependent tactics to control 
information presented to others (e.g. decreasing, deflecting and blocking). Revealed 
information with have simple narratives, including partial truth to avoid 
inconsistencies. Adversary actors will engage in a number of tactics to appear credible 
to others including fluency, positivity, objectivity, subtlety, committed and 
convincing in their interactions with others. Actors may also choose to emphasise 
certain areas of information to direct target attention away from other areas and will 
also need to mimic behavioural norms to appear credible to the target. 
Adversary actors have the potential to use a variety of influence tactics to 
appear credible to others including referent power, being attractive, reciprocating 
behaviour, social proof and presenting scarce information to the target. 
 There is potential harm to the target from the adversary gaining information on 
new technologies leading to potential economic harm from waste of resources, 
alongside security implications if the adversary can successfully uncover sensitive 
information. There is a chance that the deception could proliferate across multiple 
mediums and sources and this will reflect adversary attempts to develop credible 
persona and the spread of misinformation may occur in both in-real-life and online 
environments. 
 
Risk Management 
The main areas of risk management consist of monitoring, supervision, target 
inoculation planning and other considerations. The risks posed by adversaries 
conducting intelligence-gathering and deception operations within the UK means that 
once they have been identified they should be routinely monitored to identify threat. 
Surveillance techniques including HUMINT, IMINT (e.g. photographic evidence) and 
COMINT (e.g. phone and CMC based communications) should be used to monitor 
individuals to ascertain their targets, identify further actors and establish when 
intelligence-gathering operations have begun. 
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Only if serious threat is posed by identified adversary actors they should have 
their movements restricted – if the threat they pose is not large then they should be 
monitored to identify further actors and this will also enable them to be fed with 
misinformation to send back to the adversary. 
 Inoculation of targets against deception is required, including monitoring and 
informing key industries when they are being targeted by adversaries, and that such 
attempts will be made in-real-life and online. Companies with links to key 
infrastructure require that individuals approaching their business are verified across a 
range of sources to ensure their credibility, and reduce the chance of being deceived. 
Changes in international affairs may increase or decrease risk reflecting the 
adversary’s aims in those situations. A reassessment of risk should be conducted if the 
adversary’s nation is involved in conflict as the potential for deception and selected 
strategies and tactics will change to reflect the operational context. A reassessment of 
risk will also be required if there is an increased number of identified adversaries 
operating in the UK in order to ascertain motives and reasons for their presence. CI 
assets may also be deployed to feed misinformation to adversaries in their 
intelligence-gathering operations. 
(See appendix 9.4 for full scale risk assessment) 
Discussion: 
Findings 
The current chapter explores reactive, active and proactive approach to 
deception detection before constructing scenarios of potential threats and conducting 
theoretical risk assessment of Scenarios 3 and 8. Although the presented risk 
assessments are theoretical they provide an important illustration of the range of 
application of the DARN and DRAT in addressing and responding to threats, whilst 
increasing target resilience. An important stage of constructing new risk assessment 
measures is to provide such illustrative examples before further testing and 
development is conducted (de Vogel et al., 2014). Through treating deception from a 
risk assessment perspective, risk management strategies can be developed responding 
to the key tactics and strategies used by the adversary to appear credible to others 
rather than relying upon singular approaches towards deception and its detection. 
Next steps should consider applying the DARN and DRAT to historical and current 
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case studies, alongside developing user guidance for practitioners. Risk formulation is 
an expanding area of research within psychology and research is only beginning to 
examine the value of risk formulation in hypothesising the management plans 
required for reducing risk (Logan, 2014). However, such an approach is promising 
towards reducing and managing the risk posed by adversary deception and future 
work will develop this further. 
Limitations 
There may be limitations associated with constructing scenarios with 
entrenched thinking in present solutions, possibilities, limitations (Börjeson et al., 
2006) and biases (Buytendijk et al, 2010; Ecken, Gnatzy & van der Gracht, 2011; 
Ramírez & Ravetz, 2011, van Notten et al., 2003). These limitations may be 
countered through an iterative approach where scenarios and strategies are reformed 
and adjusted according to advances in technological capabilities, for example, DCDC 
(2014) presents updated scenarios to DCDC (2010a) reflecting advances in 
technology and associated areas of development. McFarlane and Hills (2014) consider 
that to ensure resiliency to threat system testing should be conducted continuously to 
ensure that vulnerabilities are identified before adversaries uncover them. 
Scenario development of potential future events is often accused of being 
subjective and that different scenarios may be produced by different analysts who 
have access to the same reference material. Furthermore, future scenarios may fail to 
examine outlying factors which may influence the way in which future deception 
threats manifest. However, the current research sought to address this issue by 
providing scenarios of a range of potential future threats to increase innovative 
thinking regarding future challenges rather than as predictions of the future. Some of 
the scenarios may not be considered as plausible versions of the future, however, such 
scenarios may actually increase ability to think outside of existing mental models and 
approaches helping to create further inquiry (Ramírez & Selin, 2014) justifying the 
current approach to scenario development. 
In conducting risk assessment, formulation and management practitioners 
should be required to conduct this process from a consensus perspective which is 
argued to increase quality in judgements (de Vogel et al., 2014). Such an approach 
will be required in future risk assessments to enable practitioners to discuss areas of 
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risk and reduce rater biases, although de Vogel et al. (2014) acknowledge that such a 
process may be time consuming and maybe impractical in some contexts. 
Future Directions 
The current chapter highlights the need for developing strategies to reduce risk 
from future threats, through target hardening and increasing resiliency in the target 
towards deception. As technological advances occur and global relations change 
reflecting aims and aspirations further potential futures will occur increasing the need 
for further scenario development. To anticipate such challenges future scenario 
development of potential futures should utilise the real-time Delphi approach to 
scenario development (Gordon et al., 2015), which enables SMEs to develop 
scenarios in a real-time basis through online communications, enhancing the decision-
making process. 
In assessing the ability of ACH to detect military deception, historical case 
studies have been conducted (Stech & Elsässer, 2003; Stech & Elsässer, 2004). Future 
research examining high-stakes deception should consider explanatory case study 
methods to analyse the ways in which strategic deception is conducted and uncovered. 
Explanatory case studies consider links that need to be examined over time (Yin, 
2003) and may uncover how events have developed, suggesting the application of 
case study methodology to deception research using risk assessment approaches may 
prove fruitful in analysing individual cases of deceit. 
Conclusion: 
Proactive approaches will enable a faster identification of deception and the 
ability to counter it. Through developing potential current and future scenarios 
responses can be developed which focus upon the source of the deception, the intent 
to deceive, the deceptive content, the strategies used to uncover the deception and the 
target itself. There is a requirement for scenarios to be developed for multiple future 
threats across differing contexts to reflect the changing balance of power within and 
between nations across time. A focus on risk formulation and management is required 
in meeting such challenges. Risk formulation enables the exploration of why 
individuals and groups decide to engage in deception and this will lead to the 
development of appropriate strategies to manage risk, including focussing beyond 
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identifying deception, towards managing such individuals’ behaviour to reduce the 
potential for deception and increasing the resilience of targets towards deception. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
Through adopting a holistic approach, this thesis expands current understanding of the 
deception and deception detection process and provides a clear outline to both 
researchers and practitioners of a new approach to how deception may be detected 
across converging communications modes covering tactical, operational and strategic 
levels of engagement.  
Contributions to Research and Practice: 
Key contributions to research and practice have been developed for use in 
research and applied environments. The HMD has been developed from a theoretical 
approach followed by validation by deception SMEs. This approach has increased 
understanding of the deceiver, how context and intent shape the tactics used in 
deception across communication channels, outlined a range of techniques that can be 
used in examining information for credibility, and discussed the decision-making 
processes of the deception target. This approach of examining the entire deception 
process will prove useful for practitioners in increasing their understanding of 
deception whilst enabling the development of tailored deception detection strategies 
to match specific challenges. Empirical and applied validation of the HMD is required 
before it can be used in applied settings. 
One relatively neglected area of understanding regarding deception is the 
strategies that individuals from other cultures employ in assessing credibility across 
different communication channels and in contexts with differing levels of interaction 
(see Taylor et al., 2015 for a recent discussion). An examination of the similarities 
and differences in such strategies used by different cultures has expanded knowledge 
of the strategies that individuals believe they use in detecting truth and deception, 
with one key difference between cultures in willingness to challenge authority. 
Although these may not be the strategies that individuals actually use when they 
detect deception, it still expands understanding of how people detect deception across 
a wider range of strategies than previously thought (Global Deception Research 
Team, 2006). Furthermore, some of the mentioned strategies are currently being used 
to detect deception in psychological research highlighting the potential that educating 
and improving individuals’ awareness of these strategies might bring in increasing 
resilience against deception. 
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One of the major implications of this thesis has been the need to adjust 
approaches to deception detection towards understanding and monitoring the risks 
posed by deceivers rather than seeking to achieve an unattainable 100% accuracy rate 
in deception-truth discrimination. Through adopting a risk management approach to 
deception, adversary deception may be identified and monitored across tactical, 
operational and strategic levels whilst analysts explore how such threats manifest and 
design appropriate risk mitigation strategies. Theoretical examples of how the DRAT 
may be deployed to examine future threats affecting UK interests were conducted. An 
in-depth profile of the adversary was developed from the available information, 
before a case formulation of the risk they present was conducted before 
recommendations for risk management were made in further monitoring of adversary 
behaviour and target inoculation strategies. 
A final contribution to research and practice is the development of a future-
focussed, proactive approach to deception detection. Recent approaches to deception 
detection have sought to become proactive through uncovering harmful intentions 
(Mac Giolla et al., 2015) and more covert attempts at detection (Jundi et al., 2013). 
Although these approaches have sought to negate threat in the near future, an 
understanding of how deception may be identified and monitored further into the 
future requires more innovative thinking. The current proactive approach to deception 
detection examines potential future threats to the UK through scenario-construction. 
This enables strategies to be developed to identify, monitor, and respond to a wide-
range of deception that may affect the UK in future events. Although the current 
scenario building has focussed upon non-predictive scenarios to encourage innovative 
decision-making, future research may easily explore predictive futures and provide 
strategies to deal with such challenging threats. 
 
The Ethics of Deception in Warfare: 
Deception in military environments including warfare is primarily focussed on 
conducting deception against the adversary to achieve a tactical, operational or 
strategic objective. Deception has been used throughout history in warfare to achieve 
such objectives (Whaley, 2007).This contrasts with the majority of research into 
deception which has sought to identify behavioural cues with which to detect 
deception. Deception in everyday life is perceived as being immoral and as a 
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character flaw, whilst in warfare it may be seen as a coveted skill (Glenney, 2009). 
Whilst conducting deception in warfare will remain a contentious issue there are 
positive and negative aspects of its use. In warfare deception may actually save lives, 
both of friendly and adversary forces, as objectives may be obtained without the need 
for extensive or prolonged conflict. In such circumstances deception may be seen as 
more ethical, however, one form of deception in warfare that is not considered ethical 
is perfidy. Perfidy is regarded as unethical as it involves the deception and betrayal of 
an adversary who has already surrendered and should no longer be regarded as a 
legitimate target in warfare. Although deception in warfare has been seen as immoral 
throughout history (Whaley, 2007), if through conducting deception in warfare the 
number of casualties and fatalities on all sides can be reduced then deception remains 
a legitimate option. 
 
Limitations: 
One limitation arose during the SME validation and refinement of the HMD. 
This study used an opportunity sampling technique to recruit SMEs in deception and 
surrounding areas, although 42 SMEs were approached only 19 agreed to participate 
in the current research. Across the interpersonal and online deception SME samples 
theoretical saturation emerged (Glaser, 1965; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006), 
however, difficulties were faced in gaining access to SMEs from military and 
intelligence backgrounds due to the sensitivity of this research and associated security 
restrictions. It is argued to be intuitively obvious that a larger sample is sensible in 
uncovering further themes (Fugard & Potts, 2015) and it may be that there are further 
techniques available to detect deception in military and intelligence environments 
beyond ACH, which have not been identified and incorporated into the HMD. 
However, the SME validated HMD still provides a comprehensive examination of 
deception and its detection, whilst further analytical techniques may be easily adopted 
as part of the ‘toolbox’ approach. 
In seeking to understand the strategies that individuals from different cultures 
use to detect deception and truth across different communication channels an 
opportunity sample was used to recruit participants from Western and Eastern cultural 
backgrounds living in a city in the East of the UK. This sample comprised of 22 
Western participants and 16 Eastern participants which may limit some of the findings 
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from this study. Although this sample size is representative of qualitative research 
conducted in others areas (e.g. Merdian, Wilson, Thakker, Curtis & Boer, 2013) and a 
point of theoretical saturation was reached (Glaser, 1965; Guest et al., 2006) these 
findings may not be found across all individuals from Western and Eastern cultural 
backgrounds. However, these findings do suggest that individuals may not be as naïve 
in strategies used to detect deception as previous research (Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006) examining in-real-life deception has suggested, whilst 
exploring online deception detection strategies provides researchers with a starting 
point for the further exploration of such strategies. Future research should seek to 
examine the prevalence of such strategies across a wider and more culturally varied 
population sample. 
Exploring potential futures is required to develop a more responsive approach 
to deception detection, however, there are different techniques for constructing 
scenarios. The current research used a non-actuarial qualitative approach based upon 
approaches outlined by the ‘Intuitive Logics’ methodology. This approach uses 
qualitative techniques to develop future scenarios narratives rather than predicting the 
likelihood of a future occurring. This approach may be open to bias in the 
construction of scenarios, however, to overcome this scenarios were validated across 
three SMEs to ensure that they matched criteria outlined by Amer et al. (2013) for 
validating scenarios.  
The DARN and DRAT approaches to deception risk assessment are currently 
in construction phase and have not yet been validated in experimental, real-life case 
study or applied environments. Theoretical case studies of the DRAT have been 
conducted in how the DRAT may be applied in the risk assessment of potential future 
threats to the UK that will involve deception by the adversary (See Chapter 8). It is 
currently not known how effective the DARN and DRAT will be in identifying and 
responding deception. However, the techniques recommended for detecting deception 
are currently being examined in research environments to test their effectiveness and 
through focussing on case formulation in how the deception forms as a product of 
behaviour and the environment strategies may be developed to challenge deceivers. 
Case formulation is an emerging area in risk assessment and researchers and 
practitioners have only begun to explore how case formulation relates to risk 
management plans (Logan, 2014), although logically through understanding to a 
greater extent the circumstances in which risk behaviour occurs will enable a more 
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effective response in managing such risks. Future research validating the DARN and 
DRAT is required. 
  
Ways Forward: 
Red Teaming 
The in vivo approach to constructing understanding of psychological 
phenomena states that only when a model of reality has been developed should it be 
tested empirically (Boon & Gozna, 2009). The HMD and the DARN and DRAT have 
been developed from an extensive review of the literature alongside input from 
deception SMEs from research and practitioner domains. Initial refinement and 
validation of the HMD has been conducted through the deception SME input, the next 
stage is to conduct empirical testing of the model. Such testing is argued to lead to 
either rejection of the model or to conduct an iterative process of refinement (Boon & 
Gozna, 2009).  
 Practitioners require deception detection methodologies that have been 
validated in high-stakes complex environments, however, this is difficult to replicate 
in artificial experiments (Van Koppen, 2012) posing questions as to how valid recent 
developments in deception detection approaches (Granhag et al., 2015) actually are. 
Recent approaches have sought to increase validity through requiring participants to 
perform complex tasks in environments in which they are familiar, for example, using 
participants from bio-industry backgrounds in research examining detection of bio-
threats (Morgan et al., 2014). In defence environments red teaming is recommended 
and has been used to challenge emerging concepts, reduce risks and improve problem 
solving (DCDC, 2013; Heckman et al., 2013). Red teaming will seek to test the 
deception detection and risk management capabilities of the HMD, DARN and DRAT 
through the eyes of an adversary seeking to exploit the target. Such an approach meets 
requirements of ensuring concepts are empirically validated in complex real-world 
simulations, which further enables the generation of relevant feedback to practitioners 
aiding the development of intuition and expertise in deception detection (Kahneman 
& Klein, 2009). Once the models have been subjected and validated through extensive 
red teaming they will fulfil the criteria outlined by Boon and Gozna (2009) for use by 
practitioners in applied environments. 
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Risk Assessment Guidelines and Training 
The DARN and DRAT provide practitioners with an evidence-based screening tool 
and SPJ risk assessment technique for detecting and monitoring adversary tactical, 
operational and strategic deception across communication channels. By proactively 
seeking to identify adversary behaviour indicative of deception, strategies that 
increase resilience against such threats may be deployed. To ensure the reliability of 
the DARN and DRAT for use by practitioners clear guidelines and training need to be 
developed. Procedural guidelines should be developed indicating: the circumstances 
under which the tools will be used to aid decision-making; how the DRAT should be 
scored to indicate the level of threat posed by the adversary; how case formulations 
should be constructed; the construction of risk management strategies; and who the 
appropriate users will be and what training they will require. 
Further development of the DARN and DRAT would be to create a 
computerised version where analysts will be able to input intelligence into the 
relevant risk factors before conducting risk formulation and management plans. This 
approach for data entry would enable ease of access for other analysts to the risk 
assessment and a linear view of the decision-making process in addressing adversary 
threats. Through further addendums to the DARN and DRAT risk assessment 
approaches would enable them to be used by analysts monitoring terrorist and OCGs. 
Cultural Understanding 
In an increasingly globalised world where everyday communication across a range of 
environments and communication channels may involve actors from multiple cultural 
backgrounds and different worldviews an advanced understanding of cultural 
similarities and differences is required. Following the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks 
this work has turned towards detecting deception in Arabic (Colwell et al., 2013, 
Morgan et al., 2008) although other research has explored Chinese (Fu et al., 2001; 
Zhou & Sung, 2008), Korean (Lewis & George, 2008), Vietnamese (Morgan et al., 
2010), Spanish (Colwell et al., 2013) and Russian (Hazlett & Morgan, 2009) speakers. 
Further research is required to explore these and other cultures beliefs regarding 
deception to a greater depth, particularly where individuals, groups and organisations 
from other cultures engage with critical UK infrastructure and industry or where they 
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may pose current or potential future threat related to criminal, terrorist, espionage or 
military behaviours. 
Deception Database 
One recommendation that has been drawn from the overall research is the need for 
real-life case-studies of military deception across tactical, operational and strategic 
domains. Such a recommendation seems commonsensical, but reflects a previous call 
by Whaley (2007) for in-depth examination of tactical and strategic level military 
deception. Developing a database incorporating such known cases of deception will 
highlight the impact that deception has in operating environments, whilst providing 
potential to analyse long-term deception patterns and trends and how these reflect the 
situational context and operating environment (Cali & Romanych, 2005). Such a 
resource will have the potential to enable practitioners to gain valuable experience and 
knowledge of deception and the environments in which they may conduct deception 
or counter-deception operations. Including in-depth information on how such 
deceptions were conducted or identified will also enable researchers to fully explore 
the nature of military deception and increase the applied nature of their research, 
reflecting the scientist-practitioner model (Jones & Mehr, 2007; Shapiro, 2002). 
Scenario Development 
Alongside the recommendation of developing a deception database reflecting military 
deception operations, there is a further need for expanding the use of scenario 
development in addressing future threats and the deception which may be used to 
increase the effectiveness of such threats. This requires an advanced understanding of 
adversary target selection, alongside their motives, capabilities, associated decision-
making processes and the contexts which will lead to deception.  
The current research applied a qualitative scenario construction technique with 
which to increase creativity in decision-making regarding future events, such an 
approach can and should be expanded upon to ensure wider knowledge of potential 
future threats. In-real-time Delphi approaches (Gordon et al., 2015) offer a cost-
effective, and relative fast approach to generating scenarios based upon SME 
knowledge. Future scenario construction should be focussed towards emerging local 
and global threats that will affect the UK and allies, and towards emerging 
technologies that may aid the communication of deception. To counter deception 
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across technologies there is a strong requirement to understand that technology and 
how deceivers may construct deception within that form of communication. 
Conclusion: 
In conclusion, this thesis advocates a holistic, risk, and futures based approach 
to deception detection. Such an approach enables practitioners to develop tailored 
strategies to identify potential deceivers, select an appropriate strategy to detect 
deception reflecting the context in which deception occurs, and identify areas where 
there are potential vulnerabilities to deception. Through focussing on risk 
management strategies the deceiver’s behaviour may be monitored for changes 
indicative of escalating threat, whilst target vulnerabilities may be reduced ensuring 
reduced susceptibility to deception. With increasing global uncertainty, anticipation of 
future deception is required alongside forward-thinking approaches to counter such 
deception. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 Content criteria for statement analysis 
 
General characteristics 
Logical structure 
Unstructured production 
Quantity of details 
Specific contents 
Contextual embedding 
Descriptions of interactions 
Reproduction of conversation 
Unexpected complications during the incident 
Unusual details 
Superfluous details 
Accurately reported details misunderstood 
Related external associations 
Accounts of subjective mental state 
Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state 
Motivation-related contents 
Spontaneous corrections 
Admitting lack of memory 
Raising doubts about one’s own testimony 
Self-deprecation 
Pardoning the perpetrator 
Offence-specific elements 
Details characteristic of the offence 
 
Source: adapted from Steller and Kohnken (1989) 
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Appendix 2.2 Reality Monitoring criteria 
Clarity 
Perceptual information 
Spatial information 
Temporal information 
Affect 
Reconstructability of the story 
Realism 
Cognitive operations 
 
Source: adapted from Vrij (2008) 
  
 212 
Appendix 2.3 The CHAMELEON Offender 
 
C HARACTERISED BY CHANGE 
H EALTH (PERSONALITY & MENTAL DISORDERS/PHYSICAL) 
A TTITUDES, ALLEGIANGES & AFFILIATIONS 
M INDSET & MOTIVATION & MALIGN INTENT 
E YES (INTERACTIONS, INTERVIEWS & INTERVIEWERS) 
L IES & LIMITATIONS 
E NVIRONMENT 
O FFENCES & OPPORTUNITIES 
N UANCES, NEGATIVITY & NEEDS 
 
Source: adapted from Gozna & Boon (2007) 
  
 213 
Appendix 2.4 The CHAMELEONS 
 
Malicious (venomous) CHAMELEON - contemptuous, anti-view of the world and 
feels no remorse for their actions;  
 
Conceited (swaggering) CHAMELEON - grand and aloof with intellectual arrogance 
and the attitude of an alpha male;  
 
Pseudo-charming CHAMELEON - apparent aspects of being a confident, attractive 
conversationalist;  
 
Obsequious (slimy) CHAMELEON - portrayal of a victim and will be in awe of 
authorities and will attempt to ‘suck up’ to them;  
 
Dissembling (sluggish) CHAMELEON - who will cover for deflecting questions and 
will feign vulnerabilities and claim incapacity in relation to their actions;  
 
Unstable (chaotic) CHAMELEON - spectrum of moods, inconsistent loyalties and 
anger, be engaging, manipulative and self-centred, with their own biased sense of 
justice;  
 
Rainbow CHAMELEON - anything at any time depending on their needs  
 
Source: adapted from Gozna (2011) 
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Appendix 3.1 Psychological principles of social engineering 
1. Trappings of role: The social engineer exhibits a few behavioural characteristics of 
the role he/she is masquerading in so the target will infer other attributes and act 
accordingly. 
2. Authority: People are more likely, in the right situation, to be highly responsive to 
assertions of authority, even when the person who purports to be in a position of 
authority is not physically present. 
3. Credibility: Establishing credibility is a key step in most SE arracks as it leads to 
trust. 
4. Altercasting: A strategy for persuading people by forcing them into a social role, so 
that they will be inclined to behave according to that role. 
5. Distracting from systematic thinking: Encouraging the target to process 
information, heuristically. People operating in a heuristic mode are more likely to use 
mental shortcuts, less likely to have access to their psychological defences and are 
less inclined to be suspicious, ask questions, or present objections to the attacker. 
6. The desire to help: Helping has many benefits: it can make us feel empowered; it 
can get us out of a bad mood; and it can make us feel good about ourselves. 
7. Liking and similarity: People prefer to say ‘yes’ to those they know and like. 
Factors that enhance liking include: similarity of attitude; background; physical 
attractiveness; dress; and the use of praise and cooperation. 
8. Fear: A social engineer will sometimes make his/her target believe that some 
terrible thing is about to happen, but that the impending disaster can be averted if the 
target does as the attacker suggests. 
9. Reactance: Psychological reactance is the negative reaction we experience when we 
perceive that our choices or freedoms are being taken away. 
10. Reciprocation: People are more likely to comply with requests from those who 
have provided things first. 
11. Commitment and consistency: People have a desire to look consistent through 
their words, beliefs, attitudes and deeds. 
12. Social proof: People are more willing to take a recommended action if they see 
evidence that many others, especially similar others, are taking it. 
Source: Adapted from Henderson et al. (2007) 
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Appendix 3.2 Credibility Topics 
Topic of Credibility Comment  Incidence 
Design Look     46.1% 
Information Design/Structure  28.5% 
Information Focus    25.1% 
Company Motive    15.5% 
Usefulness of Information   14.8% 
Accuracy of Information   14.3% 
Name Recognition & Reputation  14.1% 
Advertising     13.8% 
Bias of Information    11.6% 
Tone of the Writing    9.0% 
Identity of Site Sponsor   8.8% 
Functionality of Site    8.6% 
Customer Service    6.4% 
Past Experience with Site   4.6% 
Information Clarity    3.7% 
Performance on a Test   3.6% 
Readability     3.6% 
Affiliations     3.4% 
Source: Adapted from Fogg et al. (2003) 
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Appendix 5.3: Theoretical Holistic Model of Deception Scenarios 
Scenario 1: Police-Suspect Interview 
Following an altercation outside a nightclub an individual, on suspicion of having 
committed GBH, is arrested at the scene by police officers. The following morning 
once the suspect has sobered up he is interviewed by police. During the interview the 
suspect claims that they were actually the victim and that the altercation had been 
started by another individual. The suspect provides the interviewing officers a 
plausible account of the event in question, however, this account differs from that 
provided by the victim. In addition - there are mixed accounts from witnesses present 
at the incident. CCTV evidence provided by the local council-operated CCTV 
suggests that the suspect started the altercation; however, this evidence does not 
provide a narrative of the time preceding the event. 
 
Scenario 2: Online Deception 
In an attempt to gain access to confidential government information a hacker sends an 
email to an employee in a government HR department claiming to be an employee of 
a government branch. Whilst claiming to be an employee the hacker requests that 
their password is changed as they are worried that their account has been 
compromised. The email provides an explanation as to why the details need to be 
changed, however, although the employee details are all correct the email has not 
been sent from a government email account, but from another email provider. As the 
email appears credible at first glance the HR employee is required to judge whether 
they should change an account password and provide new password details. 
 
Scenario 3: Parole Interview 
After serving a required time period a prisoner applies for parole, in order to appear 
convincing and sincere to the parole board the prisoner is required to say why they 
believe they should be released. The prisoner describes their behaviour in prison in a 
positive manner, and highlights their attendance of education classes which will 
provide them with the skills required to obtain and perform employment outside of 
prison. The parole board are required to consider the prisoner’s account of their future 
intentions alongside their behaviour in prison and a psychologist’s account of the risk 
that the prisoner may present once outside the prison environment. However, the 
psychologist’s report was largely inconclusive regarding the risks posed. 
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Appendix 6.1: Interview Schedule – Interpersonal, Online and Military 
Deception 
 
This schedule contains questions that cover deception across the domains of 
interpersonal, online and military deception.  The interview discussion will be tailored 
to the particular subject matter experts identified to participate in this research study.   
The questions identified below are identified as the basis for a discussion with SMEs 
although it is acknowledged that there will be further questions that may be identified 
during the course of the discussion and therefore these will be included in the 
discussions as appropriate. 
All participants will receive the initial brief before signing the consent form once they 
are content to continue the discussions.  It will be identified that if there are areas of 
their work that are inappropriate to discuss within the remit of the interview, 
participants will be able to skip answering certain questions. 
Interpersonal deception 
Please give an overview of the work you conduct in relation to deception. 
In your particular field, how do you define deception? 
What do you think are the environments or domains that are most relevant when 
considering interpersonal deception? 
If you could pass on one thing you have learned during you experience in the field 
of deception, what would it be? 
What sort of lies do you consider people use in high-stake deception?  Can you 
give examples of this?  
What strategies do you believe that liars use in their attempts to influence people 
that they are telling the truth? (Include strategies related to verbal and nonverbal 
impression management, the concealment of emotions etc.). 
Do you believe that a person’s underlying personality can influence how they lie 
to others? 
How does a liar’s motivation impact on their ability to lie successfully?   
Does psychopathy make for a good liar or for someone who lies indiscriminately 
and therefore is not as successful?   
In which situations do / have you detect/ed deception?  How do you personally 
detect another person’s lie? (What areas of verbal and nonverbal behaviour do you 
focus on in your attempt to detect another person’s deception?) 
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What current strategies of deception detection are currently used in your 
respective field?  Do they work effectively? 
Are there techniques that should be incorporated into the current approach to 
deception detection which would improve the methods currently used? 
Do you think there are parallels from interpersonal deception that apply to the 
online environment?  What situations are these? 
If you were to develop a model of deception detection, what factors would you 
consider significant? 
What do you think is the most significant contribution that has been made in the 
field of deception research / work? 
How do we detect when someone is telling the truth?  Is credibility a wholly 
behavioural or verbal presentation of information? 
Online deception 
In your field of work, how is online deception defined? 
What do you class as the most significant challenges in the area of online 
deception? 
It is possible to develop strategies to detect deceit online?  If so, in which areas? 
In which circumstances does online deception occur?  
(For example, deception may occur in online videos, in text-based computer-
mediated communication incl. social networking sites, and in attempts at social 
engineering) 
Are there examples of high stake deceptions that have occurred online?   
Do these influence the ways that future deceptions occur? 
How do you think such deceptions would manifest online? 
What strategies do you believe that liars use in their attempts to influence online?  
To what extent is it possible to gauge an individuals or groups personality online?  
Can we ever truly know who we are interacting with? 
Is online deception more likely to be successful when conducted online than 
interpersonally? 
Are there strategies available to assist in the detection of deception online? 
How do you think it is possible to improve the detection of deception in online 
interactions?  Which types of online interactions would most benefit from this?   
If you were tasked with developing a model of online deception, what would be 
the main factors you would class as significant to consider? 
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Is it possible to detect the truth or credibility when interacting online?  How do 
people attribute credibility to particular sites or sources of information? 
Military deception 
How would you define military deception? 
Although there are records of significant deceptive actions that have been 
conducted historically in military combat, in modern warfare, how has deception 
changed? 
In what circumstances does deception occur in the military domain?   
How can we inoculate ourselves against this?  Is it just a case of ‘know your 
enemy’ or does today’s asymmetric warfare make for more complex targeting? 
Which are the more concerning forms of deception in the military context – online 
or physical/behavioural? 
What sort of deception occur in the military domain?  
What deception strategies do you consider liars use in their attempts to influence? 
In your experience, which strategies are the more effective? 
To what extent can personality, motivation and other factors affect the ability to 
deceive and the ability to detect deception? 
How do you detect another person’s lie?  
Do you have any particular methods you employ?   
What areas of verbal and nonverbal behaviour do you focus on in your attempt to 
detect another person’s deception? 
Are you usually successful in detecting deceit? 
What current strategies of deception detection are currently used in your field? 
Are there any improvements you think could be made to increase the effectiveness 
of the detection of deceit? 
What potential future threats are there from potential adversary deception 
strategies?  
Is it possible to increase the likelihood of detecting future threats and how could 
this be achieved? 
Were you to be tasked with developing a model of deception in order to combat 
deception in military domains, what elements would you include?  
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Appendix 6.2: Interview Schedule – Interpersonal and Online Deception 
This schedule contains questions that cover deception across the domains of 
interpersonal and online deception.  The interview discussion will be tailored to the 
particular subject matter experts identified to participate in this research study.   
The questions identified below are identified as the basis for a discussion with SMEs 
although it is acknowledged that there will be further questions that may be identified 
during the course of the discussion and therefore these will be included in the 
discussions as appropriate. 
All participants will receive the initial brief before signing the consent form once they 
are content to continue the discussions.  It will be identified that if there are areas of 
their work that are inappropriate to discuss within the remit of the interview, 
participants will be able to skip answering certain questions. 
Interpersonal deception 
Please give an overview of the work you conduct in relation to deception. 
In your particular field, how do you define deception? 
What do you think are the environments or domains that are most relevant when 
considering interpersonal deception? 
If you could pass on one thing you have learned during you experience in the field 
of deception, what would it be? 
What sort of lies do you consider people use in high-stake deception?  Can you 
give examples of this?  
What strategies do you believe that liars use in their attempts to influence people 
that they are telling the truth? (Include strategies related to verbal and nonverbal 
impression management, the concealment of emotions etc.). 
Do you believe that a person’s underlying personality can influence how they lie 
to others? 
How does a liar’s motivation impact on their ability to lie successfully?   
Does psychopathy make for a good liar or for someone who lies indiscriminately 
and therefore is not as successful?   
In which situations do / have you detect/ed deception?  How do you personally 
detect another person’s lie? (What areas of verbal and nonverbal behaviour do you 
focus on in your attempt to detect another person’s deception?) 
What current strategies of deception detection are currently used in your 
respective field?  Do they work effectively? 
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Are there techniques that should be incorporated into the current approach to 
deception detection which would improve the methods currently used? 
Do you think there are parallels from interpersonal deception that apply to the 
online environment?  What situations are these? 
If you were to develop a model of deception detection, what factors would you 
consider significant? 
What do you think is the most significant contribution that has been made in the 
field of deception research / work? 
How do we detect when someone is telling the truth?  Is credibility a wholly 
behavioural or verbal presentation of information? 
Online deception 
In your field of work, how is online deception defined? 
What do you class as the most significant challenges in the area of online 
deception? 
Is it possible to develop strategies to detect deceit online?  If so, in which areas? 
In which circumstances does online deception occur?  
(For example, deception may occur in online videos, in text-based computer-
mediated communication incl. social networking sites, and in attempts at social 
engineering) 
Are there examples of high stake deceptions that have occurred online?   
Do these influence the ways that future deceptions occur? 
How do you think such deceptions would manifest online? 
What strategies do you believe that liars use in their attempts to influence online?  
To what extent is it possible to gauge an individuals or groups personality online?  
Can we ever truly know who we are interacting with? 
Is online deception more likely to be successful when conducted online than 
interpersonally? 
Are there strategies available to assist in the detection of deception online? 
How do you think it is possible to improve the detection of deception in online 
interactions?  Which types of online interactions would most benefit from this?   
If you were tasked with developing a model of online deception, what would be 
the main factors you would class as significant to consider? 
Is it possible to detect the truth or credibility when interacting online?  How do 
people attribute credibility to particular sites or sources of information? 
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Appendix 6.3: SME Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Attitudes towards interpersonal and online deception and its 
detection 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
You are invited to take part in a research study investigating interpersonal and online 
deception and credibility assessment.   
Before you decide whether to consent to participate, you need to understand why 
the research is being done and the nature of your involvement. Please read the 
following information carefully. Please ask if there is anything that you are not clear 
about and take time to decide whether or not you want to take part in the research. 
What is the purpose of study? 
The purpose of the research is to identify what is known about interpersonal and 
online deception and to develop a theoretical model from which to test certain 
deceptive actions and behaviours.  
What would be involved for you? 
You will be asked to discuss a series of questions related to interpersonal and/or 
online deception (Please see the attached interview schedule). The interviews will be 
recorded using an electronic Dictaphone, recorded data will be stored in a secure 
environment.  You have the right to request that your recording be destroyed but 
this will only be until the date that the data is being written up for publication.  This 
will be August 2012. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you decide whether you would like to participate in the research.  If you 
agree to be involved you will be interviewed about the field of deception and 
credibility assessment.  We have attached a copy of the interview schedual so that 
you can see the types of questions that will be asked.  However it is also possible 
that other questions will be asked depending on the nature of the interview 
discussions we have.  If once you have read through the interview schedule, you 
have any questions, please contact the Principal Investigator, Iain Reid on the 
contact details below.  We will then arrange for a time for the interview to take place 
and a location that is convenient to you.  You are able to withdraw your participation 
from the research at any time and you do not have to answer all the questions if you 
choose not to.   
 
What will I have to do to take part? 
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If you agree to take part in the study, you will be provided with a consent form and 
will be asked to read and sign this. The interview is expected to last no more than 2 
hours depending on the nature of the discussions and your own availability.   
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Your involvement in the interview research will only be known by the research team 
identified below.  Your electronic data from the audio recording and the subsequent 
transcript will be stored on an Ironkey for 7 years unless you request for any reason to 
withdraw from the study.  Your identity will be altered to a numerical code and this 
will be used to refer you individuals during the analysis of the research.  Data will be 
confidential and raw data may only be viewed by the research team. No names or 
identifiable information will ever be used in publications resulting from the study. 
 
What if I have any concerns or queries? 
Please contact the Principal Investigator Iain Reid at ireid@lincoln.ac.uk or 
01522887366 
or Director of Studies: Dr Lynsey Gozna at lgozna@lincoln.ac.uk or 01522 837328 
or Dr Julian Boon at boo@le.ac.uk or 01162231480 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
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Appendix 6.4: SME Consent Form. 
 
 
 
Attitudes towards interpersonal and online deception and its 
detection. 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
I have read and understood the Participant Information sheet and understand the 
purpose, nature and duration of the research and what is expected of me. All my 
questions have been answered fully to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn 
immediately without having to give a reason.  
 
I understand that the information I have submitted will ultimately be published as a 
PhD manuscript, potentially as a journal article and other forms of reports. Please note 
that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 
identify you from any publications. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
I agree to volunteer as a participant for the study described in the information sheet 
and give full consent to the study including the audio recording of the interview. 
 
 
Signed: ……………………………………………………………… 
 
Name: ………………………………………………………………. 
 
Witnessed by:……………………………………………………. 
 
The information you provide will be used only for research purposes.  
 
Thank you very much for your help.  
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If you would like any more information please contact Iain Reid 
 
ireid@lincoln.ac.uk or 01522 887366 
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Appendix 6.5: SME Debrief Sheet 
 
Verbal debrief of the attitudes towards interpersonal and online deception 
project 
 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in the current research. This project 
seeks to develop a new model of deception through building on the work and 
experiences of SMEs in the areas of interpersonal and online deception. If you would 
like a summary of the findings once research has been completed please contact the 
Principal Investigator – Iain Reid at ireid@lincoln.ac.uk or 01522 887366 
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Appendix 6.6: SME Study Ethical Approval 
       
 Lincoln, 4-3-2012  
Dear Iain Reid,   
The Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology would like to inform you that 
your project titled “To identify what has been learned about the nature of 
interpersonal and online deception and associated credibility assessment based upon 
the knowledge and experience of academic Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who are 
experts in the field of deception and influence” has been:   
  approved   
approved subject to the following conditions:   
  invited for resubmission, taking into account the following issues:   
 is rejected. An appeal can be made to the Faculty Ethics Committee against 
this decision (cawalker@lincoln.ac.uk).   
is referred to the Faculty Ethics Committee. You will automatically be 
contacted by the chair of the Faculty Ethics Committee about further 
procedures.   
 
Yours sincerely,   
Emile van der Zee, PhD   
Chair of the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology University of Lincoln, 
Department of Psychology Brayford Pool Lincoln LN6 7TS United Kingdom 
telephone: +44 (0)1522 886140 fax:       +44 (0)1522 886026 e-mail:    
evanderzee@lincoln.ac.uk http://www.lincoln.ac.uk/psychology/staff/683.asp 
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Appendix 6.7: Phases of thematic analysis 
Phase Description of the process 
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data:  Transcribing data (if necessary), 
reading and re-reading the data, noting 
down initial ideas. 
2. Generating initial codes:  Coding interesting features of the data 
in a systematic fashion across the entire 
data set, collating data relevant to each 
code. 
3. Searching for themes:  Collating codes into potential themes, 
gathering all data relevant to each 
potential theme. 
4. Reviewing themes:  Checking if the themes work in relation 
to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the 
entire data set (Level 2), generating a 
thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
5. Defining and naming themes: Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics 
of each theme, and the overall story the 
analysis tells, generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. 
6. Producing the report:  The final opportunity for analysis. 
Selection of vivid, compelling extract 
examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to 
the research question and literature, 
producing a scholarly report of the 
analysis. 
Source: adapted from Braun & Clarke (2006)
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Appendix 6.8: Holistic Model of Deception Detection Framework 
Deceiver Intent Deception Tactics Interpretation Target 
Stakes 
 
Impression Management 
(Inc countermeasures) 
 
Motivation 
 
Background History 
(BH, inc individual 
differences, personality 
and culture) 
 
Target Audience 
Analysis 
 
Planning Spontaneity 
 
Deceiver Vulnerabilities 
(Emotional arousal, 
Behaviour 
 
Attitude 
 
Motive (Greed – Envy – 
Power – Revenge) 
 
Context (Inc triadic 
communication, 
communication changed 
online, anonymity, 
medium, Inhibitions 
Reduced Online, Reach, 
Scalability, Uncertainty 
Online, Richness, 
Hyperpersonal, 
manipulate attention, 
Manipulate Perception, 
Manipulate Emotion, 
Focus other/self, Timing) 
 
Control of Information ( 
Increase Information (Inc 
increase details, white-
out) and Decrease 
Information (Inc 
Source Attributes 
(Consistency, plausibility, 
responsivity, credibility, 
prominence) 
 
Risk 
 
Questioning/Interviewing 
Strategy (QIS) 
 
Detection Methods 
(including 
Behavioural Baseline, 
Verbal Methods of 
Detection, 
Neuropsychological 
Techniques, 
Pictorial Techniques, 
Physiological Techniques, 
Decision-Making (DM) 
(Inc Expectations, 
Cognition, Emotion and 
Suspicion) 
 
Stakes 
 
Individual Differences 
(ID) 
(Inc Internal/External 
Pressures, individual or 
group) 
 
Motivation 
 
Capabilities and 
Resources 
(inc Preparation and 
Experience) 
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cognitive load, decision-
making biases) 
Deflection, denying, 
fewer words (inc 
exclusive words), 
blocking, black-outs, 
concealing, Feigned 
forgetfulness) 
 
Influencers (Inc 
Emphasise to influence, 
Higher Authority 
(Appeals to higher 
authority to enhance 
credibility), fluency, 
authority, objectivity, 
positivity, referent power, 
attractive, convincing, 
commitment (inc tentative 
words), influence 
increases over time, social 
engineering, distraction, 
Deception Gambits; 
Non-Verbal Methods of 
Detection, 
Paralinguistic Techniques, 
Military/Intelligence 
Methods of Detection, 
verfication) 
 
Surveillance/ISTAR (inc 
channel availability and 
evidence/case details) 
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Subtlety) 
 
Replicating Genuine 
Behaviour 
(Replicate Genuine 
Behaviour, Mimicking, 
Dummies, Kernel of 
Truth, Decoy, Speech 
Control (Slower Speech), 
Normality) 
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Appendix 7.1: Interview Schedule – Cultural Similarities and Differences 
 
Interpersonal: 
 
How would you describe deception to someone? 
 
Are you able to tell when someone is lying to you?  How?  Are there any particular things 
that people do or say when they lie that help you to detect deception? 
 
If you think back to a situation when someone lied to you and you were able to identify this 
(either at the time or subsequently), what in hindsight gave them away? (Verbal, e.g. their 
story; non-verbal, e.g. body language) 
 
Do you consider yourself to be skilled at detecting deception?  Why do you think this is? 
 
So moving on to consider the other side of deception, how do you tell when a person is 
telling you the truth?  Do you think there are cues that help you to know when someone is 
credible? 
 
What in particular do you think illustrates a truthful person?  (Verbal, e.g. their story; non-
verbal, e.g. body language) 
 
Thinking about your own deceptive and truthful behaviour, are there any particular things 
you do to be perceived as truthful by others?   
 
How do you think we know whether we can trust other people?  Is this all about the 
believability of what people say and do or is it more than that? 
 
When you meet someone for the first time, what impression would they have to give you in 
order to be considered trustworthy and honest?  What behaviours or speech? 
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Now think about what makes a person untrustworthy and dishonest, how would someone 
present to you in order for you to make that decision about them?  What are the 
characteristics you would be looking for? 
 
Online: 
 
In general, what do you use the internet for? (e.g. social networking, research for university, 
general information, music and video, gaming) 
 
Do you think it is easy for people to be deceived on the internet?  If yes, how so?  How do 
you think this might happen?  (e.g. email, websites, online reviews, shopping, credit card 
details…) 
 
Have you ever needed to assess the credibility of sites when you are online?  How have you 
gone about doing this?  What do you think are the characteristics of a site when you might be 
a little suspicious?   
 
How do you identify whether a site or a person is credible when you are using the internet? 
E.g. social networking, shopping 
 
What in particular would you focus on? 
 
How do we know when we can trust someone online?  Do you think there are particular 
characteristics that help to identify this? 
 
Have you ever been duped when using the internet?  What happened and what was the 
outcome?  Have you altered your online behaviour as a result of this? 
 
How might people who use gaming sites or sites such as ‘second life’ deceive others?  Do 
you think it is possible to be immune from this? 
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Are there methods we can use to protect ourselves from deceptive interaction online?  What 
do you think these are? 
 
If you were going to advise a parent about the risks that might be relevant for their children 
using the internet, what are some of the issues you might need to cover with them? 
 
If you were going to deceive someone on the internet, what do you think would be the best 
methods to use? 
 
How would you try to be credible? 
 
Do you think there are differences in how we judge credibility online and offline?   
 
If yes, how do you think these differences present in the two interactions? 
 
Is there anything else you think is relevant when thinking about deception online and offline? 
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Appendix 7.2: Cross-Cultural Study Consent Form 
 
 
I have read and understood the Participant Information sheet and understand the purpose, 
nature and duration of the research and what is expected of me. All my questions have been 
answered fully to my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn 
immediately without having to give a reason.  
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study.  
I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
I agree to volunteer as a participant for the study described in the information sheet and give 
full consent to the study including the audio recording of the interview. 
 
 
Signed: ……………………………………………………………… 
 
Name: ………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
The information you provide will be used only for research purposes.  
 
Thank you very much for your help.  
 
If you would like any more information please contact your interviewer 
 
Email: ………………………………………………………….  
 
Or contact the research supervisor, Iain Reid.  
 
ireid@lincoln.ac.uk or 01522 837366 
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Appendix 7.3: Western Codebook 
Theme  Code Quotes 
Non-Verbal Behaviour Nervous Behaviour (inc 
fidgeting) 
Gaze Direction 
Eye Contact 
Body Language (inc non-
verbal movement) 
Blink Rate 
Facial Expression/Emotions 
(inc anger, smiling, less 
smiling, blushing, less 
blushing) 
Posture 
Self-manipulators (inc hand 
manipulation) 
“nervousness, like twiddling 
with your fingers or playing 
with your hair or looking off at 
funny angles” (W1: 7-8) 
 
“A combination of uh 
oxygenated blood in their face 
if they’re Caucasian erm 
because their facial emotions 
show up” (W4: 14-15) 
 
“quite often like eye contact 
erm like if people look at the 
ground” (W5: 6-7) 
 
Judgement and Biases Truth Bias (inc trusting 
online) 
F2F Bias 
Experience (inc Naivety & 
Unaware) 
No rapid judgements 
Intuition 
‘Shifty’ Behaviour 
“No I don’t think I am, I’m far 
too trusting. I’ll believe 
anything anyone tells me” 
(W1: 24) 
 
“I don’t really know if there’s 
like certain signs that people 
give off, like what particular 
sign they give off that will, 
you know, set me off and say 
oh he’s lying to me” (W2: 12-
13) 
 
“it’s instinctive it’s you like or 
you dislike them” (W4: 137) 
 
Verbal Behaviour Verbal Content (inc short 
sentences) 
Paralinguistic (inc tone of 
voice, voice change, speech 
hesitancy, free-flowing 
speech, laughter) 
Enthusiasm 
“you can t-sometimes tell by 
like if their voice wavers” 
(W5: 6) 
 
“the way they speak and what 
they speak about. Like it they 
start talking about other 
people” (W6: 45-46) 
 
“I think it was mostly sort of 
reluctance to give away more 
information than they needed 
to, sentences were short, they 
didn't elaborate on anything, 
like conversation didn't flow 
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naturally” (W7: 21-22) 
Consistency Statement Consistency 
Behavioural Consistency 
Consistency 
Content Consistency 
Maintain Consistency 
Consistency Across Time 
“more dramatasism put on it in 
like later, like later, like 
tellings of the story. So first of 
all, something tiny happened, 
and then the next time you 
hear the story it was more than 
that” (W1: 19-21) 
 
“With a person if it’s on like 
facebook or twitter or 
something like you might go 
on their profile and see like 
erm if like they’re information 
stacks up so I I’ve had people 
adding me on facebook and 
they’ve got no mutual friends 
and not many friends on 
facebook in general it just 
makes y’no you think well 
why are you adding me” (W5: 
81-85)  
 
“if things just don’t add up in 
what they write on their 
website” (W6: 58) 
 
“or if what they’re saying not 
making sense or contradicting 
something they have 
previously said” (W11: 18-19) 
Behavioural Baseline Normality 
Familiarity 
Characteristics 
Past Behaviour 
Socialising 
Behavioural Baseline 
“I think people who you know 
better and spend a lot of time 
with will be easier to detect 
deception or not through 
whether their behaviour is like 
out of character or whether 
they’re acting differently but if 
you don’t really know the 
person well (pause) I think it 
would be harder to identify 
whether they’re lying or not” 
(W3: 7-11) 
 
“unless of course you know 
you’re talking to a friend and 
you know that you’re talking 
to that friend” (W1: 79-80) 
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Erm, if I know the person, if 
I’ve known them for a while, 
then I may be able to tell at 
some point, but if I don’t know 
the person, then I might not be 
able to tell straight away. So it 
takes time, in my opinion, to 
get to know someone and see 
if they’re being deceptive or 
not (W2: 6-9) 
 
“Whether or not someone is 
trustworthy for me depends on 
what I know about the person, 
cause anyone can tell a 
believable story, but.. it’s 
whether or not you know that 
what that person’s like” (W6: 
31-33) 
Social Influence Friendly 
Reviews 
Reciprocity 
Authority 
Allegiance 
Attraction 
Value 
Joking 
Reputation 
Persuasion 
“just come across as quite 
friendly really” (W1: 45) 
 
“buying something on eBay 
and then just checking them 
out like from their previous 
reviews of how they’ve been, 
like how they’ve been with 
other people, treated them that 
kind of thing” (W1: 85-87) 
 
“you have to build trust with 
someone and offer them to 
trust you back” (W2: 228) 
 
“are they involved in anything 
any groups or societies or 
anything like that”  (W4: 150-
151) 
 
“I guess you try to do a bit of 
research and then you can look 
at like if it’s a website you can 
look at like customer reviews 
but again, they can be faked” 
(W5: 80-81) 
 
“I’d say that’s 
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because…I…I…tell a lot of 
lies fo-f-f-for jokes, no’-not 
like not like dramatically, but 
like I-I-I tell a lot of lies in like 
in humour and stuff” (W9: 25-
27) 
Plausibility Confidence 
Genuine (inc honesty) 
Plausible (inc Scepticism) 
Overcompensation 
Sly 
Sincerity 
Determination 
Shy 
Relaxed/Open Behaviour 
(appears truthful) 
Closed/Reserved Behaviour 
(appears deceptive) 
“just like what they said was 
just very over the top. Erm the 
story wasn’t very realistic in a 
way” (W5: 12-13) 
 
“If they’re more truthful, 
they’re more relaxed” (W6: 
14) 
 
“I think when i've met people 
and they've really exaggerate a 
story, there is that sort of little 
voice in the back of my head 
saying “nah that's rubbish” 
(W7: 69-70) 
 
Website Presentation Presentation 
Credibility 
Appearance 
Professionalism 
“if it didn’t look very, like I 
want to say clean and together 
but that doesn’t quite make 
sense for the internet. I don’t 
know just like sort of well, 
well-presented and erm, so if it 
wasn’t well-presented that 
would kind of make me think 
okay, this is a bit funny” (W1: 
90-92) 
 
“A lot of advertisements err, 
you know, it just looks cheap 
because obviously my 
experiences with it, because 
I’ve done marketing you 
know, I know when a website 
is trustworthy or not because 
internet’s a huge part of, you 
know, my course that I did. 
Erm, but yeah, I don’t know, 
there’d be a lot of advertising 
for example things saying 
“you’ve won a million dollars” 
or something, you know, you 
just wouldn’t believe it 
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because you know it’s leading 
to somewhere you don’t want 
to go” (W2: 140-145) 
 
“but if I think that a site looks 
quite unprofessional or a bit 
dodgy then I’d be more 
inclined to stay away from it” 
(W5: 76-77) 
 
“Erm... and generally how it 
looks, you will see a big 
difference between someone 
making their own website and 
the BBC website, if it looks 
professional then its more 
trustworthy, though thats not 
always the case” (W7: 138-
140) 
 
Experience of Internet Channels 
Media Richness 
Anonymity 
Easier Online 
Large-Scale Usage 
Less Cues online 
“because you’ve not got the 
social interaction, like like for 
example earlier I said that you 
could like see it in, it’s more a, 
you can’t tell that on the 
internet ‘cos there’s no 
physical interaction” (W1: 74-
76) 
 
“But erm yeah, I think the 
main reason is because there’s 
no face-to-face interaction and 
you don’t know what the other 
person’s motives are, you 
know, because they’re not in 
front of you so, you know, you 
can’t judge by their body 
language and stuff like that” 
(W2: 114-117) 
 
“so people will read it in a way 
or tone of voice that their head 
chooses for it, without 
considering how the person 
typing it meant it to come 
across, so you instantly lose 
any sort of... mannerisms and 
other, sort of body language 
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that might cause you to sort of, 
implications to seem suspect” 
(W7: 95-98) 
 
“I am if it’s someone, if its 
face to face, so you can see 
what their saying but i’m not 
very good at it by like text or 
something” (W12: 15-16) 
Verification Source 
Background Checks 
Supporting Evidence 
Verifiability 
Check Facts 
Warrants 
False Warrants 
Multiple Sources 
Multiple Cues 
“obviously on Amazon; a user 
rating, you know, their rating. 
So I’ll have a look at how 
many things they’ve sold, you 
know, err if they’ve been on 
the website a lot, so I’ll just 
check their rating, as far as 
shopping goes” (W2: 148-150) 
 
“they don’t trust people they 
rely on documentary evidence 
and taking a lot of time to 
consider the evidence that that 
person has provided them with 
whether or not they can or 
cannot be trusted” (W4: 125-
127) 
 
“and you should always be a 
bit weary because you don’t 
know especially if if there’s no 
webcam, you don’t know if 
it’s they are who they say they 
are” (W5: 90-92) 
 
“And if it’s a person.. I would 
probably look at their pictures, 
look at their friends, do I do I 
know anybody that they’re 
with do they look like they’re 
the person that they actually 
are saying they are. Do the 
people in the pictures actually 
look like they know who that 
person is” (W6: 64-67) 
Aversion of Risk  Restrict Access 
Supervision 
Maintain Privacy 
Risk 
“If I was going to advise their 
parents, err, you can lock 
websites you know like; you 
can make sure on the 
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Vulnerability 
Awareness of Risk 
Caution 
computer, you know, that the 
person can’t go on certain 
websites” (W2: 201-202) 
 
“um you know there’s 
thousand people out there on 
the Internet not just in terms of 
um the you know the sexual 
um predators but also uh 
financial um predators uh 
organised crime etcetera 
etcetera there are lots of 
websites that aren’t real 
websites that are there just to 
um extract your financial 
details” (W4: 177-181) 
 
“again I think goes on with 
like some people are more 
susceptible like they’re more 
easy to deceive because 
they’re more willing to help or 
believe people or fall for stuff” 
(W5- 64-66) 
 
“think it could go either way, 
got a 50% chance that it’s 
them telling the truth and 50% 
of them not” (W6: 73-74) 
Impression Management Impression Management 
Appearance (inc Demeanour, 
appear genuine/trustful, 
natural appearance) 
Stick to Truth 
Avoid Extra Detail 
Be Subtle 
Change conversation 
Eloquent 
Emphasise (inc exaggeration, 
understate, repeat claims, 
highlight honesty) 
Over-Elaboration 
Rehearsability 
Rapport 
“you’re in to that um second 
life and they’ve got an avatar 
that’s a you know blonde bl- 
busty blonde eighteen year old 
and they’re a fifty year old 
bald male erm then um then 
they have a a personality 
profile that um they i- is more 
attuned to that age range 
eighteen year old girl that 
actually has a fifteen year old 
male for some fifty year old 
male for some reason” (W4: 
240-245) 
 
“Erm, and also I don’t just 
their overall mannerisms 
would be quite they’d just feel 
quite genuine and like I don’t 
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know the emotion in their 
voice would be er, yeah more 
genuine” (W5: 22-24) 
 
“by the way they talk and the 
way they try to come across to 
people that they’re talking to, 
they might come across as 
trustworthy even though you 
know you might not 
necessarily see them in 
person”  (W6: 87-89) 
 
“Well, facebook was an easy 
one ‘cause I knew a lot of 
people that had it. I used just a 
picture of myself but it didn’t 
reveal my face so you couldn’t 
see who it was. And I also 
used pictures of animals and 
stuff ‘cause a lot of people do 
put photos of animals on. And 
I requested people that I did 
know and people that I didn’t 
know – it was quite surprising 
that a lot of people that I didn’t 
know even accepted it, so they 
didn’t have friends in 
common, it was just complete 
strangers. So, social media’s a 
good way” (W15: 119-125) 
 
“Like there’s not, nothing, I 
don’t add anything extra for 
me to say yeah, like, for me, 
for me, to you know, say to 
people, “yeah believe me,” 
like believe me. I’ll just tell 
them a story and it’s up to 
them whether they believe me 
or not” (W2: 69-71) 
 
“I might insist upon something 
being true and then play it off 
as, a sort of... a lack of 
knowledge perhaps on the 
other persons part, so i'd say 
like “yeah course it is like it 
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just is” and then sort of move 
on as if it wasnt a big deal” 
(W7: 54-56) 
 
“sometimes like I say, I know 
like I go like ‘Ah yeah I know 
totally I’m being 
honest’…like…like…I-I-I 
enforce my honesty, but I 
always-I always maintain that 
if I promise 
something…then…tha-tha-that 
is my word, so…I always try 
to have tha- a-a level of truth- 
a truth…that..tha- people 
know they can trust me” (W9: 
46-50) 
 
Response to Questioning Question Type 
Emotional Reaction 
Unexpected Answer 
Engagement (inc avoidance) 
Response 
Unforthcoming 
Elaboration 
“be prepared to talk to me if 
they erm erm run away from 
me or erm you know don’t 
want to have an- avoid me in 
the street then I wouldn’t be 
inclined to trust them with 
anything or talk to them about 
anything” (W4: 133-136) 
 
“even if they say something a 
little bit differently and then 
by questioning further it will 
probably start to unravel a bit” 
(W11: 12-13) 
 
“Also people who tell 
elaborate stories they go into 
too much detail and try too 
hard to make something 
believable” (W20: 19-21) 
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Appendix 7.4: Eastern Codebook 
Theme Code Quotes 
Behavioural Baseline Behavioural Baseline 
Normal Behaviour 
Aggressive Behaviour 
Past History 
Familiarity 
“know he likes to lie to me 
but mm but you know 
because I’m I’m so familiar 
with his know his habit his 
you know err facial 
expression because when he 
lies he like you know will 
show some y’kno- som- 
y’kno- smile and uh kno- the 
kind I don’t know how ho- 
ho- it’s kind of hard to 
describe it but some uhh 
some some facial expression 
which not easy to to to 
notice” (E2: 40-44) 
 
“It may be just through 
knowing them that you know 
their stories just not right” 
(E4: 9-10) 
 
“I think, you can’t very, you 
can not tell if a stranger is 
lying you cannot judge a 
stranger, but if you know 
someone, then you can tell if 
they’re always telling the 
truth or lying” (E5: 24-25) 
 
“If you know someone before 
then it is easier to see if there 
is a behaviour change before 
and after a lie is told” (E9: 5-
6) 
Non-Verbal Behaviour Body Language 
Eye Contact 
Facial Expression 
Gaze Direction 
“they try to avoid eye 
contact” (E2: 23) 
 
“the body language if he’s 
lying, too much body 
language…will 
be…presented” (E3: 38-39) 
 
“probably their body 
language, was very negative 
so I picked up on that” (E5: 
9) 
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“they look away when they 
talk to you” (E9: 11-12) 
 
“I can identify that one well 
someone, I, I read some 
essays when you lie as well 
you look in the left but I not 
sure that people use some 
body language I not sure like 
the real thing when they are 
doing the body language 
where it is yes it is true! But 
it is not; hmm maybe it is 
true can identify” (E11: 27-
30) 
Verbal Behaviour Paralinguistic (inc speed of 
talking, response latency, 
laughter) 
Verbal Content/Statement 
“spee-the speed when they 
talking” (E3: 43) 
 
“some people laugh. I have a 
friend who laughs when she’s 
lying” (E4: 14-15) 
 
“plus their  story is very 
detailed” (E5: 16) 
 
“First of all I would listen to 
their word that’s the first 
clues and I will be looking 
for because when they’re 
talking if they’re telling me 
sentence quite like stop each 
words well they say what 
they are thinking when they 
are talking it’s like such a lie” 
(E11: 91-93) 
Judgement and Biases Intuition 
Experience (inc target 
knowledge & Unaware) 
Truth Bias (inc trust over 
doubt) 
First Impressions 
Expertise 
“I think basically because I 
think I’m a person who tend 
to who tend to believe believe 
others” (E2: 57-58) 
 
“I think…err…most of the 
time in (main parts)…you 
believe” (E3: 34) 
 
“everyone lies, so, I don’t 
know how you tell if 
someone’s telling the truth” 
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(E4: 37-38) 
 
“So, but i don’t know how i 
actually see it but you just get 
the feeling that something’s 
wrong, the intuition, the 
stomach feeling,  telling you 
that something is not right” 
(E6: 10-11) 
 
“Yeah in my culture when 
someone is close to me so I, 
he say anything I can believe 
so, don’t doubt” (E11: 111-
112) 
Consistency Consistency Across Topics 
Consistency Across Time 
Consistency 
Detailed Story 
Statement Consistency 
Statement-Behaviour 
Consistency 
“they are lying they first  say 
something and realise they’ve 
to lie to and they will use 
another story to covered the 
first thing they say... that day 
when I can realise they are 
telling lies” (E7: 8-10) 
 
“But sometimes I notice if 
my friends was lying to me 
by you know you can’t find it 
out at the spot but you can 
later” (E8: 25-26) 
 
“Their story was conflicting, 
erm, they kept going back on 
what they were saying and 
they were different things to 
different people as well” 
(E10: 11-12) 
 
“Usually if someone is a 
professional lying I cannot 
know that, but maybe after a 
while, because our memories 
are quite well, I can 
remember some sentence 
maybe after couple time, a 
week, someone say 
something the truth and I can 
remember the older one now 
and I will feel identify 
someone” (E11: 18-21) 
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“The person who seems to 
deceive a lot, they tend to 
spread stories, different forms 
to different people. So if 
you’re in a group and that 
person is trying to deceive 
everyone else, he/she will tell 
different stories to each and 
every member” (E12: 47-49) 
Website Presentation Website Credibility 
Presentation 
Professionalism 
“I didn’t check before when 
I…online…But I think if the 
website is fake there is very 
similar to the real…so just 
depends on the err…text and 
the…err…font, something 
like that” (E3: 57-59) 
 
“well if the website has so 
many adverts I normally 
avoid it” (E5: 52) 
 
“Well usually check some, 
for study I just check for 
detail in the news, and like 
professional website like 
Google search and like BBC I 
can believe but most time” 
(E11: 144-145) 
 
Plausibility Plausibility (inc suspicion) 
Overcompensation (inc overly 
loud) 
Skepticism 
Open/Relaxed Behaviour 
Closed Behaviour 
Sleaziness 
Ingratiating 
Confidence 
“general knowledge how can 
you get a mobile for just 10 
pounds or 20 pounds (pause) 
you know something like 
that” (E1: 63-65) 
 
“I think a person should be 
mmm optimistic and uh 
y’know who are who are 
willing to help others who 
mmm mm who behave what 
they said” (E2: 83-84) 
 
“but I think most of the time, 
the feeling if someone is…I 
can feel when someone is 
lying because they aren’t 
confident” (E3: 12-13) 
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“I think ...it dependent on 
how the person give you the 
feeling because sometimes 
when they say something 
very confidently .. so you 
think that should be difficult 
then you believe that they 
telling the truth” (E7: 32-34) 
 
“Just being friendly and open, 
and not trying to make up 
stories that are completely 
unbelievable” (E10: 29-30) 
Avoidance of Risk Risk 
Caution 
Restrict Access 
Avoid Risk 
Risky Behaviours 
Vulnerability 
“otherwise games and normal 
internet they are quite fine 
because you cannot urm 
otherwise you know 
something is bad you don’t 
get into” (E1: 117-119) 
 
“If he if he was to ask ask my 
personal information and uh 
you know something like my 
mobile phone number my 
email address my even my 
y’know credit card account 
y’know I wi- you know try to 
avoid it s- you know to stay 
away from them perhaps” 
(E2: 240-242) 
 
“think because you need to 
fill in too much information 
when-when on internet, just 
like shopping on the internet, 
so…many details, just-
err…address, telephone 
number and your credit card 
details, those are easy to 
let…other people to get it” 
(E3: 50-53) 
 
“actually I think deception is 
going on more online because 
so many people use the 
internet, so talking to 
someone offline is better than 
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talking to them online 
because you are less likely to 
be deceived” (E9: 95-97) 
Social Influence Famous 
Attitude 
Reviews/Recommendation 
Respect/Reputation 
Greed 
Attractive 
Caring 
Friendly (inc approachability) 
Joking 
“I think if they show respect 
show respect to me and err 
they err I mean they easier to 
to be approached and uh you 
know this kind of person” 
(E2: 123-124) 
 
“Using sexy pictures” (E4: 
32) 
 
“well err the websites I use, 
are often used by many others 
so, I listen to what they say 
about the website then if they 
tell me something is wrong 
then I don’t use it. So mainly 
my friends tell me whether or 
not the website is good or 
not” (E5: 48-50) 
 
“online mostly depends on 
what websites you can use. 
I’d use specific websites that 
were recommended to me 
and look at online review” 
(E9: 76-77) 
Experience of Internet Media Richness 
Anonymity 
Large-Scale Usage 
“people do not make up who 
they want to be as you cannot 
see them nor is there emotion 
in the words” (E5: 41-42) 
 
“kind of.. if I do online 
shopping then you will do the 
online shopping from   the 
stores that you know instead 
of stores that are not actual 
stores.. or you going to some 
social network .....social 
networking that most people 
use and  you think it should 
be trustworthy” (E7: 83-86) 
 
“Erm… probably being 
anonymous like that’s the 
biggest thing, like making 
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sure that people can’t track 
where the information’s come 
from” (E10: 80-81) 
Impression Management Appearance (inc Serious 
appearance, comfortable) 
Impression Management (inc 
self-control, positive/nice 
behaviour, avoidance, supply 
information, fluidity of 
conversation, editability) 
 
“Just generally being nice to 
me” (E5: 28) 
 
“when you actually stand and 
talk to them and you realise 
that they are listening, and 
then next day not everybody 
knows what you talked about 
, they kinda kept it to 
themselves, and they 
remember what you say” (E6: 
47-49) 
 
“presentation, as this is 
important to make a good 
first impression, so I would 
be polite and nice” (E9: 86-
87) 
 
“Well in the group work they 
are always meeting together 
and writing very quickly 
notes and telling this is what 
we need to do each one so it’s 
very professional like so I 
cannot doubt any word he say 
because we want to get a 
good mark so it is not doubt 
because we want to get 
higher mark so” (E11: 126-
129) 
“when you’re online you 
should concentrate upon 
expressing yourself 
graphically and by giving all 
the relevant information 
which is easily seen by the 
viewers” (E1: 137-139) 
 
“try to avoid my questions 
cannot give a direct or 
immediate answer to my 
questions you know” (E2: 31-
32) 
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“I think…if I need to tell 
someone the truth I will…I’ll 
use some figure, do some 
research and then…tell them 
that is the truth because I 
have something to…prove 
that” (E3: 29-31) 
 
“Maybe by discussing and 
talking with each other and 
sharing the views on what 
you think” (E8: 30-31) 
 
“they do not directly talk to 
us, they might talk to 
someone else to indirectly tell 
you a message” (E9: 41-42) 
Verification Warrants 
Check Facts 
Multiple Sources 
3
rd
 Party 
Unreliable Sources 
“so you may have some 
customers that have used that 
site or some kind of contacts 
so that you can go back and 
check at any time or someone 
you can talk to or something 
like that” (E1: 130-132) 
 
“compare with what I know 
compare with what I know 
with what he said and you 
know it’s a comparison 
(this.)” (E2: 11-12) 
 
“I think…it’s…the 
website…is…owned by 
some-some organisation, just 
like you need to buy 
something’s…you wont go to 
the…things that is….no-not 
popular…most of the time 
you use the Morrison, Tesco, 
this one…because many 
people…know this store is 
real” (E3: 62-65) 
 
“I look at who’s written it 
basically, and how many 
people have written it. If it’s 
just one person then it’s 
likely not to be credible, but 
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if there’s several of them it’s 
a bit more trustworthy” (E4: 
34-38) 
 
“Yeah I think it’s easy but 
sometimes you’ve got non-
reliable sources you have to 
be aware of” (E8: 61-62) 
 
“Yes, erm… my PayPal got 
hacked and it was from an 
email that I thought was from 
PayPal when it wasn’t and so 
I opened it and they got into 
my account and so now I 
check where the e-mails 
come from” (E10: 63-65) 
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Appendix 8.1: Deception Assessment Real-Time Nexus (DARN)
©2015 
Deception Assessment Real-Time Nexus (DARN) ©2015 
 
PRESENCE AND RELEVANCE OF RISK FACTORS 
Determine the presence of risk factors to and during the most recent pattern of deceptive behaviour 
(Current vs. Previous), as well as their relevance to the development of future management strategies. 
 
 
Context of Deception 
 
Coding 
 
 
C1: Context of Deception 
This factor reflects the situational context in which deception occurs and how the specific 
elements of a situation and the motives of the actors involved lead to the form that deception 
takes.  
 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
  
277 
Future:   Y        ?       
N 
 
 
C2: ISR Capabilities 
This factor reflects UK and friendly skill, experience and capabilities in conducting 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Risk is measured through ability to conduct 
ISR, for example, if there are good capabilities then potentially less risk. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
C3: Usual Behavioural Pattern 
This factor reflects usual adversary behaviour, from which a judgement of risk can be made. 
For example, if the adversary usually conducts deception and/or influence operations then 
this would be considered high risk. 
 
Previous:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
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Current:  
 
Future:  
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
C4: Suspicious Behaviour 
This factor reflects suspicious behaviour identified in the adversary, and/or changes in usual 
adversary behaviour that may be deemed as suspicious and may indicate deception and/or 
influence operations are being conducted. Such behaviour requires further analysis to 
confirm or disconfirm the presence of deception. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
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C5: Acute Change in Behaviour 
This factor reflects acute changes in adversary behaviour compared to their usual 
behavioural patterns. Such changes in behaviour may be deemed high risk and a full risk 
assessment should be conducted to ascertain the presence of deception. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
Evidence and Intelligence developed from ISR 
 
Coding 
 
 
E1: Human Intelligence 
This factor reflects information recovered from any human source, whether they are an 
adversary, friendly or neutral. Intelligence is retrieved through observation and/or direct 
interaction with individuals or groups. However, care needs to be taken when assessing 
HUMINT to ensure the credibility of the intelligence. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
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Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
E2: Open Source Intelligence 
This factor reflects any intelligence that can be derived from sources open to the public, for 
example, public records, online publications and news channels. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
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E3: Social Media Intelligence 
This factor reflects any intelligence that is available through social media, for example, 
Facebook pages, or Twitter feeds. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
E4: Communications Intelligence 
This factor reflects and intelligence recovered from electronic communication means and its 
appearance will reflect the medium selected for communication. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
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Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
Situation Expertise 
 
Coding 
 
 
S1: Situation Expertise 
This factor reflects the requirement for context-dependent expertise to aid in the 
interpretation of evidence and to judge the credibility of information available. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
Interpretation of Expertise 
 
Coding 
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I1: Consistency of Evidence 
This factor reflects the consistency of evidence available for analysis. When evidence is not 
consistent across multiple sources or lacks consistency when responding to questioning in 
investigative interviews risk is increased. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
I2: Plausibility of Evidence 
This factor reflects the plausibility of evidence. Judgements of plausibility may depend upon 
expert advice about evidence, and may be used to assess the credibility of evidence. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
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Future:  
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
 
I3: Implicit Belief 
This factor reflects implicit beliefs and suspicion that adversaries may be conducting 
deception operations against friendly forces. Scepticism of adversary behaviour will also 
lead to doubt regarding adversary behaviour and how credible their aims are. 
 
Previous:  
 
Current:  
 
Future:  
 
 
 
 
Presence: Previous 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Presence: Current 
 Y        ?       
N 
 
Relevance: Future 
 Y        ?       
N 
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Appendix 8.2: Forms of Intelligence 
-Acoustic Intelligence: Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT) is defined as ‘Intelligence derived 
from the collection and processing of acoustic phenomena’ (AAP-6). 
-Human Intelligence: HUMINT is defined as ‘A category of intelligence derived from 
information collected and provided by human sources’ (AAP-6). 
-Imagery Intelligence: IMINT is defined as ‘Intelligence derived from imagery acquired by 
photographic, radar, electro-optical, infra-red, thermal and multi spectral sensors, which 
can be ground-based, seaborne or carried by overhead platforms’ (AAP-6). 
-Measurement and Signature Intelligence: Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
(MASINT) is defined as ‘Scientific and technical intelligence information obtained by 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, 
modulation, plasma and hydro magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the 
purpose of identifying specific features associated with the source, emitter or sender and to 
facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the sender and to facilitate 
subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same’ (US DoD). 
-Open Source Intelligence: Open Source Intelligence (OPSINT) is intelligence based on 
information collected from sources open to the public, such as the media, radio, television 
and newspapers, state propaganda, learned journals and technical papers the internet, 
technical manuals and books, to name but a few. 
-Radar Intelligence: Radar Intelligence (RADINT) is intelligence derived from data 
collected by radar (US DoD). 
-Signals Intelligence: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is the generic term used to describe all 
intelligence derived from the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum (EMS). It is divided into: 
1. Communications Intelligence: Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is 
defined as ‘Intelligence derived from electro-magnetic communications and 
communications systems by those who are not the intended recipients of the 
information’ (AAP-6). 
2. Electronic Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) is defined as 
‘Intelligence derived from electro-magnetic non-communication transmissions by 
those who are not the intended recipients of the information (AAP-6). 
-Technical Intelligence: Technical Intelligence is defined as ‘Intelligence concerning 
foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of 
foreign material, which have or may eventually have a practical application for military 
purposes’ (AAP-6). 
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Adapted from Henderson and Pascual (2008) 
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Appendix 8.3: Deception Risk Assessment Technique
©2015 
Deception Risk Assessment Technique (DRAT)
©2015
 
 
PRESENCE AND RELEVANCE OF RISK FACTORS 
Determine the presence of risk factors to and during the most recent pattern of deceptive behaviour, 
as well as their relevance to the development of future management strategies. 
 
 
Context of Deception 
This section examines the situation in which deception occurs, and how situational elements 
and actors involved leads to deception 
 
Coding 
0 = Absent 
1 = Possibility/Low 
Level Presence 
2 = Clearly Present 
 
C1: Situation 
This factor reflects upon what the current situation is, what has led to this current situation 
occurring at this moment in time, and what are the distinguishable elements from the 
situation which are cause for concern. 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
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 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C2: Actors 
This factor reflects who the actors are in the current situation:  can we identify these actors 
successfully? Are there multiple actors involved? Who are the key actors? Who, if any, are 
the subsidiary actors? Are the actors involved individuals, groups or larger organisations? 
In in-real-life interactions identifying actors may prove challenging if they seek to conceal 
their identity (e.g. removing military insignia – Ukraine). Online interactions are often 
characterised by anonymity where identifying actors may prove challenging, and discernible 
behavioural patterns may be overgeneralised to the actor involved, creating a potentially 
unreliable profile of the actor. 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C3: Current Threats 
This factor reflects what the current threats of the situation are, whether these threats are 
obvious, concealed or ‘ghost’ threats designed to waste resources, which area the threat/s 
is/are emerging from, and which areas of infrastructure these threats are targeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
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Current:  
 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C4: Communication Medium 
This factor reflects the communication medium the deception occurs in. Communication 
mediums include both online and in-real-life domains. Within the in-real-life domain 
communication may be verbal, vocal, non-verbal (focussing on body language) and physical 
acts of deception. Within the online domain communication may be verbal, vocal and non-
verbal (focussing on body language) and physical acts of deception, across an array of 
communication mediums (Instant Messaging, email, blogs, video chats, social media 
networks and deceptive websites). 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C5: Online Communication Characteristics 
This factor reflects the specific characteristics of online communication where interactions 
may range from a user interacting with online content where there is no reciprocal 
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communication (e.g. a website, or blog), to interactions where there is reciprocal 
communication (e.g. email, or Twitter). Online communication is characterised by its ability 
to cost-effectively reach large-scale audiences in a shorter period of time than traditional 
communication formats. The anonymity of communicating online may also lead to online 
disinhibition where individuals may be more likely to disclose information that they would 
not do so in-real-life, presenting an area for exploitation by deceivers. 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C6: In-Real-Life Communication Characteristics 
This factor reflects the specific characteristics of in-real-life communication in interpersonal 
interactions. These interactions can be within informal or formal settings and context will 
affect the characteristics of these interactions. First impressions often guide our 
interpretation of our interactional partner and form our initial judgements of them, we 
further adapt and respond to the interactional partner during conversation and can be 
influence by rapport, and the presentation and confidence of the other person. 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
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Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
History 
This section examines previous behaviour and interactions to develop a profile of usual 
adversary behaviour, enabling the identification of non-normal behaviour which may 
indicate deception 
 
Coding 
 
 
H1: Previous Behaviour – Non-Deceptive 
This factor reflects the previous behaviour of the identified adversaries which is not related 
to deception. Identifying key goals that the adversary has achieved without using deception 
enables us to understand the non-deceptive strategies that have been used to achieve these 
goals. Subsequently developing a baseline of adversary non-deceptive strategic behaviour, 
enabling us to identify deviations in behaviour that may indicate deception; although it is 
important to establish that deviations in behaviour do not have another cause. 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
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H2: Previous Deceiver Interactions - UK 
This factor reflects the past interactions that the deceiver has had with UK individuals, 
groups, organisations and infrastructure. Identifying and analysing previous known 
successful and unsuccessful deception attempts towards the UK will enable us to develop an 
understanding of how the adversary conducts and deploys deception strategies against the 
UK, enabling us to mitigate the risks of these attempts. 
N.B. The deceiver may not use the same strategy multiple times against the UK 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
H3: Previous Deceiver Interactions - Others 
This factor reflects the past interactions that the deceiver has had with other individuals, 
groups, organisations and nations which are not related to the UK. Identifying and 
analysing previous known deception attempts, whether successful or unsuccessful, by the 
adversary towards others may enable friendly capabilities to understand how the adversary 
conducts deception and identify key strategies they have previously used. 
N.B. The deceiver may not use the same strategy multiple times across different targets 
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Current:  
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
Nature of Deception 
This section reflects the different strategies used to deceive others – For further guidance see 
research by Henderson et al. on Deception Gambits, Vrij (2008), and Whaley (2007) 
 
Coding 
 
 
N1: Create and Identify Vulnerability and Exploit 
This factor reflects strategies used in deception which seek to create and/or identify 
vulnerabilities in the target and then exploit these vulnerabilities for gain. Strategies include 
the following: 
- Ruses – This item reflects the intentional exposure of information to the target with 
the intention of misdirecting them, enabling the deceiver to exploit the adversary 
whilst their attention is directed towards the ruse (e.g. feeding misinformation to 
double-agents). Ruses can be conducted by the adversary across multiple levels of 
communication, whether through in-real-life interactions, through print media, TV, 
digital media, and other forms of online communication, potentially opening up a 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
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wide area for this deception to occur in and requiring a wide-range of resources to 
target this threat. 
 
- Exploitation of target audience fears – This item reflects the deceiver deliberately 
identifying and targeting target audience fears through deception, meaning the target 
will be more likely to spend resources responding to this perceived threat, whilst the 
deceiver then exploits another area. 
 
- Exploitation of target audience hopes – This item reflects the adversary targeting 
audience and exploiting their hopes as part of their deception operation (e.g. attack 
when claiming peace). 
 
- Decoys – This item reflects how a deceiver may use a decoy to portray a false target, 
which the deceiver wants the receiver to believe as credible before they then attack 
or respond to the dummy, wasting friendly resources and enabling exploitation by the 
deceiver. 
 
 
- Feints – This item reflects mock attack or simulation of an attack by an adversary 
which seeks to create the appearance of an imminent attack, thus tying down friendly 
resources to countering the implied threat, whilst the adversary may actually perform 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
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other behaviour. 
 
- Demonstrations – This item reflects a real attack by the adversary which seeks to tie 
down friendly capabilities in active engagement in one situation whilst other 
adversary capabilities exploit the target in other areas. This strategy may prove 
costly to adversary resources as well as demonstrations in physical combat often 
increase number of casualties, however, this may be affect by adversary beliefs (e.g. 
if a soldier dies in combat he becomes a martyr and goes to heaven). 
 
 Current:  
 
 
N2: Conditioning the Target 
This risk factor reflects strategies which involve conditioning the target into expecting a 
specific behavioural pattern by the deceiver. 
- Conditioning – This item reflects the deceiver conditioning the adversary into 
expecting a certain pattern of behaviour over the course of a period time, which then 
leaves the target open to exploitation when the deceiver performs a different 
behaviour (e.g. Soviet-Czechoslovakia Campaign 1968 and the Yom Kippur War 
1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
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- Drip-Drip-Feed – Through slowly releasing information to a target, target resources 
may become focussed on this information, particularly if the adversary feeds truthful 
information to the target to build trust, before the adversary then presents the target 
with false information they have worked hard to uncover leading to a less accurate 
assessment of that information and leaving the target more vulnerable to deception. 
 
- Influence increase over time – This item reflects how we are more likely to find an 
individual credible if we are interacting and developing trust with them over a period 
of time before they then engage in deception. 
 
Current:  
 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N3: Impression Management 
This risk factor reflects the strategies that individuals engage in order to convince others 
that they are telling the truth. Individuals may engage in controlling their verbal behaviour 
(e.g. through keeping statements short to avoid contradictions) and their non-verbal 
behaviour (e.g. reducing body movements to avoid appearances of nervousness). Impression 
management occurs both in-real-life and online domains. 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
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N4: Control of Information 
This risk factor reflects how information is controlled by the deceiver, where the deceiver 
may increase or decrease or alter the amount of information the target receives to increase 
ambiguity and cognitive load in the target. Strategies include the following:  
- Increase Information - An increase in information (also known as white-out) by the 
deceiver reduces the amount of resources the target needs to accurately assess 
information increasing the risk of not identifying key threats.  
 
- Decrease Information - A decrease in information (also known as black-out) by the 
deceiver the amount of resources the target needs to accurately assess information 
with risk increased through an inability to identify threats. 
 
 
- Deflection – Through deflecting the target towards information and details irrelevant 
to the deception operation the adversary increases the amount of resources the target 
requires to monitor threats, whilst distracting the target from the adversary’s real 
intentions. 
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- Blocking – Through blocking the target’s ability to assess information there is an 
increase in ambiguity about the adversary’s actual aims. 
 
 
- Feigning forgetfulness – Through feigning forgetfulness the deceiver reduces the 
target’s ability to uncover information in in-real-life and online encounters reducing 
the target’s ability to detect deception and increasing ambiguity about reality. 
 
- Kernel of Truth – This item refers to the principle of developing deception operations 
around truthful information creating ambiguity for the target to accurately separate 
fact from fiction. 
 
- What is not being said – This item reflects examining what the current information 
does not show, as the deceiver may be stating one thing however their past history 
may indicate they mean something else. 
 
 
- Keep the Message Simple – This item reflects a common strategy amongst deceivers 
of keeping the deceptive message simple, which is harder to examine for 
inconsistencies. 
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- Concealment/Camouflage – This item reflects the controlling of information through 
reducing the target’s access to that information through concealing or camouflaging 
the information, whether this is an in-real-life encounter in combat operations or 
assessing online material for concealed messages. 
 
 
- Dazzle – This item reflects a strategy where the deceiver increases ambiguity in the 
target by overloading their cognitive abilities or sensors with unimportant 
information or noise. 
 
 
- Distractors – This item reflects a strategy where the deceiver uses distraction 
methods to divert the target’s attention away from the deception at hand. This can 
include the deliberate targeting of emotionally salient issues which will focus the 
target’s attention. 
 
Current:  
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N5: Credibility Enhancers 
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This risk factor reflects tactics that the deceiver may use to enhance their own credibility 
and/or the credibility of the information that they are employing to deceive the target. These 
strategies include: 
- Fluency – Through ensuring fluency in behaviour the adversary may appear more 
credible to the target as their no inconsistencies that may indicate deception. 
 
 
- Positivity – This item reflects that when a deceiver is positive in their behaviour, 
particularly verbal behaviour, they are more likely to be judged as credible by their 
target. 
 
 
- Objectivity – This item reflects that when an individual or organisation shows 
objectivity and appears neutral in their behaviour they will be more likely viewed as 
credible by the target, the adversary will then be able to exploit the target. 
 
 
- Commitment – This item reflects how an individual or organisation is viewed as 
credible if they are committed to their behaviour. Particularly in verbal behaviour if 
they are committed in their statement or information they provide and do not appear 
tentative or hesitant they will be more likely to be viewed as credible, even if this 
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information is false. 
 
 
- Convincing – This item reflects how individuals are more likely to believe an 
individual if they are perceived as appearing convincing, opening up the potential for 
exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
 
- Emphasise to influence – This item reflects how deceivers are likely to place 
emphasis on key points to influence how the target perceives information. Through 
placing consistent emphasis on particular aspects of behaviour there is a greater 
chance that the target will focus on these areas enabling exploitation of other areas 
by the adversary. 
 
 
- Too good to be true – This item reflects how deceivers may frame information in a 
manner that the target finds hard to believe, increasing ambiguity for the target and 
requiring further resources to assess credibility. 
 
 
- Showing the real as false – This item reflects how the adversary may show the target 
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real information (whether physical or verbal) to add credibility to false information it 
is hiding, drawing the target’s attention away from other information (e.g. Operation 
Bagration where Soviet forces used real combat planes and aircraft guns to protect 
dummy equipment drawing the attention of German forces, whilst concealing their 
true invasion plans). 
 
 
- Subtlety – This item reflects how the subtle presentation of information may 
manipulate the target into believing information that is false, or to focussing the 
target towards irrelevant information. 
 
 
- Mimicry – This item reflects how mimicry aims to make one thing appear as 
something else, this exploiting the target’s erroneous belief. Mimicry can take many 
forms across the physical, verbal, non-verbal and online domains. 
 
 
- Dummies – This item reflects objects that are used as false representations of reality 
which seek to affect how the target interprets information and constructs reality. 
 
Current:  
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
 
  
303 
 
 
N6: Social Influencers 
This risk factor reflects strategies from social influence approaches which are likely to 
influence the target into accepting the deceiver and/or information as credible. Social 
influence strategies include: 
- Higher Authority – Through appealing to a higher authority (e.g. God) a deceiver 
may enhance their credibility to others. This strategy will be more relevant to in-real-
life and online communication. Malign appeals to higher authority can be used as 
permission giving strategies for justification of action. 
 
 
- Authority – This item reflects the fact that figures of authority are judged more 
persuasive and credible by others, potentially increasing the susceptibility to 
deception from perceived authority figures. 
 
 
- Referent Power – This item reflects the fact that individuals may be more likely to 
accept information that has been presented to them by another person they deem 
credible. 
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- Attractive – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to find credible people 
that are attractive. 
 
 
- Reciprocation – This item reflects that individuals are likely to be influenced when 
they have been given something, as they then want to give something in return, which 
may leave the target open to exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
 
- Social Proof – This item reflects how we deem information correct through how 
others also judge that information. 
 
 
- Scarcity – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
information that is scarce – potentially as we have had to deploy greater resources to 
uncover this information. 
 
 
- Humour – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
information that they may find funny. Individuals may use self-denigration or 
denigration by others as humour to achieve a tactical or strategic advantage. 
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Current:  
 
 
Deceiver Risk Factors 
 
Coding 
 
 
D1: Deception Doctrine 
This risk factor reflects the adversary’s deception doctrine, including official and unofficial 
manuals. Does the adversary have deception as part of their military and intelligence 
doctrine? Under what conditions does the adversary doctrine allow deception to be 
conducted?  
 
This risk factor is focussed towards identifiable groups and organisations that have 
guidelines for deception operations, individuals and non-state actors may not have cohesive 
guidelines for using deception, or they may conduct deception tactically rather than 
strategically, therefore, further monitoring of any suspicious activity is required. 
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This risk factor reflects the stakes of the situation for the deceiver and what they may have to 
gain through deception or lose if they are caught in their deceit. The possibility of deception 
may be correlated between the levels of gains versus the level of benefits, for example, if 
there is potential for large gains and low costs then deception should be anticipated, whilst if 
there is potential for low gains and high costs then the adversary may not conduct deception. 
However, this may be mitigated by how the adversary portrays the gains and costs involved 
and what is deemed excessive. 
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D3: Motivation 
This risk factor reflects how motivated the deceiver is to convince others that they are 
credible. Motivation may affect a deceiver’s behaviour in the selection of strategies and 
length of time spent planning an act of deception. Motivation has also been found to increase 
the success of deception in online environments, where it is often challenging to assess the 
credibility of information. 
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D4: Capabilities, Resources and Experience 
This risk factor reflects the adversary’s capabilities, resources and experience in conducting 
deception. Adversary capabilities and resources alongside previous experience will affect 
how credible and convincing the deceiver can be to the target across different 
communication modes. The deceiver’s capabilities, resources and experience will affect their 
ability to utilise different communication modes and the strategies they use to target and 
appear credible to others. 
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This factor reflects how the deception is constructed, whether the deception is spontaneous 
or planned and how far along this continuum the deception may be. Spontaneous deception 
may have different characteristics and associated behaviours to planned and rehearsed acts 
of deception. 
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This risk factor reflects the deceiver’s ability to engage in cognitively challenging 
behaviours. Deception is argued to be a cognitively demanding task where individual’s need 
to construct a plausible deception and maintain their account whilst controlling their own 
behaviour and responding to interactions with the target. If the deceiver is not able to 
engage in multiple demanding cognitive tasks, behavioural cues to deception may become 
apparent to observers. 
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D7: Language 
This risk factor reflects the language which the deceiver uses to communicate in. Language 
differences may present additional challenges to receivers of information through 
mistranslation or misunderstanding of challenging information, and proceeding difficulties 
of interviewing individuals to enhance behavioural cues to deception in interactions. 
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Tetrad of psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, and sadism) and individual 
differences (including demographics) have on an individual’s actions in online and real-life 
environments, the forms of deception in which they may choose to engage in, and their 
ability to deceive others. 
- Normal Personality 
 
The Dark Tetrad consists of the following personalities all of which will present additional 
challenges when seeking to assess credibility. 
- Psychopathy is characterised by individuals who lack conscience, are often deceptive 
and impulsive in their behaviours without regarding the consequences of their 
actions 
 
 
- Narcissism is characterised by individuals who seek importance and wish to be 
viewed this way by others 
 
 
- Machiavellianism is characterised by individuals who constantly seek to manipulate 
you for their own gain 
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- Sadism is characterised by individuals who seek to physically or verbally hurt for 
their own gain 
 
Current:  
 
 
 
 
 
D9: Belief System 
This risk factor reflects an individual’s or group’s belief system including their culture, 
religion and their political beliefs and allegiances with others. The deceiver’s belief system 
will influence how they interpret the world, their interactions with others and will shape the 
motive and context from which deception emerges. 
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Target Vulnerability Factors 
 
Coding 
 
 
T1: Who is the target? 
This vulnerability factor reflects identifying who the target is – whether the target is an 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
  
311 
individual, group, or organisation and whether the target is a decision-maker or the general 
public. 
 
Current:  
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T2: Stakes 
This vulnerability factor reflects the perceived stakes that the target may have in accurately 
assessing the credibility of information. If the perceived stakes of deception are high this 
may increase the cognitive load in individual’s assigned to assessing credibility and reduce 
their decision-making abilities. 
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T3: Motivation 
This vulnerability factor reflects how motivated the target is to detect deception. The 
motivation impairment effect suggests that when individuals are highly motivated to detect 
deception their ability to accurately detect deception decreases as they rely upon incorrect 
decision-making strategies. To overcome this impairment effect it is recommended that 
practitioners discuss their findings with others to re-evaluate their judgements. 
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Current:  
 
 
T4: Target Characteristics 
This vulnerability factor reflects the culture, individual differences and personality of the 
target, and how these may affect the target’s ability to analyse and assess the credibility of 
information and intelligence. 
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T5: Mindset - Cognition 
This vulnerability factor reflects the cognitive state of the individual or group who are tasked 
with assessing veracity. As some deception and influence tactics are designed to affect 
cognitive performance, whether through inundating the target with information increasing 
cognitive load and reducing ability to accurately assess multiple sources of information, 
through reducing information leading to individuals and groups requiring more sources to 
uncover information, or deliberately diverting the target’s perception towards other 
information concealing any deception, highlighting the need for the target to be aware that 
deception strategies will seek to manipulate target expectation and cognition and reduce 
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available resources towards analysing information. 
 
Current:  
 
 
T6: Mindset - Affect 
This vulnerability factor reflects the affective state of the individual or group who are tasked 
with assessing veracity. As some influence tactics are designed to affect the emotional state 
of the target to enhance their attempts at deceit, an understanding of our affective state is 
important when analysing deception. 
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T7:  Capabilities – Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) 
This vulnerability factor reflects the targets own capabilities and how they will affect the 
ability to detect deception. Preparation for and experience of past adversary deception 
alongside deployment of ISTAR capabilities will enable the gathering of information for 
credibility assessment. The greater the number of friendly capabilities in ISTAR the more 
information may be uncovered for subsequent analysis. 
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Current:  
 
Risk Scenarios and Management Strategies 
The following tables identify the scenarios of future deception acts.  The scenarios are summarised below: 
 
RISK SCENARIOS 
Identify and describe the most plausible scenarios of future deception 
 
 Scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2 
 
Scenario #3 
 
Nature: 
 
Who are the likely 
targets of the 
deception? 
 
What kind of 
deception is likely to 
be committed? 
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What kind of strategy 
will the deceiver 
deploy to influence the 
target? 
 
What is the likely 
motive – that is, what 
is the deceiver trying 
to accomplish? 
 
Severity: 
What would be the 
impact or harm to the 
target of the deceit? 
 
What would be the 
physical harm to the 
target of the deceit?  
 
Is there a chance that 
the deception could 
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proliferate across 
multiple mediums and 
sources? 
 
Imminence: 
How soon might the 
deception occur? 
 
Are there any 
warning signs that 
might signal that the 
risk is increasing or 
imminent? 
   
Frequency / Duration 
Severity: 
How often might the 
deception occur – 
once, several times, 
frequency? 
 
Is the risk chronic or 
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acute (i.e., time 
limited)? 
 
Likelihood: 
In general, how 
frequent or common 
is this type of 
deception? 
 
Based on the 
deceiver’s history, 
how likely is it that 
this type of deception 
will occur? 
 
   
 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
Recommend strategies for managing deception risk (C/F Henderson & Pascual (2008); JDP 3-80.1 - DCDC (2007)) 
 
 Scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2 
 
Scenario #3 
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Monitoring: 
What is the best way 
to monitor warning 
signs that the risks 
posed by the deceiver 
may be increasing? 
 
What events, 
occurrences, or 
circumstances should 
trigger a re-
assessment of risk? 
 
 
   
Supervision: 
What surveillance 
strategies could be 
implemented to 
manage the risk 
posed? 
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What restrictions on 
activity, movement, 
association, or 
communication are 
indicated? 
 
Target Inoculation 
Planning: 
What steps could be 
taken to enhance the 
protection of potential 
targets? 
 
How might the 
targets’ security or 
vulnerability to 
deception be 
improved? 
 
   
Other Considerations: 
What events, 
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occurrences, or 
circumstances might 
increase or decrease 
risk? 
 
What else might be 
done to manage risk? 
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Appendix 8.4: Supporting Evidence for DRAT Risk Factors. 
Section and Item of Risk Supporting Evidence 
Context 
C1: Situation 
 
 
 
 
C2: Actors 
 
 
 
 
C3: Current Threats 
 
 
C4: Communication Medium 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: SME Study 
Gozna, L. F., & Boon, J. C. W. (2010). Interpersonal deception detection. In J.M. 
Brown & E.A. Campbell (Eds.). The Cambridge handbook of forensic 
psychology. (pp. 484-491). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chen, C., Wu, K., Srinivasan, V., & Zhang, X. (2011). Battling the Internet Water 
Army: Detection of Hidden Paid Posters. CoRR, vol. abs/1111.4297. 
Donath, J. (1999). Identity and deception in the virtual community. In M.A. Smith & P. 
Kollock (Eds.). Communities in cyberspace. (pp. 29-59). London: Routledge.  
Bennett, M., & Waltz, E. (2007). Counterdeception Principles and Applications for 
National Security. London: Artech House. 
 
Ten Brinke, L., MacDonald, S., Porter, S., & O’Connor, B. (2011). Crocodile tears: 
Facial, verbal and body language behaviours associated with genuine and 
fabricated remorse. Law and Human Behavior. doi: 10.1007/s10979-011-9265-
5. 
Wright Whelan, C., Wagstaff, G. F., & Wheatcroft, J. M. (2013). High-Stakes Lies: 
Verbal and nonverbal cues to deception in public appeals for help with missing 
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C5: Online Communication Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
C6: In-Real-Life Communication Characteristics 
or murdered relatives. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. doi: 
10.1080/13218719.2013.839931. 
 
 
Cornish, P., Hughes, R. & Livingstone, D. (2009). Cyberspace and the national 
security of the United Kingdom. London: Chatham House. 
Hancock, J.T. (2007). Digital deception: The practice of lying in the digital age. In B. 
Harrington (Ed.). Deception: From ancient empires to internet dating. (pp. 109-
120). Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Burgoon, J. K., Buller, D. B., White, C. H., Afifi, W., & Buslig, A. L. S. (1999). The 
role of conversational involvement in deceptive interpersonal interactions. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 25, 669-686. 
Porter, S., & ten Brinke, L. (2009). Dangerous decisions: A theoretical framework for 
understanding how judges assess credibility in the courtroom. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 14, 119-134. doi: 10.1348/135532508X281520. 
 
History 
H1: Previous Behaviour – Non-Deceptive 
H2: Previous Deceiver Interactions – UK 
H3: Previous Deceiver Interactions – Others 
Ewens, S., Vrij, A., Jang, M., & Jo, E. (2014). Drop the small talk when establishing 
baseline behaviour in interviews. Journal of Investigative Psychology and 
Offender Profiling. doi: 10.1002/jip.1414. 
Gozna, L. F., & Boon, J. C. W. (2010). Interpersonal deception detection. In J.M. 
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Brown & E.A. Campbell (Eds.). The Cambridge handbook of forensic 
psychology. (pp. 484-491). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Navarro, J. (2003). A four-domain model of detecting deception. FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin (June), 19-24. 
Vrij, A., & Mann, S. (2001). Telling and detecting lies in a high-stake situation: The 
case of a convicted murderer. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15, 187-203. 
 
Nature of Deception 
N1: Create and Identify Vulnerability and Exploit 
 
 
 
N2: Conditioning the Target 
 
 
 
 
 
N3: Impression Management 
 
 
 
Henderson, S. (2007). Deception – A guide to exploiting the psychological basis of 
deception in military planning. MIST/06/07/702/21/1.0. 
Whaley, B. (2007). Stratagem: Deception and surprise in war. London: Artech House. 
 
Henderson, S. (2007). Deception – A guide to exploiting the psychological basis of 
deception in military planning. MIST/06/07/702/21/1.0. 
LeMire, G. A. (2002). Employing special operations forces to conduct deception in 
support of shaping and decisive operations. Fort Leavenworth: School of 
Advanced Military Studies. 
 
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Doering, N. (2010). Impression and 
information management: On the strategic self-regulation of innocent and guilty 
suspects. The Open Criminology Journal, 3, 10-16. 
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N4: Control of Information 
 
 
 
 
N5: Credibility Enhancers 
 
 
 
N7: Social Influencers 
Hines, A., Colwell, K., Hiscock-Anisman, C., Garrett, E., Ansarra, R., & Montalvo, L. 
(2010). Impression management strategies of deceivers and honest reporters in an 
investigative interview. The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal 
Context, 2, 73-90. 
 
Chapter 6: SME Study  
Strömwall, L. A., & Willen, R. M. (2011). Inside criminal minds: Offenders’ strategies 
when lying. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 8, 271-
281. doi: 10.1002/jip.148. 
 
Chapter 6: SME Study 
Hansen, J. K. (2008). Military deception and the non-state actor. Newport: Naval War 
College. 
 
Chapter 6: SME Study 
Cialdini, R. B. (2007). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: Harper 
Collins 
 
Deceiver Risk Factors 
D1: Deception Doctrine 
 
 
Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. (2007). OPSEC, 
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Appendix 9.2: Scenarios of Future Threats 
Scenario 1: CBRN weapon capabilities 
The proliferation of new technological innovations globally has the potential to put 
pressure on the capacity of non-Western nations and as such will likely result in a 
broader requirement to present a capability of claimed technological innovations 
regardless of associated credibility. Deception regarding weapons capabilities has 
been observed in recent, on-going and potential conflicts involving Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria and Iran respectively. As Iran seeks to increase influence in the 
Middle East and surrounding regions, it is possible that uranium enrichment 
capabilities will be increased (despite any international diplomatic agreements to the 
contrary) to ensure energy supply for the population, alongside a potential for 
nuclear weapon development to appear as a strong nation. The interpretation of such 
nuclear capabilities in Iran will likely be viewed by the West now and in the future 
as being for malign military intent. Following challenges in post-hoc justifications 
for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the present Chilcott Inquiry in the UK, it is 
likely that there will be an increased requirement in the future to determine the 
credibility of any future claims of CBRN capabilities. Although the present focus has 
been on the threat of potential nuclear warfare, broader future challenges involve 
consideration not only of nation state capabilities, but of individual and group 
development of asymmetric weapons. Hence the challenges within this arena of 
future CBRN weapon threats require broader consideration than at a high level 
political focus. The detection of risk in regard of any CBRN threat will likely be 
identified through monitoring across ISR procedures and therefore the focus on 
deception or concealment of such activity will be online and through broader 
behavioural actions.  
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (interpersonal and mediated communication) 
- Control of Information (increase information related to non-CBRN 
intentions; block and deny information regarding CBRN intentions) 
- Influencers (wide range of potential influence tactics aiming to appear 
positive, credible, objective in claims) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (state representatives, diplomats, negotiators 
will all aim to appear credible through appearances of normality, basing 
deceptions around some elements of the truth) 
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Scenario 2: Competition for energy resources 
In order to ensure the future security of the UK energy infrastructure and respond to 
reduced offshore energy production there will be a requirement for imported oil and 
gas.  The energy transit routes to the European Union traverse Turkey from the 
Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Although the importation of energy 
resources from these other regions reduces reliance upon energy resources imported 
from Russia, there will be concerns from conducting business with authoritarian 
regimes in these areas, alongside growing fundamentalist groups operating in these 
countries. These issues will be further exacerbated by the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and on-going military actions in Ukraine alongside the exertion of Russian 
influence throughout the Caucasus and former USSR states. Russian-backed proxy 
groups may be likely to target UK interests in this region, and if these groups seek to 
target energy infrastructure then UK interests may be harmed in the short-term for 
isolated incidents, however, if a protracted conflict develops in these regions then 
long-term issues may develop for the UK energy infrastructure. In order to be 
successful in furthering their aims these groups will need to engage in deception to 
conceal their initial operational planning, and during operations themselves to 
conceal their identities before attacking targets. Furthermore, public facing elements 
of Russian diplomacy will also have to conceal and deny knowledge of links to these 
groups to avoid political embarrassment or repercussion. 
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (interpersonal and mediated communication) 
- Control of Information (increase information related to proxy groups to make 
them appear credible, whilst concealing information related to Russian 
involvement, planning and target selection and of the individuals engaged in 
such tasks) 
- Influencers (emphasise objectivity, convincing, committed, use of distractors) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (speech control and mimicking by diplomats 
and members of proxy groups as they seek to appear credible) 
 
Scenario 3: Radicalisation/Diaspora 
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The UK has become and continues to be a diverse, multi-cultural society, with an 
increase in nationalities from EU member states, Commonwealth members, and 
increases in asylum seekers and refugees from areas of conflict including Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Libya. Following recent large scale population 
movements by migrants fleeing conflict zones in the Middle East, Central Asia and 
North Africa these diaspora groups will increase in population size within the UK 
and will present an increasing influence on social, political and cultural events in the 
UK. Religious affiliation and identity will continue amongst elements of these 
diaspora groups and some individuals and groups will place more importance upon 
their religious than national identity, alongside perceived grievances against the host 
nation will open up possibilities for radicalisation, and further acts of terrorism 
within the UK (DCDC, 2010). Further difficulties will be faced in verifying recent 
asylum seekers to ensure they are credible refugees fleeing conflict zones rather than 
members of extremist groups, for example, the ‘Islamic State’ seeking to infiltrate 
and then conduct terror campaigns in Europe (Giglio & al-Awad, 2015). In seeking 
to prepare an act of terrorism an individual or group is required to act on a covert 
level, so that they do not come to the attention of security and intelligence agencies, 
particularly if they are entering the UK illegally. In seeking to prepare an act of 
terror, individuals and groups will be required to purchase specific chemicals from a 
range of retailers, including both online purchases and face-to-face retail purchases. 
Individuals will be required to present themselves as genuine purchasers who will be 
using these chemicals for plausible reasons, highlighting the challenges involved in 
detecting these individuals. Alongside purchasing materials, extremist individuals 
and organisations require targets where there will be large media exposure 
highlighting their cause, and these individuals may survey targets to ensure that their 
plans are effective. This form of deception in concealing preparing acts of terrorism 
presents challenges in detecting them, as there may be less evidence with which to 
detect these individuals and groups. 
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (primarily interpersonal deception, but with some mediated 
deception in securing components for explosives) 
- Control of information  (information will be increased to aid appearance as a 
genuine asylum seeker, whilst decreased and concealed surrounding links to 
their real identity and operational planning of acts of terrorism) 
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- Influencers (appeals to higher authority, commitment, subtlety, distraction 
from truth – particularly relevant for false asylum seekers) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (mimicking real behaviours when surveying 
targets, speech control during interviews for asylum claims) 
 
Scenario 4: Insider Threat 
One of the most vulnerable points in UK organisations comes from ‘insider threat’ 
where individuals or groups pose a threat to an organisation through theft of data, 
revelation of information, physical and IT sabotage, or through input of false data 
potentially effecting an organisation’s ability to function (CPNI, 2013). It is 
anticipated that as developed and developing nations and non-governmental 
organisations seek to expand their research and development capabilities to enhance 
their economies, there will be a greater risk of threats to commercial property from 
commercial and state-backed espionage (FBI, unknown; Smith, 2013). Scientific and 
engineering innovations will be at particular risk of exploitation by such 
organisations as they seek to develop these capabilities (FBI, unknown; Smith, 
2013). Although a number of insider threats are self-initiated there are still 
opportunities for infiltration by individuals and groups seeking strategic advantage 
(CPNI, 2013). An individual working in an organisation who is seeking to remove 
commercial property is required to hide their motives for working for that 
organisation from their employers and this may be difficult to detect if the individual 
works as a trusted employee before removing commercial property (CPNI, 2013). 
With the development of data storage it can be a simple procedure for an individual 
to download information onto a USB stick and pass that information onto a third-
party. These threats may be concealed for a period of time, during which a large 
amount of information may be stolen (CPNI, 2013).  
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (Primarily interpersonal and/or written communication as the insider 
justifies access to information systems) 
- Control of information (increase information related to non-relevant areas to 
try and provide justification for actions; decrease or deny and conceal 
information related to malign intent) 
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- Influencers (Emphasise honest behaviour, appeals to authority, convincing, 
authority, referent power, distraction). 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (Appear normal, try and base deception 
around truth to provide justification for access to information, control verbal 
behaviour during interactions) 
 
Scenario 5: Territory and Resource Disputes 
Contemporary and future territory conflicts will affect UK overseas territories 
including, the Falkland Islands, South Shetland, and the South Georgia and South 
Sandwich Islands which have led to conflict between the UK and Argentina in the 
past, and there are current disputed claims as to the sovereignty of these islands 
(BBC, 2013b). In recent years Argentina has increased the political rhetoric 
regarding these disputed territories claiming these territories for Argentina against 
the wishes of the inhabitants, for example, President Fernandez has recently renewed 
Argentina’s claims to the Falkland Islands at the United Nations (BBC, 2013a). The 
conflict surrounding these islands will be exacerbated due to the potential resources 
that may be uncovered in these areas, including oil and gas, and access to mineral 
resources in Antarctica, which will provide strong financial gains (Alic, 2013; 
Guardian, 2014). Argentina may seek to assert sovereignty over these territories 
through a combination of diplomatic and military means, both of which will involve 
aspects of deception. If diplomatic means fail to resolve the territorial dispute 
Argentina may resort to military means, which will require elements of surprise to 
ensure their success. It is anticipated that Argentine military capabilities are not as 
developed as UK military capabilities therefore there will be a need for deception 
through concealing any operational planning from UK intelligence, alongside 
deception in military engagements to divert UK attention. 
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (both interpersonal and mediated communication will be used for 
deception) 
- Control of information (increase of rhetoric surrounding justifications for 
control of Falkland Islands as a potential distraction, whilst other information 
regarding planning activities is concealed) 
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- Influencers (Emphasis, appeals to higher authority, attractive, concealing, 
commitment, distractors) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (Primarily focussed around maintaining 
normal behaviour whilst concealing any military ambitions) 
 
Scenario 6: Internal Intercultural Conflict 
As the UK becomes an increasingly multi-cultural society with an international 
diaspora from EU and non-EU, developed and developing nations there is an 
increasing mix of diverse groups from differing ethnic, religious and cultural 
backgrounds. Some of these groups may integrate well with mainstream British 
culture others may not. With the lack of integration between established and 
immigrant communities in urban environments, for example, Tower Hamlets in 
London (Gilligan, 2011; Huffington Post, 2013) and Highfields in Leicester, 
potential conflict will occur. Within these environments there may be a perceived 
threat from the immigrant community towards the established community, as the 
established community may not understand the customs and traditions of the 
immigrant community. Simultaneously the immigrant community may perceive the 
established as a threat as they too do not understand the customs and traditions of the 
established community. Stereotypical accounts of racism towards immigrant 
communities by established communities and the perceived lack of opportunities by 
young adults from immigrant communities may increase resentment by immigrant 
communities towards the mainstream. Established communities may perceive the 
immigrant communities in stereotypical ways of using up resources that should be 
reserved for established communities. Once this resentment has built between these 
different cultures there may be a triggering incident which results in open conflict 
between these two groups, for example, there was a recent conflict in Highfields in 
Leicester between the Jamaican and Somali émigré communities, resulting in a 
number of Jamaican families leaving the area. The triggering incident may be 
difficult to accurately predict, however, there may be specific groups involved that 
will seek to hide their motives for these actions and have organised themselves for 
any incidents occurring for them to exploit, whether that be enacting grudges against 
members of other communities or to take advantage of conflicts for financial gain, in 
a similar manner to the widespread looting seen in the London riots. 
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Likely deception methods –  
- Context (both interpersonal and mediated communication) 
- Control of Information (Most likely to involve reducing information through 
denial, blocking and other concealing attempts) 
- Influencers (Emphasise their points to provide justification for actions, 
appearance as authority figures to appear more credible, referent power, 
attractive, committed, use of distraction tactics) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (Speech control to appear more credible, 
base deceptions around truths, mimic normal behaviour) 
Scenario 7: Religious Conflict 
Religion and extremist beliefs are currently and will be a major source of conflict in 
multiple parts of the world (DCDC, 2010). Overt violent conflicts are currently on-
going in Africa, the Middle East and Asia with more isolated incidents occurring in 
Europe and North America (DCDC, 2010). These conflicts are often portrayed as 
being ostensibly Christian versus Muslim in nature, however, multiple actors are 
involved and current conflicts include different branches of Muslims, Muslims and 
Buddhists, Christians and Muslims and different branches of Christianity, it is 
anticipated that a large majority of these conflicts will continue (DCDC, 2010). 
Although conflicts may appear to be about religious and cultural differences between 
groups over a number of issues a wider array of motives appear. Furthermore, some 
conflicts will be conducted ostensibly under the guise of religion as a method for 
individuals to justify their actions and gain wider support for their ambitions. UK 
interests in conflict parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia will be affected as 
Western nations will be seen as legitimate targets in religious conflict. There will be 
threats to UK businesses, embassies and consulates in these regions from 
spontaneous and organised groups, for example, repeated Al-Shabaab attacks in 
Kenya conducted in retaliation for Kenyan support for the legitimate government of 
Somalia and in providing troops to fight Al-Shabaab. Spontaneous conflicts may be 
harder to predict, however, organised groups will need to engage in deception to 
ensure that their activities are covert and do not come to the attention of Western 
security and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, cultural differences in norms of 
conflict will change what other actors may see as legitimate targets providing a need 
 340 
 
to understand how these groups will operate and the spectrum of threats that they 
will pose. 
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (Interpersonal and mediated communication – limited by access to 
technology) 
- Control of Information (Potential to increase flow of information as a 
diversion strategy, alongside concealment and denial of motives and 
objectives) 
- Influencers (appeals to authority, authority, referent power, committed) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (Mimicking normal behaviour) 
Scenario 8: Intelligence-Gathering 
In seeking to uncover adversary operations and planning various intelligence and 
information gathering approaches have been developed by security agencies that 
monitor the online activities of a large number of people across society. These 
intelligence gathering approaches seek to monitor and uncover the digital trails that 
potential adversary individuals and networks may leave in the online domain in order 
to prevent acts of terrorism or other threats (BBC, 2013c), where individuals 
identified online can be brought in for questioning. Terrorists and other adversaries 
are not naïve and use all technology that can be available to them to achieve their 
aims whether to spread influence and misinformation (Jessee, 2006), plan operations 
(Thomas, 2003) or to raise finances (Jacobson, 2010). However, following 
revelations of these intelligence-gathering approaches by whistle-blowers 
adversaries may change their tactics to becoming more covert to reduce their chances 
of being detected (BBC, 2013c). A possible backlash against state intelligence-
gathering approaches may also occur where the state is seen as infringing upon 
individual liberties potentially leading to a reduction in intelligence-gathering 
increasing the potential for online exploitation by adversaries (BBC, 2013c). 
Adversary knowledge of information-gathering approaches also opens up 
possibilities for the spread of deception where adversaries may deliberately leave an 
online footprint to influence security agencies to an incorrect response. Furthermore, 
adversaries may seek to upload misinformation that security agencies may accept as 
genuine intelligence again influencing them to an incorrect response.  
Likely deception methods –  
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- Context (deception will occur across both interpersonal and mediated 
environments) 
- Control of Information (Increase information as a distraction from aims and 
waste target resources; conceal and deny true aims and motives) 
- Influencers (Emphasise to influence, objective, referent power, attractive, 
committed, confidence) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (Mimicking, kernel of truth, controlled 
behaviour) 
Scenario 9: UK Organised Crime 
Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) are increasingly multinational in their 
infrastructure, although core groups are often based around a shared ethnic identity 
from which a bond and trust are developed, OCGs incorporate a wide range of actors 
according to their aims and criminal activities (EUROPOL, 2013). There are 
approximately 1500 OCGs targeting the UK with groups involved in drug 
trafficking, people trafficking, fraud, counterfeit goods and cybercrime (HM 
Government, 2013), and a number of OCGs engage in multiple criminal activities, 
including links to terrorism (HM Government, 2013), to increase their share of the 
illicit economy and this his become increasingly possible with the advancement of 
the Schengen Zone and free movement within the EU (EUROPOL, 2013). OCGs are 
estimated to cost the UK at least £24 billion per year alongside loss of life, security 
and prosperity and the effects of corruption and intimidation that OCGs have on 
communities (HM Government, 2013). The global financial crisis has increased the 
scope of these groups as more consumers are turning towards illicit markets to meet 
this increased demand (EUROPOL, 2013). Internet growth has enabled OCGs to 
reach a larger number of potential victims, the potential to hide their illicit activities 
and the ability to commit a greater number of crimes in a reduced time period 
(EUROPOL, 2013). Albanian OCGs are argued to be involved in drug, arms and 
people trafficking and operate in large cities within the UK. These groups operate 
across illegitimate and legitimate businesses with OCGS also running bars, clubs and 
restaurants to appear legitimate, whilst also running brothels and involvement with 
associate OCGs in drug trade (Wikipedia, 2013b). OCGs are required to operate at a 
covert level in order to hide their illegitimate activities from authorities and they may 
achieve this through a variety of methods including running legitimate businesses 
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and maintaining Operational Security (OPSEC), posing challenges to investigating 
agencies seeking to confront these OCGs. 
Likely deception methods –  
- Context (interpersonal communication in face-to-face encounters whilst 
investigating and using informants amongst the OCG; mediated 
communication where OCG members are in different locations) 
- Control of Information (Increase information related to legitimate and front 
businesses; decrease through denial and concealment of illicit activities) 
- Influencers (authority, referent power, fluency, influence increases over time) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (mimicking normal behaviour, use of decoys, 
base deception around truth) 
 
Scenario 10: 3D Printers 
Increasing technological developments in the world of manufacturing and printing 
technologies has led to the construction of 3D printers. 3D printers can build objects 
from multiple layers of plastic or metals opening a wide-range of applications for 
these technologies. Although 3D printers are currently costly, these costs will reduce 
as the technology becomes more widespread opening up the potential for usage by a 
wide range of individuals and groups. Recent media attention has highlighted one 
potential threat from 3D printers in the shape of both plastic and metal guns created 
by 3D printers (Gibbs, 2013; Morelle, 2013). As the cost of 3D printers reduces 
groups with malign intent may be able to access the technologies to start producing 
weapons from 3D printers, especially where designs can be shared online increasing 
access to these technologies. Beyond creating 3D printed firearms there is the 
potential for adversary groups to 3D print rocket parts (Plafke, 2013) which open up 
possibilities for adversaries to construct weapons that may be capable of inflicting 
mass casualties. If adversaries can 3D print missile components they may be able to 
target specific structures through transporting missile components from multiple 
locations to try and conceal the overall aim, and make the connections between 
individuals less obvious before assembling components at a location close to the 
target. 
Likely deception methods –  
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- Context (Interpersonal and mediated communication between group 
members, may be hard to identify communication if a lone wolf) 
- Control of Information (Reduce and conceal information related to malign 
activities) 
- Influencers (Appeals to higher authority, authority, referent power, 
committed) 
- Replicating Genuine Behaviour (Mimicking real behaviour, use of decoys to 
distract authorities) 
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Appendix 9.3: Radicalisation and Terrorism in Diaspora Groups Risk Assessment 
 
Deception Risk Assessment Technique (DRAT)
©2015
 
 
PRESENCE AND RELEVANCE OF RISK FACTORS 
Determine the presence of risk factors to and during the most recent pattern of deceptive behaviour, 
as well as their relevance to the development of future management strategies. 
 
 
Context of Deception 
This section examines the situation in which deception occurs, and how situational elements 
and actors involved leads to deception 
 
Coding 
0 = Absent 
1 = Possibility/Low 
Level Presence 
2 = Clearly Present 
 
C1: Situation 
This factor reflects upon what the current situation is, what has led to this current situation 
occurring at this moment in time, and what are the distinguishable elements from the 
situation which are cause for concern. 
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Current:  
Potential for acts of terrorism by diaspora groups within the UK instigated by groups from 
their home nations. This will involve online communication between the actors which will 
require monitoring and detection. Identifying potential locations where actors may purchase 
compounds used to make explosives is required and where actors may assemble explosive 
devices. Actors may also begin target selection therefore there is a requirement to identify 
potential targets and increase their resilience.  
 
Presence: Current 
 0       1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0       1       2 
 
 
 
C2: Actors 
This factor reflects who the actors are in the current situation:  can we identify these actors 
successfully? Are there multiple actors involved? Who are the key actors? Who, if any, are 
the subsidiary actors? Are the actors involved individuals, groups or larger organisations? 
In in-real-life interactions identifying actors may prove challenging if they seek to conceal 
their identity (e.g. removing military insignia – Ukraine). Online interactions are often 
characterised by anonymity where identifying actors may prove challenging, and discernible 
behavioural patterns may be overgeneralised to the actor involved, creating a potentially 
unreliable profile of the actor. 
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Current:  
The actors are from a diaspora group in the UK, with links to further actors in their nations 
of origin. However, it may be harder to successfully identify these actors due to associated 
anonymity of online communication. Actors from diaspora groups are attempting to conceal 
their actions from authorities.  
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C3: Current Threats 
This factor reflects what the current threats of the situation are, whether these threats are 
obvious, concealed or ‘ghost’ threats designed to waste resources, which area the threat/s 
is/are emerging from, and which areas of infrastructure these threats are targeting. 
 
Current:  
Current situational threat is focussed on the potential for developing IEDs, the threat may be 
concealed to attempt surprise in targeting. Actors may target public areas with potential for 
mass casualties – therefore risk management should focus on transport hubs, sporting events, 
cultural and economic areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
 
 
 
C4: Communication Medium 
This factor reflects the communication medium the deception occurs in. Communication 
mediums include both online and in-real-life domains. Within the in-real-life domain 
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communication may be verbal, vocal, non-verbal (focussing on body language) and physical 
acts of deception. Within the online domain communication may be verbal, vocal and non-
verbal (focussing on body language) and physical acts of deception, across an array of 
communication mediums (Instant Messaging, email, blogs, video chats, social media 
networks and deceptive websites). 
 
Current:  
Deception will be conducted when the actors are seeking to conceal their communications, 
and across in-real-life and online domains, depending on where chemicals are bought from 
to create IEDs. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1      2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C5: Online Communication Characteristics 
This factor reflects the specific characteristics of online communication where interactions 
may range from a user interacting with online content where there is no reciprocal 
communication (e.g. a website, or blog), to interactions where there is reciprocal 
communication (e.g. email, or Twitter). Online communication is characterised by its ability 
to cost-effectively reach large-scale audiences in a shorter period of time than traditional 
communication formats. The anonymity of communicating online may also lead to online 
disinhibition where individuals may be more likely to disclose information that they would 
not do so in-real-life, presenting an area for exploitation by deceivers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
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Current:  
Online communication only used to discuss strategy and tactics between host nation actors 
and nation of origin actors, no real attempts at influence and deception to large audiences 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C6: In-Real-Life Communication Characteristics 
This factor reflects the specific characteristics of in-real-life communication in interpersonal 
interactions. These interactions can be within informal or formal settings and context will 
affect the characteristics of these interactions. First impressions often guide our 
interpretation of our interactional partner and form our initial judgements of them, we 
further adapt and respond to the interactional partner during conversation and can be 
influence by rapport, and the presentation and confidence of the other person. 
 
Current:  
Actors are required to make in-real-life communication when sourcing components for IEDs 
where they are required to create a favourable impression towards product sellers and to 
appear as credible buyers to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1      2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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History 
This section examines previous behaviour and interactions to develop a profile of usual 
adversary behaviour, enabling the identification of non-normal behaviour which may 
indicate deception 
 
Coding 
 
 
H1: Previous Behaviour – Non-Deceptive 
This factor reflects the previous behaviour of the identified adversaries which is not related 
to deception. Identifying key goals that the adversary has achieved without using deception 
enables us to understand the non-deceptive strategies that have been used to achieve these 
goals. Subsequently developing a baseline of adversary non-deceptive strategic behaviour, 
enabling us to identify deviations in behaviour that may indicate deception; although it is 
important to establish that deviations in behaviour do not have another cause. 
 
Current:  
Adversaries already have established contacts with actors in nations of origin, who may pose 
a threat to UK interests. 
 
Adversaries have been radicalised, which will increase the likelihood of them using 
deception to conceal their behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
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H2: Previous Deceiver Interactions - UK 
This factor reflects the past interactions that the deceiver has had with UK individuals, 
groups, organisations and infrastructure. Identifying and analysing previous known 
successful and unsuccessful deception attempts towards the UK will enable us to develop an 
understanding of how the adversary conducts and deploys deception strategies against the 
UK, enabling us to mitigate the risks of these attempts. 
N.B. The deceiver may not use the same strategy multiple times against the UK 
 
Current:  
No known previous deceptive interactions with the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
H3: Previous Deceiver Interactions - Others 
This factor reflects the past interactions that the deceiver has had with other individuals, 
groups, organisations and nations which are not related to the UK. Identifying and 
analysing previous known deception attempts, whether successful or unsuccessful, by the 
adversary towards others may enable friendly capabilities to understand how the adversary 
conducts deception and identify key strategies they have previously used. 
N.B. The deceiver may not use the same strategy multiple times across different targets 
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Current:  
No known previous deception interactions with others 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
Nature of Deception 
This section reflects the different strategies used to deceive others – For further guidance see 
research by Henderson et al. on Deception Gambits, Vrij (2008), Whaley (2007) 
 
Coding 
 
N1: Create and Identify Vulnerability and Exploit 
This factor reflects strategies used in deception which seek to create and/or identify 
vulnerabilities in the target and then exploit these vulnerabilities for gain. Strategies include 
the following: 
- Ruses – This item reflects the intentional exposure of information to the target with 
the intention of misdirecting them, enabling the deceiver to exploit the adversary 
whilst their attention is directed towards the ruse (e.g. feeding misinformation to 
double-agents). Ruses can be conducted by the adversary across multiple levels of 
communication, whether through in-real-life interactions, through print media, TV, 
digital media, and other forms of online communication, potentially opening up a 
wide area for this deception to occur in and requiring a wide-range of resources to 
target this threat. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
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- Exploitation of target audience fears – This item reflects the deceiver deliberately 
identifying and targeting target audience fears through deception, meaning the target 
will be more likely to spend resources responding to this perceived threat, whilst the 
deceiver then exploits another area. 
 
- Exploitation of target audience hopes – This item reflects the adversary targeting 
audience and exploiting their hopes as part of their deception operation (e.g. attack 
when claiming peace). 
 
- Decoys – This item reflects how a deceiver may use a decoy to portray a false target, 
which the deceiver wants the receiver to believe as credible before they then attack 
or respond to the dummy, wasting friendly resources and enabling exploitation by the 
deceiver. 
 
 
- Feints – This item reflects mock attack or simulation of an attack by an adversary 
which seeks to create the appearance of an imminent attack, thus tying down friendly 
resources to countering the implied threat, whilst the adversary may actually perform 
other behaviour. 
 
0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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- Demonstrations – This item reflects a real attack by the adversary which seeks to tie 
down friendly capabilities in active engagement in one situation whilst other 
adversary capabilities exploit the target in other areas. This strategy may prove 
costly to adversary resources as well as demonstrations in physical combat often 
increase number of casualties, however, this may be affect by adversary beliefs (e.g. 
if a soldier dies in combat he becomes a martyr and goes to heaven). 
 
 Current:  
There is a low chance that the adversary is seeking to create and then exploit a perceived 
vulnerability – actors have not been identified focussing their deception towards this 
approach, however, adversary behaviour may change to exploit this area. 
 
 
N2: Conditioning the Target 
This risk factor reflects strategies which involve conditioning the target into expecting a 
specific behavioural pattern by the deceiver. 
- Conditioning – This item reflects the deceiver conditioning the adversary into 
expecting a certain pattern of behaviour over the course of a period time, which then 
leaves the target open to exploitation when the deceiver performs a different 
behaviour (e.g. Soviet-Czechoslovakia Campaign 1968 and the Yom Kippur War 
1973). 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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- Drip-Drip-Feed – Through slowly releasing information to a target, target resources 
may become focussed on this information, particularly if the adversary feeds truthful 
information to the target to build trust, before the adversary then presents the target 
with false information they have worked hard to uncover leading to a less accurate 
assessment of that information and leaving the target more vulnerable to deception. 
 
- Influence increase over time – This item reflects how we are more likely to find an 
individual credible if we are interacting and developing trust with them over a period 
of time before they then engage in deception. 
 
Current:  
Adversaries will seek to condition the companies they are buying materials from so that they 
appear credible rather than seeking to use the materials for malign purposes. 
 
Adversaries will also need to condition the target in their target reconnaissance efforts so that 
they are not identified and/or appear as credible. 
 
Presence: Current 
0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1      2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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N3: Impression Management 
This risk factor reflects the strategies that individuals engage in order to convince others 
that they are telling the truth. Individuals may engage in controlling their verbal behaviour 
(e.g. through keeping statements short to avoid contradictions) and their non-verbal 
behaviour (e.g. reducing body movements to avoid appearances of nervousness). Impression 
management occurs both in-real-life and online domains. 
 
Current:  
The actors will be required to engage in impression management strategies to control their 
non-verbal and verbal behaviour whilst they are engaged in real-life business transactions in 
being the necessary materials to make an IED and also in online interactions when buying 
materials. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
N4: Control of Information 
This risk factor reflects how information is controlled by the deceiver, where the deceiver 
may increase or decrease or alter the amount of information the target receives to increase 
ambiguity and cognitive load in the target. Strategies include the following:  
- Increase Information - An increase in information (also known as white-out) by the 
deceiver reduces the amount of resources the target needs to accurately assess 
information increasing the risk of not identifying key threats.  
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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- Decrease Information - A decrease in information (also known as black-out) by the 
deceiver the amount of resources the target needs to accurately assess information 
with risk increased through an inability to identify threats. 
 
 
- Deflection – Through deflecting the target towards information and details irrelevant 
to the deception operation the adversary increases the amount of resources the target 
requires to monitor threats, whilst distracting the target from the adversary’s real 
intentions. 
 
 
- Blocking – Through blocking the target’s ability to assess information there is an 
increase in ambiguity about the adversary’s actual aims. 
 
 
- Feigning forgetfulness – Through feigning forgetfulness the deceiver reduces the 
target’s ability to uncover information in in-real-life and online encounters reducing 
the target’s ability to detect deception and increasing ambiguity about reality. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1      2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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- Kernel of Truth – This item refers to the principle of developing deception operations 
around truthful information creating ambiguity for the target to accurately separate 
fact from fiction. 
 
- What is not being said – This item reflects examining what the current information 
does not show, as the deceiver may be stating one thing however their past history 
may indicate they mean something else. 
 
 
- Keep the Message Simple – This item reflects a common strategy amongst deceivers 
of keeping the deceptive message simple, which is harder to examine for 
inconsistencies. 
 
 
- Concealment/Camouflage – This item reflects the controlling of information through 
reducing the target’s access to that information through concealing or camouflaging 
the information, whether this is an in-real-life encounter in combat operations or 
assessing online material for concealed messages. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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- Dazzle – This item reflects a strategy where the deceiver increases ambiguity in the 
target by overloading their cognitive abilities or sensors with unimportant 
information or noise. 
 
 
- Distractors – This item reflects a strategy where the deceiver uses distraction 
methods to divert the target’s attention away from the deception at hand. This can 
include the deliberate targeting of emotionally salient issues which will focus the 
target’s attention. 
 
Current:  
In controlling information the actors are mainly concerned with reducing target access to 
information through blocking and concealing target access to the actors behaviour, 
potentially increasing difficulties in assessing information for threats. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
N5: Credibility Enhancers 
This risk factor reflects tactics that the deceiver may use to enhance their own credibility 
and/or the credibility of the information that they are employing to deceive the target. These 
strategies include: 
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- Fluency – Through ensuring fluency in behaviour the adversary may appear more 
credible to the target as their no inconsistencies that may indicate deception. 
 
 
- Positivity – This item reflects that when a deceiver is positive in their behaviour, 
particularly verbal behaviour, they are more likely to be judged as credible by their 
target. 
 
 
- Objectivity – This item reflects that when an individual or organisation shows 
objectivity and appears neutral in their behaviour they will be more likely viewed as 
credible by the target, the adversary will then be able to exploit the target. 
 
 
- Commitment – This item reflects how an individual or organisation is viewed as 
credible if they are committed to their behaviour. Particularly in verbal behaviour if 
they are committed in their statement or information they provide and do not appear 
tentative or hesitant they will be more likely to be viewed as credible, even if this 
information is false. 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0       1       2 
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- Convincing – This item reflects how individuals are more likely to believe an 
individual if they are perceived as appearing convincing, opening up the potential for 
exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
 
- Emphasise to influence – This item reflects how deceivers are likely to place 
emphasis on key points to influence how the target perceives information. Through 
placing consistent emphasis on particular aspects of behaviour there is a greater 
chance that the target will focus on these areas enabling exploitation of other areas 
by the adversary. 
 
 
- Too good to be true – This item reflects how deceivers may frame information in a 
manner that the target finds hard to believe, increasing ambiguity for the target and 
requiring further resources to assess credibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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- Showing the real as false – This item reflects how the adversary may show the target 
real information (whether physical or verbal) to add credibility to false information it 
is hiding, drawing the target’s attention away from other information (e.g. Operation 
Bagration where Soviet forces used real combat planes and aircraft guns to protect 
dummy equipment drawing the attention of German forces, whilst concealing their 
true invasion plans). 
 
 
- Subtlety – This item reflects how the subtle presentation of information may 
manipulate the target into believing information that is false, or to focussing the 
target towards irrelevant information. 
 
 
- Mimicry – This item reflects how mimicry aims to make one thing appear as 
something else, this exploiting the target’s erroneous belief. Mimicry can take many 
forms across the physical, verbal, non-verbal and online domains. 
 
 
- Dummies – This item reflects objects that are used as false representations of reality 
which seek to affect how the target interprets information and constructs reality. 
 
Presence: Current 
0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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Current:  
Actors will be required to be positive, committed, convincing and subtle in their behaviour 
whilst buying materials or conducting reconnaissance to ensure that they are credible to 
others, further in conversation with others they will also need to engage in behavioural 
mimicry as this reflected normal behaviour in interaction. 
 
 
N6: Social Influencers 
This risk factor reflects strategies from social influence approaches which are likely to 
influence the target into accepting the deceiver and/or information as credible. Social 
influence strategies include: 
- Higher Authority – Through appealing to a higher authority (e.g. God) a deceiver 
may enhance their credibility to others. This strategy will be more relevant to in-real-
life and online communication. Malign appeals to higher authority can be used as 
permission giving strategies for justification of action. 
 
 
- Authority – This item reflects the fact that figures of authority are judged more 
persuasive and credible by others, potentially increasing the susceptibility to 
deception from perceived authority figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
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- Referent Power – This item reflects the fact that individuals may be more likely to 
accept information that has been presented to them by another person they deem 
credible. 
 
 
- Attractive – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to find credible people 
that are attractive. 
 
 
- Reciprocation – This item reflects that individuals are likely to be influenced when 
they have been given something, as they then want to give something in return, which 
may leave the target open to exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
 
- Social Proof – This item reflects how we deem information correct through how 
others also judge that information. 
 
 
- Scarcity – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
information that is scarce – potentially as we have had to deploy greater resources to 
uncover this information. 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0       1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
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- Humour – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
information that they may find funny. Individuals may use self-denigration or 
denigration by others as humour to achieve a tactical or strategic advantage. 
 
Current:  
Actors may use a variety of influence strategies to appear credible to others in purchasing 
materials for IEDs and conducting reconnaissance on targets. Actors may conduct appeals to 
higher authority as permission-granting for their behaviour, when interacting with others, 
actors may appear will aim to appear authoritative and attractive to increase credibility to 
those who they are purchasing materials from, and social proof will affect how actors are 
perceived as credible if they are interacting with multiple people from a group when they are 
purchasing materials. 
 
0        1       2 
 
 
Deceiver Risk Factors 
 
Coding 
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D1: Deception Doctrine 
This risk factor reflects the adversary’s deception doctrine, including official and unofficial 
manuals. Does the adversary have deception as part of their military and intelligence 
doctrine? Under what conditions does the adversary doctrine allow deception to be 
conducted?  
 
This risk factor is focussed towards identifiable groups and organisations that have 
guidelines for deception operations, individuals and non-state actors may not have cohesive 
guidelines for using deception, or they may conduct deception tactically rather than 
strategically, therefore, further monitoring of any suspicious activity is required. 
 
Current:  
Islamic extremists are known to have flexible deception doctrine from manuals and ideas 
developed by leaders. The actors’ deception may be guided by such manuals, careful 
monitoring is required to examine links between manuals and the actors strategy and tactics. 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 366 
 
D2: Gains Vs Losses 
This risk factor reflects the stakes of the situation for the deceiver and what they may have to 
gain through deception or lose if they are caught in their deceit. The possibility of deception 
may be correlated between the levels of gains versus the level of benefits, for example, if 
there is potential for large gains and low costs then deception should be anticipated, whilst if 
there is potential for low gains and high costs then the adversary may not conduct deception. 
However, this may be mitigated by how the adversary portrays the gains and costs involved 
and what is deemed excessive. 
 
Current:  
Deception should be anticipated as there are high gains for the adversaries in concealing 
their behaviour and there are comparatively low costs if they are caught before their plans 
are completed. 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D3: Motivation 
This risk factor reflects how motivated the deceiver is to convince others that they are 
credible. Motivation may affect a deceiver’s behaviour in the selection of strategies and 
length of time spent planning an act of deception. Motivation has also been found to increase 
the success of deception in online environments, where it is often challenging to assess the 
credibility of information. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1      2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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Current: 
Actors will be motivated and this will reflect the amount of time they place into sourcing and 
constructing IEDs and conducting target selection. 
 
 
D4: Capabilities, Resources and Experience 
This risk factor reflects the adversary’s capabilities, resources and experience in conducting 
deception. Adversary capabilities and resources alongside previous experience will affect 
how credible and convincing the deceiver can be to the target across different 
communication modes. The deceiver’s capabilities, resources and experience will affect their 
ability to utilise different communication modes and the strategies they use to target and 
appear credible to others. 
 
Current:  
Prior to identification of individual actors is hard to know what capabilities, resources and 
experience are available to the group, however, through knowledge of terrorist training 
manuals and instructions from extremist clerics on deception in operations some capabilities, 
resources and experience in concealing activities may be anticipated. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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D5: Deception Spontaneity → Planned 
This factor reflects how the deception is constructed, whether the deception is spontaneous 
or planned and how far along this continuum the deception may be. Spontaneous deception 
may have different characteristics and associated behaviours to planned and rehearsed acts 
of deception. 
 
Current:  
The deception will have been planned by the actors as they are required to assemble the 
materials needed for an IED over a period of time to reduce chance of detection. Target 
selection may vary depending on context and aims of the group, although this too will 
require some reconnaissance. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
D6: Cognitive Performance 
This risk factor reflects the deceiver’s ability to engage in cognitively challenging 
behaviours. Deception is argued to be a cognitively demanding task where individual’s need 
to construct a plausible deception and maintain their account whilst controlling their own 
behaviour and responding to interactions with the target. If the deceiver is not able to 
engage in multiple demanding cognitive tasks, behavioural cues to deception may become 
apparent to observers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
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Current:  
The actors will be required to conceal their activities from others, however, unless they are 
directly challenged about their behaviour, actors should not have trouble in appearing 
credible to others. 
 
 
D7: Language 
This risk factor reflects the language which the deceiver uses to communicate in. Language 
differences may present additional challenges to receivers of information through 
mistranslation or misunderstanding of challenging information, and proceeding difficulties 
of interviewing individuals to enhance behavioural cues to deception in interactions. 
 
Current:  
Language may not play a large role in the concealment of the illegal activities as there may 
not be direct contact with credibility assessors until actors have been apprehended. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
D8: Personality and Individual Differences 
This risk factor reflects the effects that personality (normative Vs disordered – the Dark 
Tetrad of psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, and sadism) and individual 
differences (including demographics) have on an individual’s actions in online and real-life 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
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environments, the forms of deception in which they may choose to engage in, and their 
ability to deceive others. 
- Normal Personality 
 
The Dark Tetrad consists of the following personalities all of which will present additional 
challenges when seeking to assess credibility. 
- Psychopathy is characterised by individuals who lack conscience, are often deceptive 
and impulsive in their behaviours without regarding the consequences of their 
actions 
 
 
- Narcissism is characterised by individuals who seek importance and wish to be 
viewed this way by others 
 
 
- Machiavellianism is characterised by individuals who constantly seek to manipulate 
you for their own gain 
 
 
- Sadism is characterised by individuals who seek to physically or verbally hurt for 
their own gain 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
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Current:  
It is anticipated that elements of normative personality and the dark tetrad will be present in 
groups of actors conducting deception related to acts of terrorism, however, it may be hard to 
ascertain presence of such factors outside of interactive contexts. 
 
 
D9: Belief System 
This risk factor reflects an individual’s or group’s belief system including their culture, 
religion and their political beliefs and allegiances with others. The deceiver’s belief system 
will influence how they interpret the world, their interactions with others and will shape the 
motive and context from which deception emerges. 
 
Current:  
The actors have been radicalised and this will affect the way in which they view the world 
and their motives for deception, choice of tactics and strategies and their target selection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1      2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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Target Vulnerability Factors 
 
Coding 
 
 
T1: Who is the target? 
This vulnerability factor reflects identifying who the target is – whether the target is an 
individual, group, or organisation and whether the target is a decision-maker or the general 
public. 
 
Current:  
The target will be the general public and decision-makers. 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
T2: Stakes 
This vulnerability factor reflects the perceived stakes that the target may have in accurately 
assessing the credibility of information. If the perceived stakes of deception are high this 
may increase the cognitive load in individual’s assigned to assessing credibility and reduce 
their decision-making abilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1      2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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Current:  
The stakes are very high in accurately detecting the actor’s concealed behaviour and intent 
due to the potential for large casualties – this has the potential to affect decision-making 
abilities and analysts should be aware of this. 
 
 
T3: Motivation 
This vulnerability factor reflects how motivated the target is to detect deception. The 
motivation impairment effect suggests that when individuals are highly motivated to detect 
deception their ability to accurately detect deception decreases as they rely upon incorrect 
decision-making strategies. To overcome this impairment effect it is recommended that 
practitioners discuss their findings with others to re-evaluate their judgements. 
 
Current:  
Analysts are highly motivated to uncover concealment of malign activities; however, 
judgements should be discussed with others to reduce potential biases. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1      2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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T4: Target Characteristics 
This vulnerability factor reflects the culture, individual differences and personality of the 
target, and how these may affect the target’s ability to analyse and assess the credibility of 
information and intelligence. 
 
Current:  
Background history will affect individuals seeking to uncover deception due to previous 
experience of terrorist attacks and the casualties they may inflict influencing judgements. 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
 
 
T5: Mindset - Cognition 
This vulnerability factor reflects the cognitive state of the individual or group who are tasked 
with assessing veracity. As some deception and influence tactics are designed to affect 
cognitive performance, whether through inundating the target with information increasing 
cognitive load and reducing ability to accurately assess multiple sources of information, 
through reducing information leading to individuals and groups requiring more sources to 
uncover information, or deliberately diverting the target’s perception towards other 
information concealing any deception, highlighting the need for the target to be aware that 
deception strategies will seek to manipulate target expectation and cognition and reduce 
available resources towards analysing information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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Current:  
Analysts will require greater sources of information to detect concealment of malign 
activities, potentially reducing resources available for other areas of interest. 
 
 
T6: Mindset - Affect 
This vulnerability factor reflects the affective state of the individual or group who are tasked 
with assessing veracity. As some influence tactics are designed to affect the emotional state 
of the target to enhance their attempts at deceit, an understanding of our affective state is 
important when analysing deception. 
 
Current:  
There are no detected strategies seeking to manipulate emotional state in the information 
analyst. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0       1       2 
 
 
T7:  Capabilities – Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) 
This vulnerability factor reflects the targets own capabilities and how they will affect the 
ability to detect deception. Preparation for and experience of past adversary deception 
alongside deployment of ISTAR capabilities will enable the gathering of information for 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
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credibility assessment. The greater the number of friendly capabilities in ISTAR the more 
information may be uncovered for subsequent analysis. 
 
Current:  
There are a large number of capabilities to monitor the actors’ behaviour across in-real-life 
and online domains. 
 
 
Risk Scenarios and Management Strategies 
The following tables identify the scenarios of future deception acts.  The scenarios are summarised below: 
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RISK SCENARIOS 
Identify and describe the most plausible scenarios of future deception 
 
 Scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2 
 
Scenario #3 
 
Nature: 
Who are the likely 
targets of the 
deception? 
 
 
 
 
What kind of 
deception is likely to 
be committed? 
 
 
 
 
 
General Public and intelligence 
agencies 
 
 
Concealment of activities by 
extremist groups. 
Deception in-real-life and online 
interactions with companies from 
which materials are sourced for 
IEDs. 
Potential for in-real-life deception 
when conducting reconnaissance on 
target depending on interactions with 
general public at target. 
 
General Public and intelligence 
agencies 
 
General Public and intelligence 
agencies 
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What kind of strategy 
will the deceiver 
deploy to influence 
the target? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The deceiver will be using multiple 
strategies to influence the targets 
including: conditioning the target; 
verbal and non-verbal impression 
management in purchasing materials 
in-real-life and online domains; 
controlling information through 
reducing target access to information 
(blocking and concealing); 
increasing credibility by appearing 
positive, committed, convincing and 
subtle and engaging in behavioural 
mimicry during interactions;  and 
social influencers will be used to 
justify behaviour (Appeals to higher 
authority), and appearing 
authoritative, attractive and having 
social proof when interacting with 
others. 
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What is the likely 
motive – that is, what 
is the deceiver trying 
to accomplish? 
 
The motive for the deceivers’ 
behaviour is to successfully detonate 
an IED causing terror amongst the 
general public for an ideological and 
political purpose. 
Severity: 
What would be the 
impact or harm to the 
target of the deceit? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What would be the 
physical harm to the 
target of the deceit?  
 
 
There would be a large impact to the 
target potentially through casualties 
and fatalities amongst the general 
public, alongside damage to 
infrastructure and a loss of 
confidence in security service 
effectiveness. 
 
 
 
The physical harm to the target may 
be civilian casualties and fatalities 
and damage to infrastructure. 
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Is there a chance that 
the deception could 
proliferate across 
multiple mediums and 
sources? 
 
 
There is a strong chance that the 
deception will be conducted across 
multiple mediums and sources, 
however, this will not spread outside 
of the group of actor planning acts of 
terror. 
 
Imminence: 
How soon might the 
deception occur? 
 
 
 
 
Are there any 
warning signs that 
might signal that the 
risk is increasing or 
imminent? 
 
It is anticipated that such deception 
will occur as soon as the group 
begins developing plans towards 
conducting acts of terror. 
 
 
 
Warning signs of increased risk may 
be linked to actors beginning to 
attempt to buy materials for IEDs, 
conducting reconnaissance and 
moving IEDs to the target location. 
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Frequency / Duration 
Severity: 
How often might the 
deception occur – 
once, several times, 
frequency? 
 
 
 
 
Is the risk chronic or 
acute (i.e., time 
limited)? 
 
 
 
 
Deception will occur often during the 
course of the actors behaviour as 
they require concealment of 
information to increase the success 
of their plans. 
 
 
 
The risk is acute as the actors 
timeline increases there will be a 
greater chance of a terrorist act. 
  
Likelihood: 
In general, how 
frequent or common 
is this type of 
deception? 
 
 
This type of deception is relatively 
common with acts of terrorist 
preparation uncovered throughout 
the year; such acts will dependence 
on local and global context. 
  
 382 
 
 
 
Based on the 
deceiver’s history, 
how likely is it that 
this type of deception 
will occur? 
 
 
This type of deception around 
concealment of information and 
maintaining a credible appearance to 
others whilst planning an act of terror 
will occur when groups are planning 
acts of terrorism. 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
Recommend strategies for managing deception risk (C/F SME Model; Henderson & Pascual (2008); JDP 3-80.1 - DCDC (2007)) 
 
 Scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2 
 
Scenario #3 
 
Monitoring: 
What is the best way 
to monitor warning 
signs that the risks 
posed by the deceiver 
may be increasing? 
 
 
Monitor changes in deceiver 
behaviour to identify when they are 
approaching in-real-life and online 
retailers of materials that can be used 
in IEDs – as this will require actors 
to engage with others rather than 
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What events, 
occurrences, or 
circumstances should 
trigger a re-
assessment of risk? 
 
 
 
 
 
focus on information concealment. 
 
Identify suspicious activity at 
locations that may be attractive for 
terrorist attacks. 
 
Identification of further actors that 
may be involved with the terrorist 
plot, especially if such individuals 
are known extremists or have links to 
known extremists. Changes in 
domestic and foreign affairs that 
have an effect on the actors’ 
ideological and ethnic community. 
Supervision: 
What surveillance 
strategies could be 
implemented to 
manage the risk 
posed? 
 
 
Surveillance from human 
intelligence, image intelligence 
(photographs of actors conducting 
reconnaissance of potential targets 
and buying materials needed) and 
signals intelligence (monitoring of 
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What restrictions on 
activity, movement, 
association, or 
communication are 
indicated? 
 
 
 
 
phone conversations and online 
activity) is required to monitor 
actors’ behaviour for indications they 
are developing IEDs and/or are about 
to conduct the attack. 
 
Activity should not be restricted until 
the actors’ are in the final stages of 
planning the attack in an attempt to 
uncover further actors or contacts 
and ensure enough evidence for 
eventual prosecution. 
 
 
Target Inoculation 
Planning: 
What steps could be 
taken to enhance the 
protection of potential 
targets? 
 
 
 
Increase awareness amongst analysts 
that deception may be occurring 
through concealment of information 
rather than misinformation. 
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How might the 
targets’ security or 
vulnerability to 
deception be 
improved? 
 
Companies selling materials that can 
be used to make IEDs should be 
aware of potentially deceptive buyers 
and systems developed to record who 
buyers are, and why they are buying 
materials. 
 
Requirements for ID when buying 
materials that can potentially be used 
in IEDs – this may act a source of 
verification of who individuals are 
and make them more easily 
identifiable.  
 
CCTV surveillance may also 
improve vulnerability to deception as 
potential deceivers may be identified 
faster. Whether this is surveillance in 
companies selling potentially 
hazardous materials or at locations 
which may be attractive to terrorists. 
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Other Considerations: 
What events, 
occurrences, or 
circumstances might 
increase or decrease 
risk? 
 
 
What else might be 
done to manage risk? 
 
 
 
Chances in domestic and global 
affairs may increase or decrease risk 
depending on actors perceptions of 
the justification of their actions. 
 
Conduct social network analysis to 
identify further actors with extremist 
beliefs which post a threat to UK or 
Allied interests. 
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Appendix 9.4: Detecting Adversaries and Their Intelligence-Gathering Risk Assessment 
Deception Risk Assessment Technique (DRAT)
©2015
 
 
PRESENCE AND RELEVANCE OF RISK FACTORS 
Determine the presence of risk factors to and during the most recent pattern of deceptive behaviour, 
as well as their relevance to the development of future management strategies. 
 
 
Context of Deception 
This section examines the situation in which deception occurs, and how situational elements 
and actors involved leads to deception 
 
Coding 
0 = Absent 
1 = Possibility/Low 
Level Presence 
2 = Clearly Present 
 
C1: Situation 
This factor reflects upon what the current situation is, what has led to this current situation 
occurring at this moment in time, and what are the distinguishable elements from the 
situation which are cause for concern. 
 
Current:  
The current situation reflects on-going adversary intelligence gathering efforts effecting UK 
capabilities and interests, with particular cause for concern regarding the spreading of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0       1      2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0       1      2 
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misinformation and potential for stealing information whether through social engineering or 
insiders and the resultant damage this can cause to UK interests and image. 
 
 
 
C2: Actors 
This factor reflects who the actors are in the current situation:  can we identify these actors 
successfully? Are there multiple actors involved? Who are the key actors? Who, if any, are 
the subsidiary actors? Are the actors involved individuals, groups or larger organisations? 
In in-real-life interactions identifying actors may prove challenging if they seek to conceal 
their identity (e.g. removing military insignia – Ukraine). Online interactions are often 
characterised by anonymity where identifying actors may prove challenging, and discernible 
behavioural patterns may be overgeneralised to the actor involved, creating a potentially 
unreliable profile of the actor. 
 
Current:  
There is potential to identify some of the multiple actors involved through their involvement 
in groups and known organisations, although some actors may have concealed their identity 
and adopted false ones. However, actors may prove more difficult to identify in online 
environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
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C3: Current Threats 
This factor reflects what the current threats of the situation are, whether these threats are 
obvious, concealed or ‘ghost’ threats designed to waste resources, which area the threat/s 
is/are emerging from, and which areas of infrastructure these threats are targeting. 
 
Current:  
Threats may be concealed or obvious/‘ghost’ threats designed to waste friendly resources. 
Threats are emerging from nations seeking to increase their strategic position globally, 
whether this is through financial or military presence and such threats will target 
infrastructure related to politics, security and economic interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
 
 
 
C4: Communication Medium 
This factor reflects the communication medium the deception occurs in. Communication 
mediums include both online and in-real-life domains. Within the in-real-life domain 
communication may be verbal, vocal, non-verbal (focussing on body language) and physical 
acts of deception. Within the online domain communication may be verbal, vocal and non-
verbal (focussing on body language) and physical acts of deception, across an array of 
communication mediums (Instant Messaging, email, blogs, video chats, social media 
networks and deceptive websites). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1      2 
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Current:  
Deception will occur across multiple communication mediums involving verbal, non-verbal 
and physical forms of deception. 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
 
 
C5: Online Communication Characteristics 
This factor reflects the specific characteristics of online communication where interactions 
may range from a user interacting with online content where there is no reciprocal 
communication (e.g. a website, or blog), to interactions where there is reciprocal 
communication (e.g. email, or Twitter). Online communication is characterised by its ability 
to cost-effectively reach large-scale audiences in a shorter period of time than traditional 
communication formats. The anonymity of communicating online may also lead to online 
disinhibition where individuals may be more likely to disclose information that they would 
not do so in-real-life, presenting an area for exploitation by deceivers. 
 
Current:  
Adversary agents may seek to conduct deception through the deliberate uploading of 
misinformation onto online domains, and the potential for social engineering through phone 
and online messaging domains – such techniques may present challenges in detecting deceit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0       1       2 
 
 
 
C6: In-Real-Life Communication Characteristics 
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This factor reflects the specific characteristics of in-real-life communication in interpersonal 
interactions. These interactions can be within informal or formal settings and context will 
affect the characteristics of these interactions. First impressions often guide our 
interpretation of our interactional partner and form our initial judgements of them, we 
further adapt and respond to the interactional partner during conversation and can be 
influence by rapport, and the presentation and confidence of the other person. 
 
Current:  
Adversaries may deliberately seek to uncover information or spread misinformation through 
in-real-life interactions where targets may be easily influenced by a credible persona. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0       1      2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
History 
This section examines previous behaviour and interactions to develop a profile of usual 
adversary behaviour, enabling the identification of non-normal behaviour which may 
indicate deception 
 
Coding 
 
 
H1: Previous Behaviour – Non-Deceptive 
This factor reflects the previous behaviour of the identified adversaries which is not related 
to deception. Identifying key goals that the adversary has achieved without using deception 
enables us to understand the non-deceptive strategies that have been used to achieve these 
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goals. Subsequently developing a baseline of adversary non-deceptive strategic behaviour, 
enabling us to identify deviations in behaviour that may indicate deception; although it is 
important to establish that deviations in behaviour do not have another cause. 
 
Current:  
There has been a large amount of non-deceptive previous behaviour with the adversary 
enabling us to understand how they have achieved key goals without deception in the past. 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
 
 
 
H2: Previous Deceiver Interactions - UK 
This factor reflects the past interactions that the deceiver has had with UK individuals, 
groups, organisations and infrastructure. Identifying and analysing previous known 
successful and unsuccessful deception attempts towards the UK will enable us to develop an 
understanding of how the adversary conducts and deploys deception strategies against the 
UK, enabling us to mitigate the risks of these attempts. 
N.B. The deceiver may not use the same strategy multiple times against the UK 
 
Current:  
The adversary has a history of deceptive interactions with the UK across a long period of 
time and across varying communication modes, enabling a profile of usual adversary 
behaviour to be developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1      2 
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H3: Previous Deceiver Interactions - Others 
This factor reflects the past interactions that the deceiver has had with other individuals, 
groups, organisations and nations which are not related to the UK. Identifying and 
analysing previous known deception attempts, whether successful or unsuccessful, by the 
adversary towards others may enable friendly capabilities to understand how the adversary 
conducts deception and identify key strategies they have previously used. 
N.B. The deceiver may not use the same strategy multiple times across different targets 
 
Current:  
The adversary has a long history of deception towards other nations not linked to the UK 
enabling a profile of these behaviours to be developed, although they may not deploy the 
same strategies with the UK due to contextual factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1      2 
 
 
 
Nature of Deception 
This section reflects the different strategies used to deceive others – For further guidance see 
research by Henderson et al. on Deception Gambits, Vrij (2008), Whaley (2007) 
 
Coding 
 
 
N1: Create and Identify Vulnerability and Exploit 
This factor reflects strategies used in deception which seek to create and/or identify 
vulnerabilities in the target and then exploit these vulnerabilities for gain. Strategies include 
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the following: 
- Ruses – This item reflects the intentional exposure of information to the target with 
the intention of misdirecting them, enabling the deceiver to exploit the adversary 
whilst their attention is directed towards the ruse (e.g. feeding misinformation to 
double-agents). Ruses can be conducted by the adversary across multiple levels of 
communication, whether through in-real-life interactions, through print media, TV, 
digital media, and other forms of online communication, potentially opening up a 
wide area for this deception to occur in and requiring a wide-range of resources to 
target this threat. 
 
- Exploitation of target audience fears – This item reflects the deceiver deliberately 
identifying and targeting target audience fears through deception, meaning the target 
will be more likely to spend resources responding to this perceived threat, whilst the 
deceiver then exploits another area. 
 
- Exploitation of target audience hopes – This item reflects the adversary targeting 
audience and exploiting their hopes as part of their deception operation (e.g. attack 
when claiming peace). 
 
- Decoys – This item reflects how a deceiver may use a decoy to portray a false target, 
which the deceiver wants the receiver to believe as credible before they then attack 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1      2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
 
Relevance: Current 
 0        1       2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1      2 
 
Relevance: Current 
0        1      2 
 
Presence: Current 
0        1       2 
Relevance: Current 
0        1       2 
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or respond to the dummy, wasting friendly resources and enabling exploitation by the 
deceiver. 
 
 
- Feints – This item reflects mock attack or simulation of an attack by an adversary 
which seeks to create the appearance of an imminent attack, thus tying down friendly 
resources to countering the implied threat, whilst the adversary may actually perform 
other behaviour. 
 
- Demonstrations – This item reflects a real attack by the adversary which seeks to tie 
down friendly capabilities in active engagement in one situation whilst other 
adversary capabilities exploit the target in other areas. This strategy may prove 
costly to adversary resources as well as demonstrations in physical combat often 
increase number of casualties, however, this may be affect by adversary beliefs (e.g. 
if a soldier dies in combat he becomes a martyr and goes to heaven). 
 
 Current:  
Deception will seek to exploit target audience hopes and fears, and ruses in particular will be 
used to feed misinformation to the target to direct their attention and resources to one area 
whilst the deceiver exploits another. 
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N2: Conditioning the Target 
This risk factor reflects strategies which involve conditioning the target into expecting a 
specific behavioural pattern by the deceiver. 
- Conditioning – This item reflects the deceiver conditioning the adversary into 
expecting a certain pattern of behaviour over the course of a period time, which then 
leaves the target open to exploitation when the deceiver performs a different 
behaviour (e.g. Soviet-Czechoslovakia Campaign 1968 and the Yom Kippur War 
1973). 
 
- Drip-Drip-Feed – Through slowly releasing information to a target, target resources 
may become focussed on this information, particularly if the adversary feeds truthful 
information to the target to build trust, before the adversary then presents the target 
with false information they have worked hard to uncover leading to a less accurate 
assessment of that information and leaving the target more vulnerable to deception. 
 
- Influence increase over time – This item reflects how we are more likely to find an 
individual credible if we are interacting and developing trust with them over a period 
of time before they then engage in deception. 
 
Current:  
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Adversary actors will seek to deceive the target over a period of time through conditioning 
the target to expect certain behaviour whilst feeding the target information over a period of 
time before false information is given to the target. The target will be further influenced by 
the deceiver as trust develops over a period of time enabling the deceiver to appear more 
credible than they actually are. 
 
 
N3: Impression Management 
This risk factor reflects the strategies that individuals engage in order to convince others 
that they are telling the truth. Individuals may engage in controlling their verbal behaviour 
(e.g. through keeping statements short to avoid contradictions) and their non-verbal 
behaviour (e.g. reducing body movements to avoid appearances of nervousness). Impression 
management occurs both in-real-life and online domains. 
 
Current:  
Adversary actors will engage in verbal and non-verbal impression management across in-
real-life and online interactions with others, and covert actors in particular will be highly 
skilled at such behaviour. 
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This risk factor reflects how information is controlled by the deceiver, where the deceiver 
may increase or decrease or alter the amount of information the target receives to increase 
ambiguity and cognitive load in the target. Strategies include the following:  
- Increase Information - An increase in information (also known as white-out) by the 
deceiver reduces the amount of resources the target needs to accurately assess 
information increasing the risk of not identifying key threats.  
 
- Decrease Information - A decrease in information (also known as black-out) by the 
deceiver the amount of resources the target needs to accurately assess information 
with risk increased through an inability to identify threats. 
 
 
- Deflection – Through deflecting the target towards information and details irrelevant 
to the deception operation the adversary increases the amount of resources the target 
requires to monitor threats, whilst distracting the target from the adversary’s real 
intentions. 
 
 
- Blocking – Through blocking the target’s ability to assess information there is an 
increase in ambiguity about the adversary’s actual aims. 
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- Feigning forgetfulness – Through feigning forgetfulness the deceiver reduces the 
target’s ability to uncover information in in-real-life and online encounters reducing 
the target’s ability to detect deception and increasing ambiguity about reality. 
 
- Kernel of Truth – This item refers to the principle of developing deception operations 
around truthful information creating ambiguity for the target to accurately separate 
fact from fiction. 
 
 
- What is not being said – This item reflects examining what the current information 
does not show, as the deceiver may be stating one thing however their past history 
may indicate they mean something else. 
 
- Keep the Message Simple – This item reflects a common strategy amongst deceivers 
of keeping the deceptive message simple, which is harder to examine for 
inconsistencies. 
 
 
- Concealment/Camouflage – This item reflects the controlling of information through 
reducing the target’s access to that information through concealing or camouflaging 
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the information, whether this is an in-real-life encounter in combat operations or 
assessing online material for concealed messages. 
 
 
- Dazzle – This item reflects a strategy where the deceiver increases ambiguity in the 
target by overloading their cognitive abilities or sensors with unimportant 
information or noise. 
 
- Distractors – This item reflects a strategy where the deceiver uses distraction 
methods to divert the target’s attention away from the deception at hand. This can 
include the deliberate targeting of emotionally salient issues which will focus the 
target’s attention. 
 
Current:  
 Adversary may engage in a range of techniques in controlling information to deceive others 
and the relevance of tactics will affect the context. Adversaries may decrease, deflect and 
block the target from information whilst basing information they choose to reveal around 
partial truth and keeping any narratives simple to avoid inconsistencies. 
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This risk factor reflects tactics that the deceiver may use to enhance their own credibility 
and/or the credibility of the information that they are employing to deceive the target. These 
strategies include: 
- Fluency – Through ensuring fluency in behaviour the adversary may appear more 
credible to the target as their no inconsistencies that may indicate deception. 
 
 
- Positivity – This item reflects that when a deceiver is positive in their behaviour, 
particularly verbal behaviour, they are more likely to be judged as credible by their 
target. 
 
 
 
- Objectivity – This item reflects that when an individual or organisation shows 
objectivity and appears neutral in their behaviour they will be more likely viewed as 
credible by the target, the adversary will then be able to exploit the target. 
 
- Commitment – This item reflects how an individual or organisation is viewed as 
credible if they are committed to their behaviour. Particularly in verbal behaviour if 
they are committed in their statement or information they provide and do not appear 
tentative or hesitant they will be more likely to be viewed as credible, even if this 
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information is false. 
 
 
- Convincing – This item reflects how individuals are more likely to believe an 
individual if they are perceived as appearing convincing, opening up the potential for 
exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
 
- Emphasise to influence – This item reflects how deceivers are likely to place 
emphasis on key points to influence how the target perceives information. Through 
placing consistent emphasis on particular aspects of behaviour there is a greater 
chance that the target will focus on these areas enabling exploitation of other areas 
by the adversary. 
 
 
- Too good to be true – This item reflects how deceivers may frame information in a 
manner that the target finds hard to believe, increasing ambiguity for the target and 
requiring further resources to assess credibility. 
 
 
- Showing the real as false – This item reflects how the adversary may show the target 
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real information (whether physical or verbal) to add credibility to false information it 
is hiding, drawing the target’s attention away from other information (e.g. Operation 
Bagration where Soviet forces used real combat planes and aircraft guns to protect 
dummy equipment drawing the attention of German forces, whilst concealing their 
true invasion plans). 
 
 
- Subtlety – This item reflects how the subtle presentation of information may 
manipulate the target into believing information that is false, or to focussing the 
target towards irrelevant information. 
 
 
- Mimicry – This item reflects how mimicry aims to make one thing appear as 
something else, this exploiting the target’s erroneous belief. Mimicry can take many 
forms across the physical, verbal, non-verbal and online domains. 
 
 
- Dummies – This item reflects objects that are used as false representations of reality 
which seek to affect how the target interprets information and constructs reality. 
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Adversary actors will engage in a number of tactics to appear credible to others including 
fluency, positivity, objectivity, subtlety, committed and convincing in their interactions with 
others, whilst offering real information to the target to make false information seem credible. 
Actors may also choose to emphasise certain areas of information to direct target attention 
away from other areas and will also need to mimic behavioural norms to appear credible to 
the target. 
 
 
N6: Social Influencers 
This risk factor reflects strategies from social influence approaches which are likely to 
influence the target into accepting the deceiver and/or information as credible. Social 
influence strategies include: 
- Higher Authority – Through appealing to a higher authority (e.g. God) a deceiver 
may enhance their credibility to others. This strategy will be more relevant to in-real-
life and online communication. Malign appeals to higher authority can be used as 
permission giving strategies for justification of action. 
 
 
- Authority – This item reflects the fact that figures of authority are judged more 
persuasive and credible by others, potentially increasing the susceptibility to 
deception from perceived authority figures. 
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- Referent Power – This item reflects the fact that individuals may be more likely to 
accept information that has been presented to them by another person they deem 
credible. 
 
 
- Attractive – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to find credible people 
that are attractive. 
 
 
- Reciprocation – This item reflects that individuals are likely to be influenced when 
they have been given something, as they then want to give something in return, which 
may leave the target open to exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
 
- Social Proof – This item reflects how we deem information correct through how 
others also judge that information. 
 
 
- Scarcity – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
information that is scarce – potentially as we have had to deploy greater resources to 
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uncover this information. 
 
 
- Humour – This item reflects that individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
information that they may find funny. Individuals may use self-denigration or 
denigration by others as humour to achieve a tactical or strategic advantage. 
 
Current:  
Adversary actors have the potential to use a variety of influence tactics to appear credible to 
others including referent power, being attractive, reciprocating behaviour, social proof and 
presenting scarce information to the target. 
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D1: Deception Doctrine 
This risk factor reflects the adversary’s deception doctrine, including official and unofficial 
manuals. Does the adversary have deception as part of their military and intelligence 
doctrine? Under what conditions does the adversary doctrine allow deception to be 
conducted?  
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This risk factor is focussed towards identifiable groups and organisations that have 
guidelines for deception operations, individuals and non-state actors may not have cohesive 
guidelines for using deception, or they may conduct deception tactically rather than 
strategically, therefore, further monitoring of any suspicious activity is required. 
 
Current:  
The adversary has widespread deception doctrine for a large range of contexts and deception 
is often used in interactions with other nations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D2: Gains Vs Losses 
This risk factor reflects the stakes of the situation for the deceiver and what they may have to 
gain through deception or lose if they are caught in their deceit. The possibility of deception 
may be correlated between the levels of gains versus the level of benefits, for example, if 
there is potential for large gains and low costs then deception should be anticipated, whilst if 
there is potential for low gains and high costs then the adversary may not conduct deception. 
However, this may be mitigated by how the adversary portrays the gains and costs involved 
and what is deemed excessive. 
 
Current:  
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There are large gains for adversary actors through planting misinformation as it may direct 
the target’s attention and resources away from other areas which the adversary may then 
exploit. 
 
 
D3: Motivation 
This risk factor reflects how motivated the deceiver is to convince others that they are 
credible. Motivation may affect a deceiver’s behaviour in the selection of strategies and 
length of time spent planning an act of deception. Motivation has also been found to increase 
the success of deception in online environments, where it is often challenging to assess the 
credibility of information. 
 
Current: 
Actors will be highly motivated to convince others that they and the information they present 
is credible and this will reflect their selection of deception strategies as they seek to use the 
ones they perceive as most effective to deceive others across multiple channels. 
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how credible and convincing the deceiver can be to the target across different 
communication modes. The deceiver’s capabilities, resources and experience will affect their 
ability to utilise different communication modes and the strategies they use to target and 
appear credible to others. 
 
Current:  
Adversaries have a large range of collective, resources and experience in conducting 
intelligence gathering and deception operations against the UK and this may be reflected at 
an individual level in selected experienced or extensively trained operatives as intelligence 
gatherers. 
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D5: Deception Spontaneity → Planned 
This factor reflects how the deception is constructed, whether the deception is spontaneous 
or planned and how far along this continuum the deception may be. Spontaneous deception 
may have different characteristics and associated behaviours to planned and rehearsed acts 
of deception. 
 
Current:  
The deception will be planned so that adversary actors conceal their intelligence gathering 
activities and carefully construct misinformation to be used to influence others. However, it 
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should be anticipated that spontaneous deception will occur according to the contexts that 
actors find themselves in and what rules there are governing their use of deception. 
 
 
D6: Cognitive Performance 
This risk factor reflects the deceiver’s ability to engage in cognitively challenging 
behaviours. Deception is argued to be a cognitively demanding task where individual’s need 
to construct a plausible deception and maintain their account whilst controlling their own 
behaviour and responding to interactions with the target. If the deceiver is not able to 
engage in multiple demanding cognitive tasks, behavioural cues to deception may become 
apparent to observers. 
 
Current:  
Actors will have strong cognitive performance ability and may have been selected for such 
operations due to abilities to present a credible appearance whilst deceiving others. 
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This risk factor reflects the language which the deceiver uses to communicate in. Language 
differences may present additional challenges to receivers of information through 
mistranslation or misunderstanding of challenging information, and proceeding difficulties 
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of interviewing individuals to enhance behavioural cues to deception in interactions. 
 
Current:  
Actors conducting intelligence gathering and misinformation campaigns within the UK will 
have strong language skills which will enable them to appear more convincing to others. 
Language difficulties in interviews may only emerge if actors are apprehended and present 
challenging behaviour during subsequent interviewing. 
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D8: Personality and Individual Differences 
This risk factor reflects the effects that personality (normative Vs disordered – the Dark 
Tetrad of psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, and sadism) and individual 
differences (including demographics) have on an individual’s actions in online and real-life 
environments, the forms of deception in which they may choose to engage in, and their 
ability to deceive others. 
- Normal Personality 
 
The Dark Tetrad consists of the following personalities all of which will present additional 
challenges when seeking to assess credibility. 
- Psychopathy is characterised by individuals who lack conscience, are often deceptive 
and impulsive in their behaviours without regarding the consequences of their 
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actions 
 
 
- Narcissism is characterised by individuals who seek importance and wish to be 
viewed this way by others 
 
 
- Machiavellianism is characterised by individuals who constantly seek to manipulate 
you for their own gain 
 
 
- Sadism is characterised by individuals who seek to physically or verbally hurt for 
their own gain 
 
Current:  
Actors will mainly have normal personality types, however, some actors may have 
Machiavellian tendencies and enjoy deceiving others with little thought of the consequences 
of such actions.  Impulsive behaviour may not common amongst actors as they may have 
unintended consequences effecting their strategic aims. 
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D9: Belief System 
This risk factor reflects an individual’s or group’s belief system including their culture, 
religion and their political beliefs and allegiances with others. The deceiver’s belief system 
will influence how they interpret the world, their interactions with others and will shape the 
motive and context from which deception emerges. 
 
Current:  
Actors belief system will shape their behaviour in concealing information-gathering and 
misinformation campaigns. Use of deception is widely accepted within the cultural belief 
system highlighting the ease with which actors may use this as a solution to any issues they 
face. 
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Target Vulnerability Factors 
 
Coding 
 
 
T1: Who is the target? 
This vulnerability factor reflects identifying who the target is – whether the target is an 
individual, group, or organisation and whether the target is a decision-maker or the general 
public. 
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Current:  
The target is the UK general public, individuals related to adversary intelligence-gathering 
aims and decision-makers within UK organisations.  
 
 
T2: Stakes 
This vulnerability factor reflects the perceived stakes that the target may have in accurately 
assessing the credibility of information. If the perceived stakes of deception are high this 
may increase the cognitive load in individual’s assigned to assessing credibility and reduce 
their decision-making abilities. 
 
Current:  
In detecting adversary intelligence-gathering and misinformation there are important stakes 
in identifying and protecting areas of exploitation, although this may not impair judgement 
and decision-making. 
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T3: Motivation 
This vulnerability factor reflects how motivated the target is to detect deception. The 
motivation impairment effect suggests that when individuals are highly motivated to detect 
deception their ability to accurately detect deception decreases as they rely upon incorrect 
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decision-making strategies. To overcome this impairment effect it is recommended that 
practitioners discuss their findings with others to re-evaluate their judgements. 
 
Current:  
The target will be motivated to detect deception, however, any impair in judgement will be 
mitigated by training analysts to focus on validated cues to deception. 
 
0        1       2 
 
 
T4: Target Characteristics 
This vulnerability factor reflects the culture, individual differences and personality of the 
target, and how these may affect the target’s ability to analyse and assess the credibility of 
information and intelligence. 
 
Current:  
Adversary misinformation may be found more plausible by lay individuals who are more 
likely to trust others or lack knowledge of how deception appears credible in some 
communication channels, although analysts seeking to detect adversaries may be more aware 
of such biases in information interpretation. 
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This vulnerability factor reflects the cognitive state of the individual or group who are tasked 
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with assessing veracity. As some deception and influence tactics are designed to affect 
cognitive performance, whether through inundating the target with information increasing 
cognitive load and reducing ability to accurately assess multiple sources of information, 
through reducing information leading to individuals and groups requiring more sources to 
uncover information, or deliberately diverting the target’s perception towards other 
information concealing any deception, highlighting the need for the target to be aware that 
deception strategies will seek to manipulate target expectation and cognition and reduce 
available resources towards analysing information. 
 
Current:  
Actors will seek to conceal their information-gathering activities through a combination of 
denying information to the target and directing their attention to other areas of concern. 
Misinformation will seek to influence the general public who may not be as aware of such 
attempts at influence, whilst target analysts will require greater resources to uncover attempts 
at misinformation and misdirection. 
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T6: Mindset - Affect 
This vulnerability factor reflects the affective state of the individual or group who are tasked 
with assessing veracity. As some influence tactics are designed to affect the emotional state 
of the target to enhance their attempts at deceit, an understanding of our affective state is 
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important when analysing deception. 
 
Current:  
Attempts at misdirection and misinformation by the adversary will seek to exploit the 
emotional state of the target and this may be particularly effective with deceiving the general 
public but may be more easily identified by analysts. 
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T7:  Capabilities – Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) 
This vulnerability factor reflects the targets own capabilities and how they will affect the 
ability to detect deception. Preparation for and experience of past adversary deception 
alongside deployment of ISTAR capabilities will enable the gathering of information for 
credibility assessment. The greater the number of friendly capabilities in ISTAR the more 
information may be uncovered for subsequent analysis. 
 
Current:  
There are a large number of analysis and surveillance techniques open to friendly analysts in 
uncovering adversary intelligence-gathering and misinformation and these should be 
regularly monitored for deception. However, the general public may not have these 
techniques or knowledge available and be influenced by adversary misinformation. 
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Risk Scenarios and Management Strategies 
The following tables identify the scenarios of future deception acts.  The scenarios are summarised below: 
 
RISK SCENARIOS 
Identify and describe the most plausible scenarios of future deception 
 
 Scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2 
 
Scenario #3 
 
Nature: 
Who are the likely 
targets of the 
deception? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What kind of 
deception is likely to 
be committed? 
Concealment of intelligence-
gathering will be targeted towards 
intelligence analysts and decision-
makers. 
 
Misinformation will target the 
general public, intelligence agencies 
and decision-makers. 
 
 
The deceiver is likely to conceal their 
activities and identity, whilst 
portraying a credible persona and 
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What kind of strategy 
will the deceiver 
deploy to influence 
the target? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
using misinformation to divert the 
target’s attention and resources. 
 
The deceiver will seek to exploit 
audience hopes and fears, whilst 
using ruses to feed misinformation to 
the target to divert attention before 
exploiting another area. 
 
The target will be conditioned before 
preventing them with false 
information and this will be further 
effected by the development of trust 
and rapport by the target towards the 
deceiver. 
 
Actors will engage in verbal and non-
verbal impression management to 
portray a credible persona to others. 
 
A variety of tactics will be used to 
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control information including 
decreasing available information, and 
deflecting and blocking attempts to 
uncover intelligence-gathering 
activities. Information portrayed to 
others will be based around partial 
truths and have a simple narrative to 
avoid inconsistencies. 
 
The adversary will need to appear 
fluent, positive, objective, subtle, 
committed and convincing when 
interacting with others. They may 
also offer real information to make 
false information seem more 
credible, emphasise some areas to 
divert attention from others and 
mimic behavioural norms to appear 
credible. 
 
Adversaries may influence others 
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What is the likely 
motive – that is, what 
is the deceiver trying 
to accomplish? 
 
through referent power, 
attractiveness, reciprocating 
behaviour with the target, social 
proof and presenting scare 
information to others. 
 
The deceiver is seeking to conceal 
their intelligence-gathering activities 
from others whilst also taking 
available opportunities to spread 
misinformation to the target. 
Severity: 
What would be the 
impact or harm to the 
target of the deceit? 
 
 
What would be the 
physical harm to the 
target of the deceit?  
 
 
If the adversary is undetected then 
they may be able to gain information 
on new technologies, sensitive 
information and cause economic 
harm. 
 
The target may waste resources and 
finances developing technology that 
the adversary is now aware of, and 
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Is there a chance that 
the deception could 
proliferate across 
multiple mediums and 
sources? 
 
there is potential for security 
implications if the adversary is able 
to uncover sensitive information. 
 
 
There is a chance that the deception 
could proliferate across multiple 
mediums and sources and this will 
reflect adversary attempts to develop 
credible persona and the spread of 
misinformation may occur in both in-
real-life and online environments. 
 
Imminence: 
How soon might the 
deception occur? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This deception is potentially already 
occurring. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 423 
 
Are there any 
warning signs that 
might signal that the 
risk is increasing or 
imminent? 
 
Actors may be identified as building 
contacts with areas of key interest –
which may indicate target selection 
for intelligence-gathering. 
Frequency / Duration 
Severity: 
How often might the 
deception occur – 
once, several times, 
frequency? 
 
 
 
 
Is the risk chronic or 
acute (i.e., time 
limited)? 
 
 
 
 
This deception will be on-going and 
may only stop once actors have been 
identified and expelled from the UK, 
however, there may be actors not 
identified. 
 
 
 
The risk should be considered 
chronic as it reflects long-term 
adversary strategy. 
 
Times of acute risk may emerge 
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during international conflicts and 
such risks will reflect contexts. 
Likelihood: 
In general, how 
frequent or common 
is this type of 
deception? 
 
 
Based on the 
deceiver’s history, 
how likely is it that 
this type of deception 
will occur? 
 
 
Adversary concealment of 
intelligence-gathering is a frequent 
behaviour – and misinformation may 
often be used to divert attention away 
from other strategic aims. 
 
The deceiver’s history and culture 
highlight frequent use of deception as 
part of policy and in working towards 
strategic aims, suggesting it is highly 
likely this type of deception will 
occur. 
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RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
Recommend strategies for managing deception risk (C/F Henderson & Pascual (2008); JDP 3-80.1 - DCDC (2007)) 
 
 Scenario #1 
 
Scenario #2 
 
Scenario #3 
 
Monitoring: 
What is the best way 
to monitor warning 
signs that the risks 
posed by the deceiver 
may be increasing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What events, 
occurrences, or 
 
If the adversary is attempting to build 
up relationships with companies with 
links to the UK it may suggest that 
adversary intelligence-gathering is 
about to start or is already underway. 
 
If the adversary nation becomes 
involved in conflict then there will be 
more risk from misinformation or 
even outright deception towards the 
UK general public and decision-
makers. 
 
Re-assessment of risk should be 
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circumstances should 
trigger a re-
assessment of risk? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conducted if the adversary nation has 
sudden changes in its foreign affairs, 
especially if the nation becomes 
involved in a conflict. 
 
If there is a large increase in the 
number if identified adversary actors 
operating in the UK then a re-
assessment of risk will be required to 
identify their motives and reasons for 
their presence. 
Supervision: 
What surveillance 
strategies could be 
implemented to 
manage the risk 
posed? 
 
 
 
 
 
Key industries that might be targeted 
by adversary information-gathering 
should be monitored to detect any 
attempt at exploitation. 
 
Identified actors should be made 
subjects of surveillance to monitor 
who they are interacting with, to 
identify potentially further adversary 
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What restrictions on 
activity, movement, 
association, or 
communication are 
indicated? 
 
 
 
 
actors. 
 
 
Only if serious threat is posed by 
identified adversary actors then they 
should have their movement’s 
restricted – if the threat they pose is 
not large then they should be 
monitored to identify further actors 
and this will also enable them to be 
fed with misinformation to send back 
to the adversary. 
Target Inoculation 
Planning: 
What steps could be 
taken to enhance the 
protection of potential 
targets? 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies need to be sure that 
individuals approaching their 
business are verified across a range 
of sources to ensure that they are 
credible – particularly if these 
companies are working in areas of 
technological development and/or 
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How might the 
targets’ security or 
vulnerability to 
deception be 
improved? 
 
have links to government agencies or 
interests. 
 
 
 
Informing such companies of the 
potential for deception to occur – 
companies are already aware of the 
potential for cyber-attacks however 
cognitive hacking needs to be 
addressed in companies security 
policies. 
 
Other Considerations: 
What events, 
occurrences, or 
circumstances might 
increase or decrease 
risk? 
 
 
 
Changes in international affairs may 
increase or decrease risk – if the 
adversary’s nation is involved in 
conflict they may deploy 
misinformation strategies or seek to 
direct the target’s attention towards 
other areas. 
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What else might be 
done to manage risk? 
 
 
 
Use counter-intelligence assets to 
feed misinformation to adversaries in 
their intelligence-gathering, which 
will enable the adversary to then 
develop an incorrect profile affecting 
their strategy. 
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